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This thesis sets out to critically reposition contemporary figurative sculpture 
through a re- articulation of the hero.  
 
It starts by identifying the removal of the human figure in minimal art and with 
notions of objectivity, repetition and indifference. Here I argue against Donald 
Judd, Robert Morris and Rosalind E. Krauss, by claiming that there is a 
necessity to reflect upon the sculptural object and the subject beyond that which 
is produced by the principles outlined by these artists and critics.  
 
Working through readings of Judith Butler, Alain Badiou, Hannah Arendt, 
Bernard Stiegler, Jacques Lacan and others, the argument establishes the 
contingency and polemics of the term hero, the way it pertains to the 
introduction of the new and how it coalesces action and narrative with constant 
negotiation. Using the philosophy of Richard Rorty as a scaffold, I propose in 
turn that the hero constitutes a necessary idealism for improving vocabularies, 
and along with Bruno Latour’s position on composition, that this can be 
translated into figurative sculpture as a dialectical becoming-object.  
 
Additionally, the problem of knowing what constitutes a subject of heroism is 
associated with the formation of an ethical subject. I conclude, in contrast to 
Simon Critchley and Jacques Derrida, that this subject can be articulated using 
the hero strategically as a conceit. I also suggest that, as such, it can be 
realized through the work of figurative sculpture and the agonist space it 
produces.  
 
Alongside this, the thesis rethinks the materiality associated with figuration in 
terms of construction, and elaborates on the importance of the hero to the post-
mannequin condition of figurative sculpture based on how it combines invention 
with political determination. This is further examined by looking at the work of 
Isa Genzken, Rachel Harrison and Mark Manders, and especially at the 
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This thesis explores the ‘idea’ of the human form in sculpture after the 
conceptual frame of Minimalism. It consists of two elements, one practical, 
which is documented at the end of the volume; the other written, which is 
introduced here. In fact, the problem the text endeavours to solve is one to be 
found at the intersection between these two modes, that is: the problem of 
knowing how to reclaim and reposition the project of sculptural figuration from a 
theoretical point of view. Starting from the premise that there is a tendency not 
to recognize in the numerous polemics of figurative sculpture its critical 
potential, the aim is to show that a connection can be established between 
figurative sculpture and politics through a rearticulated notion of the hero.  
 
This proposal is concerned with two main factors. Firstly, it refers to the 
necessity to find an alternative to the conceptual markers that are still in use by 
the history of contemporary art to think about sculpture. Rosalind E. Krauss’s 
Sculpture in the Expanded Field or Thomas McEvilley’s Sculpture in the Age of 
Doubt, for example, are important texts in studies of post-modern sculpture but 
not appropriate sources for a positive reconsideration of figurative sculpture 
because respectively, they exclude figuration and view it in terms of irony. 
Secondly, the proposal also acknowledges the necessity to work with a concept 
that allows us to separate the theme of representation from repetition and 
mimesis and to replace these with difference and invention. The claim is that the 
notion of the hero meets these two criteria whilst opening into a process of 
reimagining the contemporary subject through the medium of sculpture. In other 
words, the task is less concerned with the specificity of contemporary figurative 
sculpture – in reality there is not a lot that is said about figurative sculpture in 
isolation, but rather to discuss how figuration in sculpture challenges the mode 
through which we might understand the construction of subjectivity.   
 
Hence, in parallel to reading some classic texts on Minimalism, which are 
important to understand the evacuation of the figure by the latter, the thesis 
brings together different references from philosophy, literature and sociology to 
discuss the possibilities of figurative sculpture beyond the scope of the art field. 
Amongst these, the main theoretical reference is the writing of Richard Rorty, 
who I would claim is a ghost in the machine. Not always in an explicit way, his 
discussions on objectivity have made it possible to see representation 
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separately from truth claims and prepare from the perspective of utility, a 
reflection on how the combination of figurative sculpture and the hero might 
function as a form for articulating the political subject. In this instance I read 
mostly from Rorty’s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity and Objectivity, 
Relativism and Truth. The other major reference is Bruno Latour whose object-
oriented sociology, again not always in an obvious way, helped to provide an 
understanding of such utility in political terms. The main sources from Latour 
include his seminal work We Have Never Been Modern, Reassembling the 
Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, and the essay “An Attempt at a 
‘Compositionist Manifesto”.   
 
More a path than a model, the argument is divided into four distinct moments 
corresponding to four semi-independent chapters, which work linearly between 
themselves and thematically in alternate pairs. The first and third chapters deal 
more directly with questions related to sculpture, while the second and fourth 
focus more on the theme of the hero.   
 
In the first chapter I have attempted to trace the discrediting of figurative 
sculpture in Minimalism and understand therein the possibilities to reverse the 
negative reading of the first by setting up a critique of the latter. Here I examine 
Krauss’s minimalist reading of modern sculpture together with Robert Morris’s 
and Donald Judd’s art works and writings, proposing to use the framework of 
Rorty’s neo-pragmatism in order to discuss the limitations of objectivity and the 
staging of the body in Minimalism. In short, the first chapter attempts to 
understand the reasons behind the evacuation of the human figure through 
Minimalism’s claim to facticity and argues that this is limiting for the task of 
reimagining the contemporary subject.  
 
The figure of the hero is discussed immediately after in the second chapter with 
the use of philosophical and literary examples. This chapter begins with Judith 
Butler’s reading of Sophocles’s Antigone and the idea of forming/deforming 
political subjectivities. It continues with a dialogue between Simon Critchley and 
Alain Badiou on political disappointment and the politics of resistance, which is 
used to set up a connection between the hero, positive dialectics and the 
necessity to think about a new political subject. Furthermore, the chapter also 
locates the notion of the hero in Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition and 
establishes a link between heroism and the occurrence of the new, action, 
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speech and public life. Bernard Stiegler's take on the question of technique is 
discussed afterwards, which makes it possible to associate the hero with what 
he presents as the mutual process of psychological and social individuation. 
Naturally coming to the surface at this stage, Rorty allows us to see the hero as 
a strategy to improve vocabularies, or as I describe it, to create an idealism of 
necessity whose value resides in the subject’s potential for reimagining 
contemporary forms of living. From there, the text investigates Lacan’s seventh 
seminar titled, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis to sketch out a few ideas on why 
such idealism requires a form of sublimation and why this can be met by the 
figure of the hero. The chapter concludes with a study offered by Angela Hobbs, 
who suggests that Plato tries to replace a Homeric ideal for the Socratic subject 
by discussing the theme of courage and heroism. Here I explore the importance 
of notions of heroism in the task of reorganizing politics and subjectivities.  
 
If in the second chapter the text works through the subject of writing in relation 
to the hero, then in the third chapter the argument returns to the subject of 
sculpture. Based on the idea that sculpture cannot be an index of what it 
represents, the text intimates that figurative sculpture can be seen as a way to 
compose, or indeed to invent, a public and politicized selfhood. This is observed 
in relation to classical Greek sculpture, which furthermore helps me to establish 
how the medium of figurative sculpture lends itself to the heroic. Meanwhile, I 
also acknowledge the limitations of using classical Greek sculpture for a 
contemporary take on the figure. This is done along Jacques Rancière’s reading 
of Johann Winckelmann’s commentary on The Belvedere Torso where the need 
to consider the fragment, the multiple and the potential in sculpture comes to the 
fore. The argument that I develop next is that the notion of hero can be used as 
the conceptual tenet for a methodology of composition. The aim of this step is to 
establish that, as such, composition can include the fragment, the multiple and 
the potential alongside a priority to answer to reality, as opposed to correspond 
to reality, and a necessity to actualize procedures of composition depending on 
the specifics of each situation.  
 
I found Latour’s take on composition and his notion of assemblage, with its 
focus on interactions, useful when discussing contemporary sculpture and in 
particular, the nature of installation found when encountering Rachel Harrison’s 
practice. The chapter covers Harrison’s work in order to debate how the human 
figure cancels out the abstraction produced by ‘object orientated’ art works that 
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seem to deliberately push the viewer aside. Debated in relation to Isa Genzken’s 
work, it is also suggested that there is a need to rethink the condition of 
figurative sculpture after the mannequin and that the hero as a conceit of 
representation helps in this process. The work of Mark Manders and the way it 
combines the ready-made with modelled figures to form heterogeneous bodies 
is advanced as an innovating alternative.  
 
In the place of a conclusion, the thesis finishes with a fourth and final chapter 
where the attention turns once again to the hero. This is a logical move but also 
a result of a series of events that took place during the time of research leading 
up to this text. In 2008, when the project commenced, the effects of the 
economic recession were yet to hit Europe and the political scenario was 
relatively calm. The concept of the hero was not easy to work with but the 
difficulties had more to do with a negative acculturation of the term and with the 
necessity to find ways of reversing the threat of anachronism. All of a sudden, 
from economical meltdown and politics of austerity to the reawakening of 
protest, all things changed. On the one hand, ideas surround the subject of the 
hero seemed increasingly more in tune with the political nature of the events 
that were taking place everywhere, on the other of this, one was left feeling 
incapable of keeping up to speed with what was happening and with the 
profound changes that were being introduced in the socio-political context, and 
more importantly, with how these constantly brought into question any short-
lived certainties surrounding notions of heroism. What happened between 2008 
and 2014 affected the project profoundly and made me repeatedly question the 
direction of the ideas as it became more urgent to understand the real 
implications of thinking through the subject of the hero and to make it clearer 
what contemporary figurative sculpture might offer in today’s world.  
 
The lesson of what happened during these years to this research project, as it 
was happening, was that the notion of hero can only be found in a constant 
dialogue with reality, which in turn made it clear that the project itself had to 
address, in some form at least, what took place during the eventful years of its 
making. I have to add that any reading of the impact these years had for the 
practical element of this thesis can be found the section containing visual 
documentation of my studio work. Although I might add that while it may not 
seem obvious, it is there. In the written element, I have tried to put the argument 
in relation to the spirit of the moment by reading from Simon Critchley’s Ethics 
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and Infinite Demanding – Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance, where 
Critchley is very precise in the way he diagnoses the feeling of political 
disappointment at the heart of western democracies and in the way he 
demonstrates how it is possible to conceive an ethical experience through 
collective, anti-heroic, humour-based forms of resistance.  
 
That being said, the chapter offers an alternative view to that of Critchley, and in 
a way to that of Derrida in The Politics of Friendship, which Critchley draws 
from, to then reason that the idea of the hero opens into a form of sublimation 
that, unlike the anti-hero, allows for a positive articulation of an ethico-political 
subject beyond the duration of a sensible experience, proposing in addition, that 
we can associate figurative sculpture with the presentability of such subject. In 
other words, the thesis concludes by arguing that it is possible and productive to 
imagine a subject-to-come through the hero and that sculpture can operate as 
the mode of appearance of such a subject.   
 
Lastly, I need to make two remarks concerning the methodology of the essay. 
Firstly, the essay constitutes an attempt, made by a sculptor, to contextualize 
sculptural figuration in relation to the field of contemporary art that assumes the 
form of a speculation about its implications and possibilities for what is beyond 
the artistic. However, its aim is not to produce new knowledge on a particular 
author from the perspective of art, nor inversely, to verify in what way specific 
theoretical positions or concepts can bring new light to artworks. Instead, what I 
have attempted to do is define a framework for the accountability of procedures 
inherent to the work of figuration in sculpture. Finally, concerning the use of 
footnotes: these will be used in the conventional way, i.e. to indicate 
bibliographic references and disambiguate any necessary issue, but also where 
appropriate, to make observations relevant for the main text that may not find 














This chapter examines some key developments introduced in art during the 
1960s and 1970s via Rosalind E. Krauss’s minimalist reading of modern 
sculpture, and Robert Morris’s and Donald Judd’s art works and critical writings.  
Their positions, which are often contrasting, will help me to elaborate questions 
that are central to the argument. Running further behind the scenes is Alex 
Potts’s more recent history of sculpture, which was focal in developing an 
understanding of Minimalism in relation to the history of figurative sculpture, and 
Richard Rorty, whose influence forms the basis for a discussion on the 
limitations of objectivity in Minimalism.  
 
The argument is set up by a brief account of key aspects of minimal art followed 
by a discussion of the relationship of this to what I will call a correspondence 
theory of knowledge which will be used as a platform to answer questions of 
objectivity, repetition and indifference. The chapter concludes by analysing the 
limitations of Minimalism in recent artwork recreations.  
 
The term Minimalism is used in its (controversial) general sense, as well as in 
referring to an expanded use of things in space and to the centrality of language 
in visual arts. It may refer to sculpture, installation, performance, or post-minimal 
works – a broad approach but a risk that I hope will be justified by serving 
specific conclusions about what is behind the evacuation of the human figure by 
minimal art.  
 
 
On using the term Minimalism and the expression minimal art in relation to 
sculpture  
 
For the convenience of writing and a more fluent reading of this text, the term 
Minimalism and the expression minimal art are used indistinguishably. It is, 
however, important to make a few remarks about the terminology in question.   
 
Most artists one associates with Minimalism did not recognize the term as 
appropriately describing their practice. For example, it is well known that Donald 
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Judd refused to associate Minimalism with the work he and others were 
producing during the 1960s. In a text published in 1966 for the catalogue of the 
exhibition “Primary structures: Younger American and British Sculptors”  (an 
exhibition to which I will return in a minute), Judd argues that the term “minimal” 
is inadequate because it suggests a reduction which in his opinion cannot 
appropriately describe the sort of intellectual investment found in the artworks 
associated with it. In his own words: “I object to several popular ideas. I don’t 
think anyone’s work is reductive (…) New work is just as complex and 
developed as old work.“1 
 
Already in “Specific Objects”, published the previous year and possibly Judd’s 
better known text, one finds a clear attempt to undermine the use of the term 
mentioned above and the use of any fixed definition: “The new three-
dimensional work doesn’t constitute a movement, school or style. The common 
aspects are too general and too little common to define a movement. The 
differences are greater than the similarities.”2  
 
Robert Morris is far more tolerant with the term. In fact, he uses the terminology 
in the last part of his highly influential series of texts “Notes on Sculpture”. 
Published in 1969, at a time when his work had moved away from geometric 
solids and closer to Process art, this is a text that allowed Morris to launch new 
ideas whilst also looking back at the developments that made what both Judd 
and he were calling ‘new work’ and that he was now referring to as minimal art3. 
By force of using the expression, Morris brings some historical legitimacy to the 
body of terms associated with it.    
 
Keeping in mind that minimal art is an expression normally used in a critical 
context – it was used for the first time by art critic Richard Wollheim, in an essay 
published in early 19954 - one might interpret Morris’s choice of worlds as an 
attempt to acknowledge the critical reception of the work that he and others had 
developed up to that point. This is speculation in the case of Morris, but one that 
announces the line of thought followed in this thesis. Using the term Minimalism 																																																								
1 Donald Judd, Complete Writings 1955-1975: Gallery Reviews, Book Reviews, Articles, Letters to the Editor, 
Reports, Statements, Complaints, Nova Scotia, The press of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, 2005, 
190 
2 Donald Judd, “Specific Objects” in David Hulks, Alex Potts, Jon wood, eds., Modern Sculpture Reader, 
Leeds, Henry Moore Institute, 2007, 214	
3 See Robert Morris, Continuous Project Altered Daily. The Writings of Robert Morris, Cambridge, MIT Press, 
1995, 54	
4 See: Richard Wollheim, “Minimal art” in Gregory Battcock, ed., Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, London, 
University of California Press, 387-399 
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or the expression minimal art constitutes an attempt to emphasize the way the 
latter developed through a dialogue with theory and critique.  
 
But using both the term and the expression in question is also a matter of 
simplifying the terms of the discussion. They evoke a certain familiarity that 
allows for ideas to be explored in a more direct way, given that it is neither 
possible nor necessary to talk in detail about the polemics generated around the 
use of this or that expression. What is more, they help to keep in mind the ideas 
that the words themselves evoke: that minimal art reflects a break with the 
association between expressive qualities and artistic value, a formal 
simplification and a minimum of manual work. In fact, it is key to remember that 
minimal art evolved as a result of efforts made by artists such as Judd and 
Morris to liberate art from metaphor and to reconfigure the art object around its 
own simple material qualities.  
 
So, in short, the use of both the term Minimalism and the expression minimal 
art, form part of a strategy to signal an important dialogue with critique and 
theory; to evoke the sort of formal bareness that is characteristic of the works 
that will be discussed; and a strategy to bring to the fore the contrast between 
minimal art and the formal complexity and subtleties of metaphoric meaning at 
play in figurative sculpture. All these aspects are central to the main argument.  
 
Furthermore, it is necessary to say something about the connection between 
Minimalism and sculpture. Minimalism is related to an attempt to abandon 
medium specificity and to create an integrated conception of art. This idea is 
present in the writing of Judd who once again can be identified with a more rigid 
conception of the sort of artworks one might call Minimalist. The very first line of 
“Specific Objects” reads: “Half or more of the best new work in the last few years 
has been neither painting nor sculpture”5. In others words, and what matters 
here, Judd reasons that despite being primarily three-dimensional the “new 
work”6 does not belong to the domain of sculpture. Rather, the use of the three 
dimensions is simply an alternative whose value relies on the fact that it “opens 
to anything”7. It opens the works to their context, and crucially, the field of art to 																																																								
5 Donald Judd, “Specific Objects” in David Hulks, Alex Potts, Jon wood, eds., Modern Sculpture Reader, 213  
6 It is perhaps worth clarifying that Judd uses the expression “new work” in reference to the work he and 
others started to produce around the early 1960s. It is equivalent to what I am calling Minimalism and minimal 
art.  
7 Ibid., 214 
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non-art. Now, Without being able to address the issue of context and of how 
Minimalism undermines the separation between art and non-art (I shall return to 
these questions later) what needs to be asked at this point is if it is legitimate to 
think about figurative sculpture through a paradigm that resists a definition of art 
in terms of medium specificity. 
 
If Judd raises the question, in a way he also indicates a possible answer to it. As 
was already mentioned, he tells us that the “new work” is neither painting nor 
sculpture. But he also goes on, saying that whilst it resembles sculpture it is 
closer to painting8. In fact, from a close reading of “Specific Objects” it becomes 
clear that Judd’s proposal to use three dimensions mostly applies to the 
difficulties one associates specifically with painting. Namely, problems to do with 
the frame and how it necessarily turns the pictorial space inwards and limits 
painting to a series of internal relations. Also of importance is the predicament of 
the wall, that is, the problem that no matter how good a painting is, it is always a 
rectangle on the wall and therefore a form of work that involves a figure/ground 
relation - created by the image of the frame on wall. This led Judd to conclude 
that somehow painting always functions as a picture, and the only way to break 
with this logic and with any residual illusionism is for it to become three-
dimensional. He says:  
 
 
Three dimensions are real space. That gets rid 
of the problem of illusionism and of literal space, 
space in and around marks and colors – which 
is riddance of one of the salient and most 
objectionable relics of European art. The several 
limits of painting are no longer present.   
 
 
However, the suggestion that painting must advance beyond its own limits in 
order for it to become three-dimensional, demands, within the logic explored in 
“Specific Objects”, a theoretical distinction between the three-dimensionality that 
Judd is referring to and that of sculpture. And what does he do? Specifically he 
distinguishes the “new work” not from sculpture but from the tradition of 																																																								
8 Donald Judd, “Specific Objects” in David Hulks, Alex Potts, Jon wood, eds., Modern Sculpture Reader, 216 
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sculpture, which he considers to be dominated by the logic of composition, 
therefore hierarchy, and representation. This is perhaps the weakest point of the 
argument in “Specific Objects”. Judd is clearly able to separate the “new work” 
from the tradition of sculpture by discussing how it breaks with the aspects 
mentioned above, but is unable to clarify what differentiates the former from 
sculpture in terms of its physical presence in space. The more one reads, the 
more it is suggested that Judd’s main concern is to question the relevance of 
history and situate the “new work” as far as possible from any tradition and fixed 
definition – which would compromise the sought out transition towards an 
unified notion of art.  Therefore in considering only a limited number of general 
aspects, such as part/whole relations and the problem of mass, Judd is unable 
to distinguish, in a satisfying way, the three-dimensionality of Minimalism from 
that of sculpture in a broad sense.   
 
Now, considering the level of his influence, Judd might be regarded as a 
spokesman for this argument, saying that because minimal art opposes medium 
specificity, it should not be thought of as sculpture. And yet, he also leaves us 
with the idea that the separation between minimal art and sculpture (and the 
disqualification of both terms) results primarily from the influence of a theoretical 
framework that no longer considered the medium to be a relevant category. In 
short, what supports the division between minimal art and sculpture seems to be 
the ambition to engage with art as an integrated field.  
 
This thesis departs from such an idea and proposes instead to reflect on the 
possibilities of contemporary figurative sculpture. This change of perspective 
gives me just enough space to use Minimalism as a starting point for a reflection 
that engages with sculpture. This is supported by two main factors, which are 
based on what has been said above. Firstly, in terms of concrete presence, it is 
difficult to separate the three-dimensionality of minimal art from that of sculpture.  
Apart from the more technical difficulties created by the use of specific 
theoretical references, there seems to be no reason why minimal artworks 
should not be regarded as sculpture. Secondly, and more probably, it seems 
relevant to use Minimalism as a starting point to reflect upon contemporary 
figurative sculpture because Minimalism has played an instrumental role in the 
development of the reconfigured notion of sculpture we know today, which in 
turn logically influences the use of the figure. In fact, it is not uncommon to claim 
that minimal art has developed around issues pertaining to sculpture. Morris, for 
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instance, supports the idea in “Notes on Sculpture, Part 4”, where he writes: 
“Part of the possibility for the success of the project of reconstituting objects as 
art had to do with the state of sculpture.”9 
 
Finally, it is important to outline some initial and general terms. It is useful to 
understand sculpture both as a practice and conceptual discipline that deals 
with the transformation, dislocation, assemblage and juxtaposition of materials 
and objects. One can also think of it as an artistic practice that engenders a 
physical relationship between objects and the viewer in a space shared by both. 
Essentially the artworks discussed in this chapter can be included in this 
definition of sculpture.  
 
Meanwhile, we need to consider that in minimal art it is not so much the object 
that matters, but the way that viewers engage with it. Furthermore, in rejecting 
the use of metaphor, minimal art invites the viewer to participate in the 
construction of meaning. This also means that it is possible to define Minimalism 
as a form of art that uses simplified forms to establish a relationship between 
objects and viewers in space, and more specifically, that works towards setting 
the awareness of the experience of viewing as its very central aspect. This 
implies that by positing the viewing experience as a condition of meaning, 
minimal art is ontologically realized through the living body.  
 
On that note, it is worth restating that in the following pages the term Minimalism 
occasionally appears associated with artworks where the object has a residual 
presence, or even no presence at all, and that clearly replace the importance of 
the object for that of a lively experience. In other words, Minimalism may refer to 
installation, performance or post-minimal works. 
 
In fact, this relationship between minimal art and the body is key to the main 
argument here, which is based largely on a contrast between the way the former 
stages the body and the way that figurative sculpture opens up the possibility of 
recomposing the body beyond the living body and therefore, as will be argued 
later, the subject. Proceeding on from this, in a somewhat abbreviated and 
condensed manner, the proposal is to understand figurative sculpture as a 
specific field of sculpture that evokes the human form as the condition of its 																																																								
9 Robert Morris, Continuous Project Altered Daily. The Writings of Robert Morris, 53  
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initial meaning, and perhaps more importantly, where the figure may come to 
the fore as a way of rehearsing and negotiating multiple and often conflicting 
new meanings.   
 
 
 The discredit of contemporary figurative sculpture 
 
 
One of the premises of this thesis is that contemporary figurative sculpture is 
discredited; this needs to be established. Perhaps it is beneficial to start by 
saying that it is impractical to talk about contemporary sculpture in an academic 
context without taking into account today’s expanded notion of sculpture, 
something upheld during the 1960s and 1970s as a result of the radical 
alterations which occurred in the art world during that period. These changes 
included a profound reconfiguration of the art object and of the viewing 
experience. Furthermore, the advances made during those two decades have 
irrevocably determined our present understanding of contemporary art by 
introducing a constant demand for the critical, conceptual and relational aspects 
of artworks to be taken as a priority.  
 
Minimal art was instrumental in the development of these changes. It brought 
into question the use of metaphor, undermined representation, and crucially, 
worked to produce an idea of art as a whole, as opposed to a phenomenon 
defined in terms of different mediums. It also helped to make the experience of 
the viewer a central preoccupation to practicing artists. Having mentioned this 
before, it is important to underline that if these questions were intensified during 
1960s and 1970s they still continue to influence the way artists work today.  
 
One cannot separate the almost complete removal of figurative work from 
western art during the 1960s and 1970s from Minimalism and its influence. In 
actuality, it is no surprise that a significant part of the figurative work that started 
to appear again at the beginning of the 1980s, continued to demonstrate the 
effect of this influence.  
 
For example, both Stephan Balkenhol and Charles Ray, (particularly in work 
made during the early 1990s) started to produce figures that seem to confront 
the viewer in the space of the gallery and, as a result, engender awareness of 
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the very act of viewing. Directly carved in wood, and evoking the common man 
in the case of Balkenhol, or bringing to mind the mannequin in the case of Ray, 
these figures also recall the everyday, and therefore challenge the division 
between art and non-art. Let us not forget, that these are all priorities which 
were insisted on by minimal art.  
 
In more recent years, the number of leading artists that have used the figure as 
a central element of their practice has further increased. These include artists 
like Isa Genzken, Rachel Harrison or Mark Manders who, in using an 
exploratory approach, have been charting new possibilities for the sculptural 
human form. I shall return to these artists later.  
 
So, in some respects figurative sculpture has been gaining ground in the field of 
contemporary art, but we also need to consider that this field is structured 
around paradigms that have largely evolved from a denial of representation. 
Paradigms that seem to foster an idea of art as an activity that produces critical 
visions of reality and that tends, one could say naturally, to be suspicious of 
figurative sculpture and particularly its illusionistic nature.  
 
In other words, the discrediting of figurative sculpture is revealed by a certain 
discomfort that contemporary thought has towards the ambiguous materiality of 
figurative sculpture, (which is neither entirely concrete nor a result of mere 
appearance), and explains why the figure in sculpture is not used as an object of 
artistic discourse so much as a point of departure. Indeed, one might be 
tempted to compare the antagonism between the materiality of figurative 
sculpture and the idea of reality, to the tension that exists between a figure and 
the living body in space. Considering that the body is a central theme in 
contemporary art, then it might be argued that this tension is one of the causes 
of what I am here calling the discredit of figurative sculpture.  
 
Writing in 2014, on the occasion of a major exhibition of contemporary figurative 
sculpture held at the Hayward Gallery in London, Ralph Rugoff, then director of 
the gallery, drew a portrait of how the figure was currently being used in 
sculpture, (which could equally be applied to the state of figurative sculpture 
today). He suggested that the figure is engaged with “not to affirm our existing 
notions of subjectivity and identity, but as a means of looking askance at 
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them”10. This observation reflects the ironic tone that can be detected in so 
many of today’s figurative projects, (including some belonging to the artists 
mentioned above), and the numerous cases where the figure, approaching the 
form of the caricature, appears to ridicule its own presence in space. Artworks 
that strategically use the figure to evoke a series of codes and conventions do 
seem more frequent than those that engage with the figure as a project in its 
own right. The presence of figurative sculpture, it could be said, is mostly a 
negative presence.  
 
As a whole, beyond a demand to reflect its historical condition and place it within 
the discourses of contemporary art, artists seem unable to use the figure in a 
positive manner. It may appear that artists are starting to turn to the figure more, 
but the suspicion is still there: figurative sculpture always needs to be thoroughly 
justified, almost apologised for. Clearly when something needs to be justified 
repeatedly, it is because it is discredited. Its criticality is always in question, its 
relevance and value always need to be asserted. Furthermore whilst one could 
be mislead by the work of a small group of artists who managed to bring 
attention back to the possibilities of the human form, this suspicion towards 
figurative sculpture becomes more tangible when we consider the relative 
number of artists and curators who decide to work with it in important events. I 
shall now continue the argument by providing some statistical evidence  
 
Let us start by looking at Skulptur Projekte - an event that takes place once 
every 10 years in the small town of Münster, Germany. It is one of the largest 
international events dedicated to sculpture, and more importantly, one whose 
relevance is widely recognized. It aims at exploring the relationship between 
sculpture and the city but it is demonstrative of the question examined here. 
Furthermore, the long period between editions makes Skulptur Projekte a 
legitimate example to take the pulse of the different expressions and trends of 
thought presented there.  
 
The first edition of Skulptur Projekte was held in 1977 and hosted a total of 9 
projects, all by key artists of the time. None of the projects were figurative. The 
second edition was comprised of 63 projects of which only 3 evoked the human 
figure. This represented about 6%. After 10 years, with the event now on its third 																																																								
10 Ralph Rugoff, ed., The Human Factor. The Figure in Contemporary Sculpture, exh. Cat., London, Hayward 
Publishing, 18 
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edition, the ratio of the number of projects to figurative work increased but not in 
a significant way. In 1997 there were 74 projects, and only 7 engaged with the 
figure making up 9% of the whole; incidentally this included a work by Hans 
Haacke who appropriated a previously existing sculpture by constructing an 
installation around it. At the time of writing, the last edition was held in 2007 and 
it included 35 projects. Again, only 3 object-based proposals evoked the human 
figure, which amounted to around 8%11. 
 
Documenta is another international event recognized for its artistic relevance. 
Held every 5 years in Kassel, also in Germany, it is a multidisciplinary event 
particularly known for promoting a reflection about how art can relate to the 
world at large on a social and political level. It gives us an idea about the relative 
presence of the figure in relation to a wide range of artistic practices - and in that 
sense is a good indicator of the weight artists assign to the human figure. 
Focusing on the same period as above, 1977 saw the sixth edition of 
Documenta. This was the first event related to the visual arts ever to be 
transmitted by means of television, and a large number of video works and 
performances were shown. Similarly to what happened in Skulptur Projekte 
during that same year, the figure was completely absent12.  
 
The following edition, named Documenta 7, was held in 1982 and saw artists 
like Joel Shapiro, Markus Raetz, Michelangelo Pistoletto and Jonathan 
Borofsky, introducing figurative work to the event. But these still represented a 
rather modest presence if compared to the total number of projects and the 
wider scope of the exhibition. Documenta 7 hosted a total of 178 projects, 
comprising 31 non-figurative sculptural projects, 14 installations, 4 
performances, 16 conceptual works (language based), 12 photo based artworks 
and 86 contributions made in the form of painting - including 34 where the 
human form was represented. By comparison, the artists above contributed with 
a total of 7 figurative sculptures, which represents about 4%13.  
 
This tendency for diversity and residual figurative work continued over the 
following editions.  Documenta 8, produced in 1987, was comprised of 140 																																																								
11 The information gathered here can be found at: < http://www.skulptur-projekte.de/skulptur-projekte-
download/muenster/index.htm >[Accessed September 26th 2015] 
12 See Michael Glasmeier, 50 Jahre / Years Documenta 1955-2005: Archive in Motion – Discrete Energies / 
Diskrete Energien, exh. cat, Kassel, Steidl, 2005 
13 See AA.VV., documenta 7, exh. cat, Kassel, Dierichs, 1982 
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proposals that included video art, conceptual art, photography, architecture, 
design and even music. Installation was represented by 19 works, including 2 
that used figurative elements, painting with 33, with 8 that engaged with the 
human form, and finally sculpture, with 62 projects of which only one was clearly 
figurative14. This translates as 0,7%.  
 
In the editions that followed there was a slight increase in the number of 
figurative works, again without this increase ever becoming really significant. 
The combined number of figurative sculptures presented in 199215, 199716, 
200217 and 200718 was 25, which stands against an impressive total of 523 
artworks. This means less than 5%.  
 
In 2012, during Documenta (13), the last edition to date, this percentage rises to 
approximately 9%. These numbers, however, are largely the result of curatorial 
decisions that, according to the curator, sought to explore the idea of art as 
research19. They included a series of projects with small figurative elements 
used as a form of support to a theoretical and critical construction of ideas more 
than as a project in their own right. This misleading increase is further supported 
by the presence of the figure which resulted from an unusual selection of 
figurative works by deceased artists, including Gonzalez, Man Ray and the 
surrealist sculptor from Brazil, Maria Martins – whose works were again used 
more from a set of curatorial decisions than as an artistic project per se.  
 
The near absence of the figure, and the tendency to appropriate it as a 
conceptual point of departure more than as an artistic proposition, becomes 
even more explicit if we look at the history of another, more recent event: the 
Biennial of art Manifesta. Initially put forward as a platform to investigate the 
post-nation European identity,20 it has become of increasing significance 
through the constant participation of influential artists and theorists.  
 
Between 1996, the year that saw Manifesta’s first edition, and 2014, the year of 																																																								
14 See AA.VV., Documenta 8, exh. cat, Kassel, Verlag und Gesamtherstellung, 1987 
15 See Jan Hoet ed., Documenta IX, exh. cat, Kassel, Hatje Cantz, 1999  
16 See Paul Sztulman, Catherine David, Jean-François Chvevrier, eds., Documenta X: Short Guide. exh. cat. 
Kassel: Verlag Gerd Hatje. 1997 
17 See Okwui Enwezor, ed., Documenta 11, exh. cat., Kassel, Hatje Cantz, 2002 
18 See Roger Buergel, Ruth Noack, eds., Documenta 12: Catalogue, exh. cat., Kassel, Taschen, 2007   
19 See AA.VV., Documenta (13) Catalog 1/3: The Book of Books, exh. cat., Kassel, Hatje Cantz, 2012 
20 For more on the initial proposal of Manifesta, see for example:  Robert Fleck, Maria Lind, Barbara 
Vanderlinden, eds., Manisfesta 2. European Biennial of Contemporary Art/Luxembourg, exh. cat, Luxembourg, 
Manifesta, 1998, 6-8  
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the event’s last edition, more than 700 projects have been presented, of which 
only 13 were sculptural projects which engaged with the figure. This 
corresponds to less than 2%. Significantly, the numbers include a huge amount 
of projects that relied upon the direct participation of viewers, and crucially, that 
involved local communities as a way of rehearsing and thinking about the social 
and the political spheres21.  
 
It is worth remembering, that, within the context of visual arts, the idea of 
producing conditions for viewers to participate in the creation of meaning started 
to gain relevancy as an artistic strategy primarily after minimal art - and that 
today, as evidenced by the above, this continues to occupy a central place in 
the field of contemporary art.  
 
Artangel is another useful reference to look at. It is a leading arts organization in 
the UK and beyond, which for the past decades has commissioned and 
produced an array of daring large-scale projects, and more importantly, has a 
strong opinion about what constitutes subjects of interest for the general public.  
 
If I can now focus on the United Kingdom, and take a very brief look into 
projects supported by Artangel, further evidence is available concerning the 
priorities of the art world and the relative value ascribed to figurative sculpture. 
Numbers are once again revealing. Between 1992, when it first started to 
operate, and 2015, the year at the time of writing, Artangel has been involved in 
the production of 93 projects, of which only 2 have explored the human figure. 
This again, corresponds to only 2% of the total number of projects22. As 
suggested by the history of Artangel and all of the events mentioned above, the 
presence of the sculpted figure corresponds to approximately 5% or less23 of the 
works highlighted by the art world over the past few decades.  
 
This allows us to infer two things. The first is that the number of artists who 
choose to engage with the figure (more than who those artists are), and the 																																																								
21 An archive with documentation from all of Manifesta’s editions can be viewed at: < 
http://www.manifesta.org/network/manifesta-archive/> [Accessed September 11th 2015] 
22 For a complete account of Artangel’s commissions, see: < http://www.artangel.org.uk/projects> [Accessed 
September 11th 2015]  
23 The value corresponds to an average calculated by using the added number of editions of each event 
between 1977 and 2012, in the case of Skulptur Projekte and Documenta, the added number of editions 
between 1996 and 2014, in the case of Manifesta, and the total number of projects realized between 1992 and 
2015, in the case of Artangel.  	
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frequency with which figurative work actually gets to be exhibited in the context 
of major art events, suggest that figurative sculpture is, or rather continues to 
be, a discredited language. To be more precise: statistic evidence does not 
prove intent on the part of the individual artist, but it indicates tendency of 
practice and receptivity, or the lack of it, on the part of the art world towards 
figurative work. The second inference, already intimated earlier, is that minimal 
art has played a central role in undermining the logic of figuration. With this in 
mind what I will do next, is try and reverse these terms and utilise a discussion 







Having started as an attempt to reinstate a notion of art that is critical of the 
aesthetic and to undermine the idea of autonomy, medium specificity and the 
stability of meaning, Minimalism managed to exchange a concept of artwork 
based on visual composition for a much broader definition based on experience, 
which includes viewers and the very act of perception as integral parts. As 
mentioned above, this was instrumental in forming the basis for an 
understanding of contemporary art.   
 
The introduction of a new relationship between art criticism and art making was 
also central to the movement, with artists such as Judd and Morris writing some 
of the most groundbreaking and provocative art criticism of the time (whilst 
establishing themselves as the main theorists of their own practice). Smithson 
and Carl Andre could also be remembered as artists and prominent writers. In 
turn, Rosalind E. Krauss, who will be considered for the main thread of this 
chapter, has contributed much to the development of Minimalism - and crucially 
helped to define and position it - as an art critic and theorist. Furthermore, whilst 
maintaining that phenomenology and structural linguistics are the two main 
theoretical frameworks behind the development of Minimalism, Krauss develops 
a specific reading of the history of modern sculpture, as gathered in the hugely 
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influential Passages in Modern Sculpture24, first published in 1977, where 
Minimalism appears as its final stage of development. 
 
This reading appears reworked in the essay “The Cultural Logic of the Late 
Capitalist Museum”25, published in 1990, where Krauss explains that one of the 
most important achievements of minimal art was to simultaneously reconfigure 
the art object and the viewing subject. In other words, that in denying both “the 
work as a repository of known forms”26 and “a subject who cognitively grasps 
these forms because he or she knows them in advance”27, minimal art managed 
to break with the idea of sculpture seen in terms of mediation and to exchange a 
centred, autonomous subject, that experiences the work mentally, and therefore 
privately, for another that coheres only temporarily in the physical space – space 
that, in this sense, would offer further critical possibilities in its ability to be 
shared. I will return to this essay later.  
 
Giving shape to a critique of interiority in sculpture, the notions of essence and 
being were also questioned by Minimalism as well-illustrated by Judd’s Floor 
Sculpture Series. Produced from 1967 onwards, these are normally constituted 
by single units or progressions of repeated units, presented as something 
between a well-defined whole and an opening, and that together with the 
repetition of modules - neither solid nor simple containers - seem to refuse the 
concept of an object with a core and a connection with authenticity. This idea is 
underlined by the fact that both formal variations and repetition take place in the 
absence of an original and originating element, which clearly breaks with the 
association, traditionally made in relation to figurative sculpture, between 
sculpture and the idea of soul28.  																																																								
24“Indeed, the history of modern sculpture coincides with the development of two bodies of thought, 
phenomenology and structural linguistics...” in KRAUSS, Rosalind E. Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, 
Cambridge and London, MIT Press, 1981, 4 
25 Rosalind E. Krauss, “The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalist Museum” in October Vol. 54 nº 104, MIT 
Press, 1990 
26 Ibid., 8  
27 Ibid.	
28 As a leap forward, it is interesting to note that in placing the work of Rodin right at the beginning of 
Passages in Modern Sculpture, Krauss identifies the latter as a predecessor of Minimalism. She suggests, 
albeit not explicitly, that his groundbreaking visibility of process, repetition and multi-positionality, as found in 
The Gates of Hell, as well as in the way, for a significant part of his work, the artist uses surface, has no direct 
correlation to the figure’s anatomical tension. This makes it difficult to locate Rodin’s work within, precisely, a 
relation between sculpture and the idea of soul (as the strong affirmation of sculpture’s materiality and the 
priority he gave to surface values seem to constantly undermine the idea of interiority). That being said, it is 
equally relevant to make a note of how Krauss avoids the question of representation by bracketing Rodin’s 
figures as a sum of pure formal elements – helping her to reflect on the increasingly problematic category of 
sculpture, by putting the figurative element of the work out of focus and hence announcing, or confirming, the 
idea of an object that no longer comes invested with meaning. Later in the text, I will try to reverse this logic 
and bring ‘the figure’ back into focus by concentrating on ‘what a figure does’ rather than on ‘what a figure is 
(supposed to be)’, which I think is what causes difficulties in conciliating a materialistic approach to sculpture 
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 1.Vladimir Tatlin. Corner Counter-Relief (1914), iron, aluminium, paint. 31 ½ x 59 x 29 ½  inches 
 
 
And then, of course, there is the question of representation that the minimalist 
artist sees as a form of illusion and negative idealization, or as a vehicle to an 
imaginary space that presents the viewer with something other than reality, 
hence concealing the truth about reality. The contours of a pedagogical 
problem, whose solution had been shown several decades earlier by Vladimir 
Tatlin’s pioneering gesture, consisting of moving forms and materials from the 
pictorial space to real space in Corner Counter-Relief 29 from 1914 (fig.1); a work 
that minimal art took as a formula to purge metaphor and illusionism, to produce 
self-identical works and to engender a situation that involves literal objects, 




and figuration. For more on Krauss’s argument, see the first chapter in Passages in Modern Sculpture: 
“Narrative Time: The question of the Gates of Hell” in Rosalind E. Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, 7-
37  
29 We can perhaps speculate on the relation between Tatlin’s Corner Relief and some types of Russian icons 
since, unlike the western tradition of drawing the geometry of an imaginative space that the viewer is invited to 
enter, these are painted with an inverted perspective to suggest the entering of the pictorial space into real 
space – serving the fact that these are normally placed in a corner (a feat that of course Tatlin also uses) to 
increase the effect of perspective distortion and further suggest that the religious image exists as if in the same 




2.View of ‘Primary Structures’ exhibition at the Jewish Museum, New York, 1966, with Donald Judd’s Untitled             
(1966), galvanized iron, aluminium, 40x189¾x40 inches with 10 inches intervals, on the wall and on the floor,  
on the left of the image and further to the right, with Robert Morris’s L-beams (1965), painted plywood, 
96x96x24 inches  
 
 
During the seminal exhibition “Primary Structures: Younger American and British 
Sculptors” held at the Jewish Museum in New York in 1966, it became clear how 
such a ‘situation’ could be translated into the context of art after modernism in 
the West. Judd, one of the participating artists, showed Untitled from the same 
year (fig.2) composed of two similar elements, one displayed on the wall, the 
other placed on the floor with each made of four repeated units plus a bar on 
top, of galvanized iron and aluminium respectively – hence, this is a work that 
signals the refusal of representation by giving all its elements a physical 
presence in space.  
 
Furthermore, judging from the image provided, if a viewer assumed a position in 
front of the work, the two elements must have been perceived as four 
undifferentiated cubes separated by equal distances and visually linked on top 
by a line of different colour. However, if the same viewer moved towards the 
side, the single cube must have appeared as the strongest element, now with 
the aluminium bar taking the shape of a hollow tube of square section. In other 
words, it would have been difficult to identify a principal viewing position and, 
concerning the objects, difficult to single out the parts or even to identify an 
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overpowering element in the set. Moreover, Untitled shows how minimal art 
functions in terms of a bodily engagement in detriment to a mental engagement, 
achieved by giving the viewer different perspectives from different positions, all 
of which were equally important, that provide the latter with a sense of his own 
position in space.   
 
This awareness is what functions in support of Minimalism’s ambition to present 
the subject to himself – a non-idealized subject that, in the process of opening 
up to the context around him, is able to learn things in time (marking a clear 
effort led by minimalist sculptors to break with an autonomous, centred subject). 
What this signifies is that the viewer is the condition of the meaning of the work, 
which is not found internally in the artwork but is instead structured externally on 
site; that being the case, the stability of meaning is also questioned by the 
variety of different, equally relevant, views. One immediate result of this is that 
artworks become more explicitly dependent on the viewing conditions and, 
borrowing from Morris, that taking relations out of work and making them “a 
function of space, light and the viewer’s field of vision” produces, in turn, “less 
self-important works”30.  
 
Besides the dismissal of representation, Untitled also reveals the intention to 
move away from hierarchy and part-by-part sculpture towards forms perceived 
as a whole; argued at the time to be the key to abandoning the imaginary and 
the individuality of one’s encounter with a sculptural object. In addition, 
Minimalism’s inherent refusal of medium specificity is in a way also signalled by 
the fact that the two elements do not change, be it on the wall, as is traditionally 
associated with painting, or on the floor, commonly associated with sculpture.  
 
The dissolution of hierarchy in Minimalism, as discussed above and referenced 
here in terms of whole-orientated preoccupations, further translates as a break 
from composition seen as a historical formula for organizing meaning (the sort of 
linear implication that is typical in art works that depend on narrative, the use of 
references or those that are constituted in terms of part-by-part relations)31. 																																																								
30 These ideas are the very basis for the conceit of an expanded sculptural object, which Morris developed in 
“Notes on Sculpture, Part 2”, first published in 1966, and that appears later, in 1979 to be precise, in Krauss’s 
“Sculpture in the Expanded Field”. For the citations and Krauss’s essay see: Robert Morris, “Notes on 
Sculpture part 2” in David Hulks, Alex Potts, Jon Wood. eds., Modern Sculpture Reader, 238. Rosalind E. 
Krauss, “Sculpture in the Expanded Field” in Rosalind E. Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde and other 
Modernist Myths, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1986, 276-290 
31 Throughout “Specific Objects”, it becomes clear that part of the argument behind the opposition to illusion 
and composition is also to do with an attempt to distance the ‘new work’ from the European tradition of art. 
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What again underlines the claim about Minimalism as a public form of art - with 
the removal of the hierarchic forms of organizing meaning and any forms of pre-
knowledge as requirements for understanding works – is that once organized in 
terms of a whole, as is found in Untitled, the difference both on the level of 
objects and on the level of the viewing experience, seems to be cancelled out by 
reporting exclusively to a form of external engagement that activates only 
aspects common to an undifferentiated viewer. In summary, insofar as breaking 
with the pictorial space and hierarchical forms of organizing meaning, 
individually known images were also dismissed to suggest the possibility of a 
communal perception. Indifference seems also to be at the heart of the 
Minimalist artist’s claim that Minimalism as a genre was a public form of art in 
terms of the engagement with the work, the work itself, and the undifferentiation 
of viewers. 
 
Dance is another good example to understand some general implications of 
Minimalism. During the 1960s, the Judson Dance Theater developed a new 
concept of dance based on ordinary movement involving gestures with no 
‘interior meaning’, or ‘task performance’ as it ended up being called, the 
principles of which Morris used for the famous collaborative piece Site 
performed in 1964. Here he moved several boards of plywood around a stage, 
describing these movements in a way similar to that of any other common 
worker; leading, upon removal of the last board, to the apparition of Carolee 
Schneemann, enacting the position of the painted figure in Manet’s Olympia, 
from 1863, thus more importantly suggesting an unmediated presence of a 
woman stripped of any forms of visual illusion. As Krauss states in a catalogue 
essay published much later in 1994, in that moment Schneemann joined “ her 
body to the anti-illusionism expressed in the very idea of a dance of ordinary 
movement as well as that refusal of interiority in painting that would become the 
manifesto of Minimalism, whether in Morris’s own ‘Notes on Sculpture’ or 
Donald Judd’s essay ‘Specific Objects’” 32.  
 
The performance allows us two main considerations. Firstly, again we have the 
refusal of illusionism, which at this time is explained to us through a metaphor of 																																																								
Here is an example: “Three dimensions are real space. That gets rid of the problem of illusionism and of literal 
space, space in and around marks and colours - which is riddance of one of the salient and most objectionable 
relics of European art” in Donald Judd, “Specific Objects” in David Hulks, Alex Potts, Jon Wood. eds., Modern 
Sculpture Reader, 218 
32 Rosalind E. Krauss “The Mind/Body Problem: Robert Morris in series” AA.VV. Robert Morris. The 
Mind/Body Problem. New  York: Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum. 1994, 6 
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painting. In fact, anti-illusionism appears as an attempt to answer the problems 
raised by the immateriality of something produced by marks on a bidimensional 
plane and that exists only as a visual suggestion. So what is now literally 
illustrated is that, conceptually, Minimalism is established in the passage from 
the pictorial space to the real space, or in other words, that it is rooted in a 
painterly understanding of art. As Judd suggests: “The new work obviously 
resembles sculpture more than it does painting, but it is nearer to painting” 33. 
Secondly, we also have a refusal of anthropomorphism that, if before it was felt 
in terms of form, here it takes the side of gesture, or, a certain emptying out of 
gesture (repeated, for example, in the evacuation of the manual from processes 
of making objects), that in turn makes it clear that the critique of interiority also 
applies to the subject at play in Minimalism – one whose conceptualization 
corresponds as it were, to the emptying of the body.  
 
Now focusing on the theoretical background of minimal art, if we consider the 
importance of the arguments developed around the viewing experience, it is 
clear why phenomenology, and in particular Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, 
was so important: “Viewing was envisaged by him, [Merleau-Ponty] not as the 
self-contained activity of a disembodied eye, but as embedded within the body 
and inextricably bound up with a broader situation of the body within the 
physical environment.”34. 
 
However, alongside the framework of phenomenology, one can appreciate that 
the notion of objectivity occupies a chief position within the territory of 
Minimalism’s conceptual markers, for it forms the basis for a distinction between 
concreteness and illusion. In fact, objectivity did at some point emerge as a 
central conceptual support for Minimalism’s political claims of working within a 
framework of depersonalized experience of art, and the need to presuppose the 
beholder’s mindset. It does this through a principle that prevents the possibility 
to imaginatively, that is individually, recompose artworks - a scenario which 
Merleau-Ponty’s idea of creative viewing was unable to suspend35.  
 																																																								
33 in Donald Judd, “Specific Objects” in David Hulks, Alex Potts, Jon Wood Jon. eds., Modern Sculpture 
Reader, 216	
11 Here I am quoting from Alex Potts who discusses the impact that Merleau-Ponty’s theory of 
phenomenology had on the intellectual development behind Minimalism, in Alex Potts, The Sculptural 
Imagination. Figurative, Modernism, Minimalism, London, Yale University Press, 2009,  208 
35 There was always a contradiction between phenomenology and objectivity. Not so much that the first might 
be falsely associated with a subjective experience - in an individualistic sense - but because it defines a 
symbiosis between the self and the world which the latter denies.  
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Reading across references, the one-directional movement between object and 
subject implicit in the notion of sense-data, a notion that entered the vocabulary 
of minimal art through the influence of Wittgenstein, seems to have resolved the 
contradiction between phenomenology and objectivity over a short period of 
time. A period that allowed a transition from phenomenology to post-
structuralism and then to structural linguistics as the main theoretical references 
for Minimalism from the mid-1960s onwards. This in turn, established language 
and critical analysis as principles for an unequivocal assertion of meaning and, 
precisely, the objective means to distinguish between knowing and believing36. 
In Krauss’s own account: “The implementation of the Word is public; I either use 
it correctly or I don’t” 37, or:  
 
to reduce the ‘mental’ to ‘language’ is to transform 
the presumed privacy of thinking into the public 
medium of speech and the logic of propositions. It is 
as well to exchange the mysterious domain of what 
can be known only to the knower for the overt 
space of shared events 38   
 
The influence of objectivity as a principle behind the development of Minimalism 
can also be identified with reference to the idea of art criticism as centred 
around judgment. This approach, typical of Greenberg’s criticism, lost its 
prevalence to theories developed by Judd, Morris, Krauss, and those 
associated. As the latter points out in the introduction to The originality of the 
Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, these took the influence of 
Structuralism and Post-structuralism to exchanged judgment for method, and 
replace the goal of asserting value through the historical reading of formal 
ruptures and continuities - which is typical of the first kind of criticism - for the 
analysis of the structures of signification materially integrated in the  works of 
art. Artworks, that in being increasingly developed in a state of symbiosis with 																																																								
36 Whilst the influence of French thought continued to be felt in the works of Barthes, Foucault, Saussure, or 
Lacan (explicitly in writings of Krauss), Wittgenstein is perhaps the single author whose philosophical 
vocabulary most appealed to artists, theorists and critics during this period. Alex Potts, for instance, notes that: 
“By the end of the 1960s, artists or art critics looking to ground their analysis philosophically, and seeking 
alternatives to traditional rationalist or positivist models, tended to return to Wittgenstein rather than to the 
French exisentialists or phenomenologists. With this insistence on the centrality of an understanding of 
language to a conceptually informed critical analysis, Wittgenstein became the thinking artist’s and critic’s 
philosopher” Alex Potts, The Sculptural Imagination. Figurative, Modernism, Minimalism, 210. For a more 
complete account of the series of substitutions of philosophical references during this time see: Ibid., 206-213	
37 Rosalind E. Krauss, “The Mind/Body Problem: Robert Morris in series” in AA.VV., Robert Morris, The 
Mind/Body Problem, 6 
38 Ibid., p. 4 
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art criticism – it is significant that a lot of artists were also accomplished writers - 
tended to facilitate an objective, non-historical analysis, by means of 
establishing (and exposing) the criteria of their own signification within its 
physical structures39. A feat connected to the notion of verification in 
Minimalism, which I will discuss later.  
 
Lastly, reflecting on the implications of an experience that is located between an 
intellectual and emotional response, such as that of viewing a minimalist art 
work, through the logic of linguistic propositions, seems to require the means to 
legitimize such object without imposing the conceptual limitations of an 
experiencing self. This can perhaps explain why Minimalism developed, once 
again in Krauss’s view, along a parallel between “a need of certain artists to 
explore the externality of language and therefore of meaning”, with “the project 
in the work of other sculptors: the discovery of the body as a complete 
externalization of Self.”40 This is a formulation that, if we consider the movement 
as defined by its initial dismissal of representation and the autonomy of the 
work, passing by the decentring of the subject and arriving at the introduction of 
language, appears to take the shape of a mature theoretical understanding of 
minimal art. 
 
The exposition here would not be complete without a note or two about the 
unexpected direction minimal art took. In “The Cultural Logic of the Late 
Capitalist Museum”, written in 1990 in a clearly post-Minimalism context, Krauss 
delivers both an overarching survey and a re-evaluation of the movement. On 
the one hand, she maintains that Minimalism offered a compensatory 
experience; some instant of bodily plenitude in a world of fast industrialization 41. 																																																								
39 Right at the end of the introduction to The originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, a book 
that like others from the author organizes and collects previously published essays, Krauss writes: 
“Postmodernist Art enters this terrain (the theoretical domain of structuralism and poststructuralist analysis) 
openly. And it is this phenomenon, born of the last two decades, that in turn, has opened critical practice, 
overtly, onto method.” In Rosalind E. Krauss, The originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, 6.		
40 The quote here is taken from “Sense and Sensibility: Reflection on Post ‘60s Sculpture”. An essay originally 
published in 1973, where Krauss reflects on the continuity between minimal and post-minimal art and in 
particular on how the latter continues to reject history as a source of meaning. The argument is established on 
general lines and although Krauss spends a bit more time reflecting, with no specific detail, on the work of 
Roberto Morris and Richard Serra, a large numbers of other artists are mentioned therein. The expression 
“other sculptors” is left, one could say adequately, with no specific reference. The essay can be found in 
Rosalind E. Krauss “Sense and Sensibility: Reflection on Post '60s Sculpture” in James Meyer, ed., 
Minimalism, London, Phaidon, 2000, 256 
41 “(…) the Minimalist subject is in this very displacement returned to its body, regrounded in a kind of richer, 
denser subsoil of experience than the paper-thin layer of an autonomous visuality that had been the goal of 
optical painting. And thus this move is, we could say, compensatory, an act of reparation to a subject whose 
everyday experience is one of increasing isolation, reification, specialization, a subject who lives under the 
conditions of advanced industrial culture as an increasingly instrumentalized being. It is to this subject that 
Minimalism in an act of resistance to the serialization, stereotyping, and banalizing of commodity production, 
holds out a promise of some instant of bodily plenitude in a gesture of compensation that we recognize as 
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On the other hand, she states that Minimalism is now being used in the service 
of capital.  
 
The text begins in a typically ‘Kraussian’ style by making the argument ever 
more eloquent through a form of writing that places the reader alongside Krauss 
as she walks through an exhibition of minimalist works from the Panza 
Collection, where many of her “old friends”, as she calls the works, “triumphantly 
fill vast suites of galleries, having muscled everything else off the walls” 42. 
Confessing to be happy at first, she continues to communicate resentment, for 
she explains, a revision of Minimalism, and particularly the sort of spatial 
relations that it introduces, is now being used to reconfigure the museum 
according to the logic of late capitalism. This being, the type of museum that as 
she recognizes in the Guggenheim group, which is made to fit the needs of, as 
well as working to produce, a “subject in search not of affect but of intensities”43, 
leading her to ask if it is possible that “a movement that wished to attack 
commodification and tecnhologization somehow always already carried the 




With Minimalism, the potential was already there 
that not only would the object be caught up in the 
logic of commodity production, a logic that would 
overwhelm its specificity, but that the subject 
projected by Minimalism, would also be 
reprogrammed. Which is to say that the Minimalism 
subject of “lived bodily experience” – unballasted by 
past knowledge and coalescing in the very moment 
of its encounter with the object – could, if only 
pushed just a little farther, break up entirely into the 
utterly fragmented, postmodern subject of 
contemporary mass culture. It could even be 
suggested that by prizing loose the old ego-																																																								
deeply aesthetic” in Rosalind E. Krauss, “The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalist Museum” in October Vol. 54 
nº 104, 9-10  




centered subject of traditional art, Minimalism 




Now, whilst Krauss anticipates part of my argument, what is going to be 
discussed next is that the problem of Minimalism is not so much its ‘code’ but its 
ambition to present the subject to itself together with self-identical objects. It will 
be argued, in other words, that the problem might actually concern what 
Minimalism has always left out: the possibility to think about - and inscribe - 
notions of the subject beyond “what the subject already is” and about objects of 
difference. Suggesting upfront that this has something to do with how 
Minimalism is caught in the logic of objectivity, I will now discuss, from a position 
influenced by pragmatism and more precisely by Richard Rorty, the limitations 
of minimal art from the angle of its subordination to the logic of objectivity.  
 
 
Minimalism with Pragmatism  
 
 
Having published his first book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature46 only in 
1979, when Minimalism was conceptually well-structured, one can only imagine 
the sort of positive influence Richard Rorty could have had for minimalist artists 
with works such as the above – where he argues modern epistemology is 
misguided by an idea of the mind as trying to faithfully correspond to a human-
independent external reality; or inversely, the impact that his defense of 
narrative, notably in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity47 from 1989, could have 
had for Minimalism’s refusal of narrative. However, despite the absence of a 
documented line of influence, his work allows us the possibility of thinking in a 
different way about Minimalism.  
 
Rorty’s project is concerned with building an argument for the need to orientate 
philosophical debate towards social and political questions. Throughout his 																																																								
45 Ibid.,12 
46 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature: Thirtieth-Anniversary Edition, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009 
47 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989	
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writings he often returns to Dewey and specifically to his position, maintaining 
that western philosophy is conservative by its favouring of stability over change, 
the priority of objective truth, and thus producing a system of belief with fixed 
values that privilege the leisure class over the producing class. It is with this in 
mind that Rorty tries to redefine the philosophical vocabulary, combining the 
analytical tradition (following mostly Dewey, precisely) with continental, post-
Nietzschian philosophy (in line with Heidegger and Derrida). He proposes that 
we abandon a dualistic view, and the distinction between reality and 
appearances together with the epistemological distinction between finding and 
making, replacing these for a distinction between the more useful and the less 
useful in order to give priority to democracy over philosophy. That is, to dissolve 
what keeps philosophical debate and the preoccupations of democracy apart. 
To put it another way, in recuperating Nietzsche’s maxim of saying that 
philosophy and literature are one and the same, Rorty proposes the task of 
attempting to improve the health of our democracies, replacing argument for re-
description - of the way we live- and crucially, to part ways with:  
 
The tradition in western culture which centres 
around the notion of search for Truth (…) the 
clearest example of the attempt to find a 
sense in one’s existence by turning away 
from solidarity to objectivity. The idea of Truth 
as something to be pursued for its own sake, 
not because it will be good for oneself, or for 
one’s real or imaginary community, is the 




Unsurprisingly, my contention is that Minimalism can be associated with this 
tradition, an association I propose to explain in three short steps, and then 
followed by a longer one.   
 																																																								
48 Objectivity is one of the terms that Rorty elaborates on the most. It is frequently found in contrast with the 
term solidarity which partially disambiguates the question about relativism that his work is often accused of. A 
similar fault may be found in the term irony , which in Rorty’s understanding of the word, relates to the idea 
that there is no final vocabulary or narrative, thus, that these can be modified for the benefit of solidarity. Irony 
is not merely ‘being ironic’ where ‘everything goes’. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, 












We are already in a position to claim that minimal art is influenced by theories of 
knowledge and concerned with problems arising from the discovery of artworks, 
that is, with how different aspects of artworks get to be known – problems which 
it aims to situate in relation to the possibility of articulating meaning publicly. 
From the outset, both aspects were considered important to reinstate and define 
a critically invested work of art as one that lends itself as “a way of finding out  
 
what the world’s like” 49; in turn, this allows us to say that Minimalism is a 
movement that articulates questions of truth.  
 
																																																								
49 The phrase is a definition of Minimalism originally attributed to Donald Judd. Krauss used it on three 
different occasions and I retrieved it from David Raskin’s essay: “Judd’s Moral Art”. See David Raskin, “Judd’s 
Moral Art” in Nicholas Serrota eds., Donald Judd, London, Tate Publishing, 2004, 82  
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Krauss, for example, often aligns positions in regard to claims of truth. In the 
essay “Allusion and Illusion in Donald Judd” 50, writing about one of Judd’s wall 
progressions (fig. 3), she notes that Judd wants to remove both “allusion and 
illusion” but that his work has kept both. The frontal view of the piece, 
suggesting a mathematical progression, does not clarify the physical condition 
of the object, perceived only from the side51. However, this is seen as a positive 
feature because it makes the work depend on the accumulation of views, a 
quality Krauss named “lived illusion” and as you may find elsewhere is:  
 
 
a realisation that she [Krauss] celebrated with a 
didactic claim about life … ‘lived illusion’ rightly 
demonstrated that it is the very interplay between a 
person and the world that gives meaning to both, that 
makes each exist52.  
 
 
This would be revised on two different occasions. First, negatively in 197153, 
when Krauss argues that “lived illusion” depends on the private experience of a 
singular viewer and therefore offers no certainty of truth. Second, positively in 
1973 54, when she stated that “lived illusion” demonstrates that the senses do 
not offer access to truth, suggesting that Minimalism is set to work like (and 
measured as) a field where the interplay between the subject and the world, and 
in particular acts of conscience, can be staged. 
 
In order to make a distinction from the traditional understanding of 
correspondence theories of truth, it is possible to say that Minimalism therefore, 
relates to what we could perhaps call a correspondence theory of knowledge.  
This distinction is made on the basis that, as far as Minimalism is about the 
whole preceding the parts and about artworks that stand on their own right, i.e. 
in the immediacy of their concrete presence in space, neither a description nor a 
sensual expression, then minimal art refuses the very idea of medium and 																																																								
50 Rosalind E. Krauss “Allusion and Illusion in Donald Judd” in, Artforum, vol. 4, no9 1966 
51 Ibid., 24   
52 David Raskin, “Judd’s Moral Art” in Nicholas Serrota eds., Donald Judd, 79  
53 See Rosalind E. Krauss “Problems of Criticism, X: Pictorial Space and the Question of Documentary” in 
Artforum, Vol.10, Nº 3 November, 1971		
54 see Rosalind E. Krauss, “Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on Post '60s Sculpture”,in Artforum, Vol. 12, 
Nº3, November 1973 
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dissolves a structure-content schema which is unlike any correspondence 
theory of truth. However, Minimalism also retains the priority of articulating 
questions of truth, as gathered from the use of materials and processes, which 
are stripped bare as it were, from anything but themselves, or in the way it 
engenders a situation that, in basic terms, produces the conditions for the 
viewer to gain awareness of the very process of viewing as a form of knowing 
and thus suggesting the idea of a correspondence theory of knowledge.  
 
In other words, Minimalism does not want to correspond to truth. Instead it 
claims that minimalist art works ‘are truth’. However, it does stage the process of 
acquiring knowledge and constructing meaning (under the principle that 
meaning is unstable), firstly by offering an empiricist ‘way of knowing’, and 
secondly, by corresponding to a behaviourist version of language that 
understands meaning not in terms of mental concepts but in the ability to use 
words. In the case of Minimalism, it is always in relation to an after-linguistic 
inquiry which makes it possible to undermine the object as a container of 
meaning whilst providing the means to an external determination of both object 
and viewing experience – according to how these correspond to, and in a way, 
resolve specific versions of philosophical problems, such as the process of 
acquiring knowledge, the nature of meaning, or the mind/body problem.  
 
To return for a moment to Rorty, in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth 55, he 
reasons that most western philosophy takes truth to be a relationship between 
representation and reality, leading to the question of how truth is determined. He 
speaks of two systems of thought: ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’. For an idealist it is 
representation, or an image in the mind that establishes reality and thus 
determines truth, while for realists, truth is determined by the case of a given 
object, or reality, that informs representation56. Rorty calls both 
“representationalists”: examples of a tradition that is obsessed with pursuing 
truth for its own sake, and so investing in the discovery of images as possible 
explanations. He uses the term representation as part of a philosophical and 
scientific lexicon, not in an artistic sense (a distinction that will require further 
attention), but the term is nonetheless useful to the discussion at this point when 
attempting to describe the relationship between a given object, or reality, and a 																																																								
55 Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. The first 
out of the four volumes that make the series “Philosophical papers” – a series published between 1991 and 
2008 
56 See ibid.,1-17	 	
	 40	
situation that claims to demonstrate it. This theory provides a method to 
describe Minimalism as a representationalist system and within that, as a project 
that is essentially concerned with realism. Not because it presents the 
appearances of an object or isolated ideas, but because it engenders a situation 
that wants to correspond to the way a person interacts with the world: it wants to 
be representative of the process of knowing. 
 
Inversely, we cannot align Minimalism with idealism because it is not assumed 
that the nature of this process can be modified. In fact, this is a distinction that 
also holds in terms of the viewing experience, an experience which is not 
predetermined by mental representations, but rather, as discussed in more 
detail further ahead, one that inevitably asks its subjects to produce a mental 
and objective image of the reality that such an experience is.  
 
In Summary, Minimalism can be inscribed in a line of thought that believes we 
cannot represent truth without betraying truth, because representation involves 
a game of simulation and substitution, but that in the name of truth, we must 
gain awareness of acts of conscience. This in turn means that, in trying to break 
with the appearance of truth, Minimalism has kept truth as a priority; that whilst 
its attack on representation is set out from a distinction between appearance 
and reality, and is indeed able to break with ‘appearances’, it remains 
conceptually hostage to the distinction between the two. Rorty’s definition of 
representationalism makes it possible to say that the minimalist anti-aesthetic 
approach to reality relates to what I have called, a correspondence theory of 






For the second step, we need to exchange the question of truth, which could 
easily lead the argument into a black hole, for another concept that is close 
enough to continue within this avenue: the idea of verification, which appears in 
Minimalism, so to speak, in a fold. On one side, we can recognise the way in 
which a minimalist artwork is designed to suppress difference and cancel part-
by-part relations for the benefit of the whole. Because of this, artworks become 
objects where in reality we cannot really say that something happens besides 
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ocular variations produced by different positions of viewing. On the other side, 
Minimalism foregrounds the viewer’s finding out about the work, suggesting the 
most important aspect to discover is the fact that there is indeed, something to 
be found – measured in terms of formal variations that motivate the viewer to 
continue looking. This makes it possible to say, therefore, that Minimalism is 
related to the process of knowing through verification, and because verification 
(of the verifiable) is the condition of the viewing experience – what animates the 
lively bodily engagement and provides the moving awareness of one’s relative 
position in space – then all Minimalism effectively does is to produce conditions 
of verification.  
 
In connection to this Ralph Perry, an influential thinker for Judd, maintains that: 
“In the theory of value it is this object, [referring to an abstract object] and not 
the acts of judgment themselves, which is primarily in question” 57. This follows 
Judd’s own conclusion that a work of art “needs only to be interesting.”58 Now, 
although it is not clear what Judd means by ‘interesting’, the answer is not too 
far away since if we are to consider how minimal art and specifically Judd’s own 
work abandons mental concepts, then ‘interesting’ is not only about the absence 
of judgement, but it is also about perception without concepts, from where it can 
be gathered that ‘interesting’ must be what keeps the viewer looking.  
 
Untitled from 1969 (fig. 4), for example, is a progression that most people, I 
imagine, would find visually appealing. It is formed by four open elements (each 
48x60x60 inches) displayed linearly and separated in consistent intervals of 12 
inches. The appearance of the work shifts from a group of solid forms to near 
absence, with each unit being constructed with four planes of anodized 
aluminium, layered with dark blue plexiglass inside. The work can be seen both 
as an object, or objects, and as space, since each element communicates with 
the spatial context around it and overall resists a definition of interior or exterior 
as well as refusing the notion of sculpture in terms of a core. It is also worth 
noting that units are displayed along a line with the open ends facing each other 																																																								
57 Ralph Perry was president of the American Philosophical Association, a professor at Harvard for nearly fifty 
years, as well as student, editor and biographer of William James. Having been an influential figure for Judd, 
he is quoted here for the catalogue essay of the artist’s retrospective at Tate in 2004 (see below). As student 
of James, Perry is often associated with the theorists of Pragmatism Yet, as indicated by this quotation, his 
thought  is radically different from that of Rorty, who throughout his work argued for the importance of 
continuous forms of judgment (as evaluation of vocabularies) David Raskin, “Judd’s Moral Art” in Nicholas 
Serrota eds., Donald Judd, 85. 




so that the whole presents itself as ‘seeing through’ without being a real 
passage.  
 
So although there are actually that many different elements to see, plenty can 
be said about the act of seeing which only confirms Judd’s point that: “The thing 
as a whole, its quality as a whole, is what is interesting”. Where different 
elements exist, they do so only to produce a rich perceptual field, and therefore 
‘interesting’ is as much what keeps one looking as what keeps one doubting – 
the very condition that brings the viewer, who knows things (only) moment by 
moment, into a process of infinite verification, that is, always doubting and 
verifying what lies around; a process that is key to producing the perceptive 
awareness one associates with Minimalism described by Potts, as he reads 
from Fried, as a moment “located firmly in the potentially endlessly looping 







4.Donald Judd, Untitled (1969), anodized aluminium, blue plexiglass, each unit 48x60x60 inches at a constant 
distance of 12 inches  
 																																																								
59 Alex Potts, The Sculptural Imagination, Figurative, Modernism, Minimalism, 198  		
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To summarize, the minimalist object translates the claim to objectivity into a 
form of verification – the verification of its own objectivity that in turn produces a 
neutral space where nothing happens beside the awareness of the viewing 
itself; its only task is to put together a rich perceptual field where the viewer is 
not completely unlike the figure of the sceptic – someone who doubts 
everything, but spends their life trying to find a way to verification. In turn, 
viewing could be described as the experience of verifying the verifiable (which is 
a kind of minimum truth), a pursuit which we can conclude has no purpose other 






The third step is a move into questions of making. Here the connection I am 
trying to establish between minimal art and objectivity manifests itself in the 
industrial ethos of the first – where we can again recognize an attempt to break 
with forms of illusion, symbolic value and the idea of works of art as 
commodities: an attempt thought to be possible by the very process of industrial 
fabrication and how it breaks with objects conceived in terms of originality. In 
connection to how the industrial aspect of Minimalism lends itself to the process 
of museological commodity production, there is not much to add to what Krauss 
has already said, as mentioned earlier with reference to “The Cultural Logic of 
the Late Capitalist Museum”, and therefore this topic will not be addressed 
directly. It is more productive to look instead into the implications of the model of 
objectivity (especially with regard to the applicability and reproduction of abstract 
diagrams) as it pertains to an absent model of agency.  
 
To begin with, we know that objectivity is the condition of what is exterior to 
subjective forms of apprehending the world typical, in short, of a subject-of-
conscience that tries to relate to what is independent of himself without altering 
it (to change it would mean to be unfaithful to it). This again brings to mind the 
idea of a correspondence theory of knowledge that is in fact similar to what 
Dewey, in The Quest for Certainty, has called a “spectator theory of knowledge”,  
which evokes objectivity as a system that places an impediment to the 
dissolution of what separates the order of knowledge and a knowing subject, 
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adding a sense of distance and the suggestion of relations of power, all singly 
captured in the term spectator.  
 
In terms of the association between this and Minimalism, we might think for 
instance, of Judd’s artworks as a whole. They are thoroughly planned and 
executed with a spatial and temporal distance between the two moments, that 
hence define a mode of production where the works ‘do not become’, because 
they, as it were, already pre-exist, in the planning. Minimalism, we can conclude, 
operates through planning a de-situated practice within the framework of 
objectivity that does not allow for a model of agency beyond the moment of an 
abstract conception. Or for difference to be introduced during making – a real 
difference, that is, that has not been planned or predetermined by industrial 
processes of fabrication and a logical priority use of construction methods and 
the plane.  
 
But indifference is not a rule in an absolute sense since variations take place 
here and there. An example can be found in the installation at Marfa 100 
Untitled Works in Mill Aluminum (1982-1986) where each of the 100 objects that 
comprise the installation has the same outer dimensions (41x51x72 inches), but 
a unique configuration within those limits. That being said, and in continuation of 
the example, the limitations of the industrial model of production are still present 
because singularity is not introduced, and crucially, difference is not a significant 
difference. Why? Because what makes each object distinct does not produce 
difference within the installation as a whole inasmuch as the difference of the 
first is dissolved into the whole of the second to which it does not add meaning.  
 
In parallel, to the consequences of an industrial model on the level of objects, 
we can also recognize other problems associated with the separation between 
thinking and making. Since making is seen as mere execution, there is not only 
the question of difference not being introduced, but a hierarchy that is 
established between thinking and making, which in turn raises political questions 
concerning the value attributed to different activities and different social groups.  
  
However, it needs to be said that, in the context of Minimalism, the indifference 
of making is not part of an intentional attempt to establish thinking as having a 
higher value to making, and even less so as an attempt to downgrade industrial 
works. And in fact, we know of the identification that artists and factory workers 
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shared at the time60. The emptying out of the significance of making in 
(archetypal) minimal art has to do with the search for the means to achieve a 
public determination of meaning which, as discussed earlier, seems to ask for 
the erasure of gestural and formal anthropomorphism. However, the separation 
between the two moments, that of thinking an object and that of making an 
object, works to reproduce the conditions that have established a social 
hierarchy and a division of activities in the first place; in the broader context of 
the social distribution of activities leading to the production of a piece by Judd, 
for example, that enact the division (overlapping with the notion of objectivity) 
between thinking and making.  
 
Another political mishap here is that in parallel to the argument that states 
indifference as the key to a democratic form of art, as pointed out before in 
relation to the viewing experience and the absence of difference in objects, the 
idea of democracy has a necessity for difference simply because democracy 
cannot be thought of in terms of a totalizing whole that cancels out the possibility 
for the ‘parts’ to introduce some form of significant difference (which, in effect, 
seems contrary to the levelling out and cancelling of part-whole relations in 
Minimalism). I will come back to this throughout the text.  
 
Now, coming together under the influence of the critique mounted throughout 
the 1960s, with reference to the notion of author and intentionality, specifically 
through Roland Barthes’ dissolution of the author’s mastery of meaning into the 
context of reception and Foucault’s association between the author and the 
disciplinary order61, the question of making in Minimalism, or in this case doing, 																																																								
60 It is possible to establish a connection between a significant number of artists associated with the New York 
art scene during the 1960s and 1970s, who often experienced life with financial limitations, and perhaps 
therefore able to identify with the working classes. Furthermore, artists incorporated aspects of industrial work 
into artistic production. One particular example is that of Richard Serra, who maintained a long and engaged 
relationship with metallurgic workers (his father worked in San Francisco shipyard and during a period in his 
life Serra himself worked in steel mills), a relationship that influenced his artistic work in formal and obviously in 
material terms and that one might also recognize in the way Serra’s work seeks to undermine the relation 
between gesture and meaning as a way to translate an absent identification between blue collar workers and 
the nature and product of their work (Industrial techniques can also be found in, for example, Chris Burden and 
his Honest Labour ,1979, and Franck Stella and his use of industrial paint and industrial-like techniques of 
transferring paint onto the canvas as anticipated in bodies of work such as Black Paintings, 1959-1960). 
Steelmill/Stahlwerk, a documentary from 1979 made in collaboration with Clara Weyergraf, Serra’s future wife, 
exemplifies this well by showing the construction of an artwork whilst focusing mostly on the de-humanizing 
working conditions experienced by steel workers involved. This is perhaps Serra’s most direct and explicit 
attempt to find the means to empathize with workers by giving them visibility. Certainly, one may accuse Serra 
of developing work that problematically depends of those very same conditions, but not of ignoring nor of not 
respecting them. For more about the film Serra’s relation with industry, see: Annette Michelson, “The films of 
Richard Serra: An Interview” in Richard Serra, Clara Weyergraf, Richard Serra: Interviews, Etc. 1970-1980, 
New York, The Hudson River Museum, 1980, 93-117.  
61 I rely on the analyses of Krauss who in “Who Comes After the Subject?”, in which the author selects 
Barthes and Foucault as the main theoretical references for the conceptualization of the minimalist subject, 
namely through the seminal “The Death of the Author” from the first and ‘What is an Author?’ from the second. 
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has another side. This is particularly expressive in a later phase of Morris’s 
minimalist period that involves the inverse to planning and therefore not the 
same type of objectivity but one that continues to refuse a model of agency.  
 
By the time the fourth and last part of “Notes on Sculpture” was published - the 
part where Morris is more critical of the institutionalization of art and of the 
commodity status of art works as finished products-, his attention had shifted 
from the idea of the gestalt 62 and an earlier minimalist understanding of 
sculpture, one that maintains a “figure-ground relation” 63, towards process, 
materials and anti-form. Describing a movement that Lucy Lippard would later 
call the “Dematerialisation of the art object”64, or in Morris’s own terms, 
“sculpture as field”, that is:  sculpture that takes “the conditions of the visual field 




Rosalind E Krauss. “Who Comes After the Subject?” in Rosalind E. Krauss, Perpetual Inventory, London, MIT 
Press, 2010, 257-263 
62 Notably in Notes on Sculpture part 1, Morris uses the term gestalt for shape in line with the principles of 
Gestalt psychology - that argues the human mind tends to organize the visual world by forming perceptual 
wholes. For more see: Roberto Morris, “Notes on Sculpture, Part 1” in Robert Morris, Continuous Projected 
Altered Daily. The Writings of Robert Morris, 6-8 
63 The complete citation reads: “So-called Minimal art fulfilled the project of reconstituting art as objects while 
at the time sharing the same perceptual condition as figurative sculpture. Both objects and figures in real 
space maintain a figure-ground relation” in Robert Morris, “Notes on Sculpture Part 4” in Robert Morris, 
Continuous Projected Altered Daily. The Writings of Robert Morris, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1995, 54  
64 In Lucy Lippard, Six Years: The Dematerialization of the Art Object from 1966 to 1972, University of 
Califórnia Press, 1997 
65 Robert Morris, “Notes on Sculpture Part 4” in Robert Morris, Continuous Projected Altered Daily. The 




5. Robert Morris, views of and diagram for, Untitled [Stadium] (1967), eight units in total, fibreglass, four 




6. Robert Morris, Untitled (scatter piece) 1968-69, as recreated in 2010 at Leo Castelli Gallery, New York, 




Initiated by investigations into the instability of shape in works such as Stadium 
from 1967 (fig. 5), made of interchangeable elements that Morris would 
rearrange into different configurations, this phase arrives at a more mature 
stage with the now iconic Continuous Project Altered Daily, exhibited alongside 
Untitled (Scatter Piece) 1968-1969 at Leo Castelli Gallery warehouse in New 
York in 1969. Two works that marked the moment when Morris clearly distanced 
himself from the preceding period, with explorations into gravity, formlessness 
and, to use a colloquial expression, the random distribution of ‘stuff’. This 
allowed him to move away from the concentration and homogeneity found 
inobjects and figures, i.e. away from isolated things and towards dispersion and 
heterogeneity, or precisely, in the direction of the visual field itself – a distinction 
that Morris maintains is the same as what separates a figurative mode from a 
landscape mode66. However, dismissing the figurative logic by breaking 
withfigure/ground relation is of course, not the same as cancelling the staging of 
the body. In an oeuvre, which is fundamentally theatrical, Morris’ is defined 
around the viewer’s body, and crucially, around his own 67, which brings us 
again, to questions of making and then later, to the viewer’s body.   
 
Untitled (Scatter Piece) 1968-69 (fig. 6) was recreated in 2010 once again at 
Leo Castelli Gallery 68. Similarly to its original version, it was made of felt and 
metal pieces distributed in equal part throughout the gallery. The felts 
corresponded to the shape of the metals before bending, which in turn were 
made of copper, aluminium, zinc, brass, lead or steel. Morris followed the 
original plans to fabricate the elements, plans had been determined by chance 
operations: coin tosses and numbers taken from a phone book that determined 
the length; width and thickness of each element and whether it was to be flat or 
bent at a right angle once or twice.  
 
That same year Richard Kalina, who had been sitting behind the front desk at 
Leo Castelli warehouse during the original exhibition, published a text in Art in 
America 69. Here he writes of an episode from 1969 when Richard Serra entered 
the room containing the piece Continuous Project Altered Daily, and without 																																																								
66 Ibid.   
67 Column,1960, I box, 1962, War, 1963, Site, 1964, Waterman switch, 1965, and his infamous 
sadomasochism-inspired poster for Leo Castelli Gallery (1974) are all works that mark a strong presence of 
Morris’s body in his own oeuvre.   
68 The work was recreated at Leo Castelli, which by 2010 had changed location.  
69 Much of the information here is owed to this essay: Richard Kalina, “Robert Morris: The order of disorder” in 
Art in América, Nº 5, May 2010, 65-68	
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permission started “kicking things around much like a kid does to a tempting pile 
of leaves” 70 gleefully justifying this act by saying that it wouldn’t matter. And it 
didn’t, as Kalina says, Morris would arrive later that day and notice nothing.  
 
In fact, Morris himself told the gallery director that his hand was not necessary in 
the making of the piece; that either she, or a group of eight-year-olds, could 
arrange the work. This, of course, is coherent with the critique of authorship and 
intentionality that we recognize in Minimalism, where the issue at work is the 
subject, or more precisely, the attempt to erase the personal aspect of the 
subject. Morris effectively achieved this by removing choice and purpose, thus 
the work is a negative intent or the equivalent to indifference. Things were put 
together in such a random way that any residual possibility of distinguishing the 
important from the irrelevant was lost and whatever Morris would add or change 
would make no difference. So although the reading of Continuous Project 
Altered Daily is determined by a coherent theoretical production71, the artwork 
itself cancels any possibility of producing meaning, be it on the level of the 
artwork or on the level of the subject at play, both in viewing and in making. It 
shows, or rather confirms, the fate of Minimalism as working to produce a 
subject that is incapable of meaningful actions and artworks without a capacity 
to introduce difference.  
 
All this comes in line with a text that Morris published in 1970 titled, “Some 
Notes on the Phenomenology of Making: The Search for Motivated” 72, where he 
argues that it is critical to evacuate intentionality from art and turn the process of 
making into an end in itself – a move we can align with the principles of so-
called Process Art. But not only that, he also argues about the importance of 
using chance operations, much like those mentioned above, in order to replace 
intention and what he calls, arbitrary reasons such as taste. The problem is that 
chance operations come with a free-flowing energy that he calls “the motivated”, 
or a motivation without object, which is not only free from intention but serves no 
necessity: this is the other type of objectivity. Retrieving from a process of 																																																								
70 Ibid., 68 
71 The fact that writing is what gives some coherence to Morris’s rather dispersive oeuvre seems relevant, 
particularly in relation to the works being discussed and the publication of “Anti-Form” and “Some Notes on the 
Phenomenology of Making: The Search for the Motivated”. Robert Morris, “Anti-Form” in Artforum, vol. 6, April 
1968, 33-35. Robert Morris, “Some Notes on the Phenomenology of Making: The Search for the Motivated” in 
Artforum, vol. 8, April 1970, 62-66.  
72 First published in Artforum in 1970, “Some Notes on the Phenomenology of Making: The Search for 
Motivated” was republished in 1993 in Robert Morris, Continuous Project Altered Daily: The Writings of Robert 
Morris, London, MIT Press, 1993		
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making decisions leaves the space open, as Stanley Cavell has observed, to a 




The invocation of chance is like an earlier artist’s 
invocation of the muse, and serves the same 
purpose: to indicate that his work comes not from 
him, but through him – its validity or authority is 
not a function of his own powers or intentions. 
Speaking for the muse, however, was to give 
voice to what all men share, or all would hear; 
speaking through chance forgoes a voice 





The final step may be the most abstract of all four. If we return for a moment to 
the question of fabrication, we could defend Minimalism in terms of its 
acknowledgment of making, pointing out that there are numerous cases where 
there is an obvious preoccupation with giving the viewer the possibility of 
understanding how different elements come together and how their physical 
support is achieved. As much as we may say that this is a general rule, there 
are exceptions that undermine the principles of this being a rule. In viewing 
Judd’s vertical progressions for example (fig. 7), we are not able to know how 
gravity is defeated and how the different elements are able to stand on the wall 
and walking around or getting closer to it does not provide an answer. What 
Krauss calls “lived illusion” as referenced before, does not apply here because 
the material condition of the predetermination of these art works (as such) is 
hidden and instead it is as if all elements float.  																																																								
73 A more complete quote would be as follows: “When a contemporary theorist appeals to chance, he 
obviously is not to call attention to the act of composition, but to deny that act; to deny that what he offers is 
composed. His concept is singular, with no existing plural; it functions not as an explanation for particular 
actions but as a metaphysical principle which supervises his life and work as a whole. The invocation of 
chance is like an earlier artist’s invocation of the muse, and serves the same purpose: to indicate that his work 
comes not from him, but through him – its validity or authority is not a function of his own powers or intentions. 
Speaking for the muse, however, was to give voice to what all men share, or all would hear; speaking through 
chance forgoes a voice altogether – there is nothing to say” in Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? 







7.Donald Judd, Untitled (1968),  
stainless steel, yellow plexiglass, ten units, 
each unit 6x27x24 inches at a constant distance of 6 inches  
 
 
What this registers conceptually can perhaps be summarized by two observations. 
First, that the concealment undermines the very idea of a concrete presence in 
space and a pure ahistoricism of minimal art works, which are questioned by the 
impossibility of understanding what precedes the physical support of objects in space 
– a feat related to what Charles Reeve has called Judd’s hidden historicism74. This 
refers to the obscuring of the history (and politics) of materials before and beyond the 
moment of industrial recasting and, for what matters the most here, of the pre-																																																								
74 The idea that Judd’s artwork carries a hidden historicism (an idea that can be easily translated to Minimalism in 
general) can be found as claimed by Charles Reeve in REEVE, Charles Reeve, “Cold Metal: Donald Judd’s Hidden 
Historicity” in Art History, Vol. 15. nº4, 1992, 486-504 
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condition of objects. Second, what this concealment suggests is that there is a blind 
area in Minimalism’s claim to objectivity. As will be outlined below, this allows me to 
summarize some of the ideas discussed so far.  
 
First of all, objectivity carries a claim to universality and its logic is that of an 
elsewhere determination, that one assumes to be exterior to any subject-related 
aspect such as personal, cultural, or political influences. It reclaims a certain matter-
of-factness, if you will, that although has no specific location can be repeated, and 
once used on matters of decision reduces the capacity to make decisions. In other 
words, with objectivity the space of decisions is replaced with a numeric relation that 
in turn is presented as a motive for consensus – an observation that we can 
associate with both fabrication and chance operations.  
 
Secondly, the form of such consensus is what is behind a connection between 
objectivity and democracy which is, in that sense, reduced to a relation with the 
numeric in the specific form of the consensus as an ordering that neutralizes any 
difference. Furthermore, the claims behind the use of objectivity, and this is 
particularly clear in Minimalism, seem to assume that there is an artistic and political 
gain in replacing a symbolic order for the numeric (which itself becomes similar to a 
symbolic order established with no apparent relation to [a] community). This is at 
stake in Judd’s use of mathematics, notably the fibonacchi sequence, and once 
again Morris’s use of chance operations.  
 
However, such exteriority is not truly universal because its very definition is 
determined by an intellectual tradition. As Rorty has told us, as a concept it has its 
own history and results from a series of contingencies including the formation of 
isolated social groups with the power to control the conditions, one could say the 
staging, of a claim to universality (any project that tries to legitimize knowledge by 
isolating institutions and transcending practical questions) which, in that sense, 
appears as an exercise of power, taking place between the subject that determines 
and fixes what is objective, that is, what is proposed as transversal and equal to all, 
and the subject that receives it.  
 
Summarily speaking, therefore, objectivity seems at once to be a condition of the 
democratic and anti-democratic; democratic because it relates to what is equal to all, 
and anti-democratic because it imposes an ordering that involves the attempt to fix a 
form of what is public. Doing so by problematically, foregoing the very conditions of 
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its determination which we can recognize, if only by pushing the argument to its limit, 
in how Judd’s wall pieces literally hide the contingency of their physical support.   
 
So in synthesis, we could perhaps define objectivity as a condition of a conservative 
model of the democratic – a model that promotes the repetition of a given order 
under a claim for universality. And insofar as we can say Minimalism reclaims 
objectivity, we can also say that it follows a conservative model of the democratic 
which, in turn, would seem to correspond to the weakening, indeed the illusion, of a 
democratic form of art produced in terms of an experience of viewing that is 
undifferentiated. Or what we have come to call a communitarian perception, and 
simultaneously contingent to the isolation and control of the viewing conditions.  
 
Hence, it is also possible to say that a model of the democratic that claims relevancy 
through objectivity lends itself more easily to the logic of commodification through 
repetition and subservience to the numeric. In fact, this is not so distant from a 
certain prohibition, not-to-be-democratic, that we experience today in the form of a 
coercion to find consensus, cancelling out difference and reinforce a given order in 
place – often taking precedence from economic questions and a priority of the 
numeric – therein considered natural to the claim of democracy.  
 
If we return to the works presented at Marfa for a moment, it would be complicated to 
say Judd anticipated the more commercial side that the project has acquired since its 
early stages – largely resulting from the fact that Marfa was progressively established 
as an exclusive travel destination for art lovers. However, the way the project was 
absorbed by the industry of art, furthermore describing the transference of 
Minimalism as a public form of art to the sphere of the private, reveals the difficulties 
that Minimalism has to resist the effects of a culture organized around acts of 
consumption. This happens because its logic of repetition and indifference carried 
the seeds of commodification all along, but perhaps mostly because Minimalism’s 
“moment of bodily plenitude”, to use Krauss’s expression, is unable to answer back 
with an alternative to the symbolic void produced by such culture around everything 
except the very act of consumption. This brings me to another point that needs some 
attention before the chapter’s conclusion: the analogy, already suggested, between 
the minimal object and subject.  
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The analogy between the object and the subject of Minimalism  
 
 
It is as difficult to accommodate the idea of interiority on the level of the object 
as it is on the level of the subject, which signals how Minimalism lives from a 
continuous correlation between the object and the subject, the first functioning 
as a visual analogy of the second. The analogy is always there in the relation of 
scale that the viewer establishes between his body and the work, but the true 
analogy that is taking place seems to be between undifferentiated specific 
objects and undifferentiated and unspecific subjects – something at the very 
origin of Minimalism.  
 
Morris’ Column, a dance piece from 1960, exemplified this point well by 
parodying the idea of the object as a container of meaning, as well as a model 
of intellect based on interiority through a visual play. The piece made use of the 
image of the mind inhabited by a humanoid who stood inside a box made to fit 
his body, as suggested by Morris himself. In an albeit more subtle style, Judd 
suggests something similar with his famous rule “it’s just one thing after 
another,”75 which could be applied well to art works but could also be seen in 
relation to the undifferentiated subject of Minimalism.  
 
Hinting at something similar is Michael Fried who identifies the analogy in terms 
of a hidden interiority and anthropomorphism, as exemplified when he writes: 
“the apparent hollowness of most literalist work – the quality of having an inside 
– is almost blatantly anthropomorphic” 76 and, “being distanced by such objects 
is not … entirely unlike being distanced, or crowded, by the silent presence of 
another person”77. More recently Alex Potts noted that: “Judd’s work might just 
be envisaged as a categorically modernist analogue of the ideal classical nude 
of earlier figurative sculpture”78.  
 
Hardly a surprise at this point, it is nonetheless important to make clear that this 
analogy between the minimalist object and the human body, the way this mirrors 																																																								
75 Donald Judd, “Specific Objects” in David Hulks, Alex Potts, Jon Wood Jon. eds., Modern Sculpture Reader, 
218 
76 The example Fried gives is Morris’s now titled “Ring with Light” from 1965 “with its fluorescent light glowing 
from the within”. Michael Fried, Art and Objecthood, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 
1998, 156 
77 Ibid., 155 
78 Alex Potts, The Sculptural Imagination. Figurative, Modernism, Minimalism, 304	
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the subject being produced, which leaves us with a visual suggestion of the 
neutral viewer posited by the latter’s demand for an experience structured 
externally – a subject that is anonymous, or undifferentiated, and mentally 
calmed. Productive as it may be within the minimalist logic, this subject has 
serious limitations in a wider context. It is the nature of these limitations that 
needs to be discussed, which I propose to do next in relation to a 1971 





8. Exhibition view, Robert Morris, Neo-Classic (1971) at the Tate Gallery, London  
 
 
The first is Neo-Classic 79 (fig. 8), exhibited at the Tate Gallery in 1971, another 
groundbreaking work by Morris and one that, in comprising different phases of 
his artistic development 80, allows me to return to some problems concerning 
how the viewer enters the space of Minimalism. In the year that it took Morris to 																																																								
79 I am relying on a description of the exhibition offered by Jon Bird. See Jon Bird, “Minding the Body: Robert 
Morris’s 1971 Tate Gallery Retrospective” in Jon Bird, Michael Newman, eds. Rewriting Conceptual Art. 
London, Reaktion Books,1999  
80 The idea for the exhibition was proposed by art critic David Sylvester who, in addition to seeing Morris’s 
work at Leo Castelli Gallery, had interviewed him for a series of talks on the BBC. Initially, the proposal was for 
a conventional retrospective of works from the 1960s but as Jon Bird tells us in an essay dedicated to this 
exhibition “Morris recognized the necessity to show past works in London, although from the outset he clearly 
intended to limit the retrospective element within an overall conception of a large scale installation” in Ibid., 90	
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discuss the exhibition with the Tate, he went from a project of a traditional 
retrospective to a rather more experimental one that gave him the opportunity to 
recapitulate the movement from a reflective and purely visual reception of 
contents to a bodily engagement; to emphasize the object as a sign of play and 
exchange of meaning (not its bearer); to mark the visual field as a site for 
exchange and process; and finally, to combine a form of institutional critique 
with the viewer’s body as a destabilizing factor.  
 
The exhibition was divided into three main areas and consisted of objects and 
structures, i.e. props, plus a series of instructive photographs displayed along 
the gallery walls, a slide show of previous works and the screening of some of 
Morris’s films, including “Neo-Classic”, completed just forty-eight hours before 
the opening to document the exhibition81. The first area of the exhibition housed 
objects to be moved by the viewer along metal and wooden ramps. In the 
second, it was the movement of the viewer that set objects in motion: 
 
 
timber logs or large cylinders that could be set 
rolling, plywood platforms balanced on large 
balls, or balls that could be propelled along 
tracks. Here, the works were mutually interactive 
and imposed a certain choreographic pattern on 
the movement and gestures of the spectators82.  
 
 
The third area was occupied by flexible devices and large structures with the 
potential to determine the movement of viewers:  
 
 
Variations on the theme of a tightrope, double-
tired ramps which increased and decreased in 
height, contorting the body as it moved up or  																																																								
81 The film Neo-Classic was made with a female model interacting calmly with the works while naked. I was 
unable to find any footage from the actual film, but judging by the cinematographic description offered by Jon 
Bird, it was suggestive that the model was a sculptural figure, in that it showed a person slowly interacting with 
the props with an almost static and precise, rather than fluid, mechanical movement. It is hard not to imagine 
those who saw it thinking of classic sculpture in its more common known version of the nude. The description 
can be found in Ibid., 88-89 
82 As above, I am relying on the description of the exhibition offered by Jon Bird in Ibid., 88-106 
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down, and wooden crevices negotiated by 
jamming the body, or part of the body, against 




The only instructions on how to interact with the props were given by the display 
of black and white photographs taken prior to the show with demonstrations by 
gallery staff. These are the images that more commonly illustrate the 1971 
exhibition (see fig. 8). Contrary to the tranquility that the images suggest, we 
know that the response from visitors resulted in an exhibition that somewhat 
exploded into excessive enthusiasm for the works being engaged with. For the 
first time in its history, the Tate Gallery had asked people to interact directly with 
works of art, indeed to complete them, resulting in what at the time was a form 
of unconventional behaviour and, if only collateral, an anti-establishment 
physical release. A growing concern about the safety of visitors and some minor 
injuries caused by the scrappy quality of materials as reported, led to the early 
closure of the exhibition only four days after its opening. Six days after it came 
down, a more traditional retrospective exhibition of Morris’s works, new 
exhibition title, was reinstalled. Despite its contrived and early end, Neo-Classic 
is a milestone in contemporary exhibition culture because of the way it 
expanded the notion of the viewing experience in a direction that is now 
common: works that exist in the same space as viewers who, in turn, make 
them operative. In 2009, Neo-Classic was recreated at Tate Modern’s Turbine 
Hall with the name Bodyspacemotionthings (fig. 9). 
 
																																																								
83 see Jon Bird, “Minding the Body: Robert Morris’s 1971 Tate Gallery Retrospective” in Jon Bird, Michael 




9. Exhibition view from the mezzanine, Robert Morris, bodyspacemotionthings (2009) Tate Modern  
 
 
However, Bodyspacemotionthings represents a different kind of exhibition. 
Commissioned as a four-day event in May 2009, due to public demand it 
continued for two extra weeks. Exhibited in one open area, many of the props 
remained similar in form, material and function to those from 1971, but they 
were larger and made according to recent health and safety procedures. No 
major injuries occurred this time.  
 
Those who participated in this version of the work were caught between the 
awareness of their body in space – provided by the physical engagement with 
the props – and the externalization of that awareness. ‘To be aware’ constitutes 
a moment of self-reflexivity, or to ‘see’ oneself viewing, requires a disembodied 
perspective of sorts. If before this awareness was associated with the use of 
language, it was now materialized in the mezzanine above the Turbine Hall 
where one could have an exterior overview, i.e., an objective perspective, of the 
work. My contention is that this is a late feature that operates as an equivalent to 
the ‘externalization of self’, which completes the minimalist logic and 
simultaneously supports the critique developed here. It certainly seems to 
correspond to the last chapter or the last stage of development in Krauss’s 
history of Modern Sculpture where she writes: “It causes us to meditate on a 
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knowledge of ourselves that is formed by looking outward toward the responses 
of others as they look back at us. It is a metaphor for the self as it is known 
through its appearance to the other”84.  
 
So while participants engaged in the activities proposed by the props and, 
similarly to what happened decades before, they would balance, roll, climb or 
crawl, acquiring in that manner a sense of their own bodies and relative position 
in space, they were also quite aware that they were being seen; a form of 
conscious externalization, if only temporal, of their own activities. And what did 
the perspective from the mezzanine show? Well, besides the quasi-theatrical 
setting of the installation, the activities first of all seemed simple and fun; simple 
physical exchanges, or tasks, determined by the form of the props. No pre-
knowledge was required to fully engage with all the work had to offer, which 
perhaps explains the success it achieved across different groups and different 
generations. It was clearly a very inclusive piece and one with a sense of 
communal and lively fun. Looking out from the mezzanine and into the Turbine 
Hall, however, also showed something different.  
 
The work, as we know, corresponded to a stage of development when the 
figurative mode had been completely dismissed, while maintaining a figurative 
aspect. The audience completed the visual field with the live anthropomorphic 
image of the body and appeared in space with the unequivocal shape of figures, 
an image that Minimalism has always carried in its interest of the body. Using 
the term ‘figure’ here is perhaps confusing, but not if we remember that 
Minimalism wanted to rid of the referent and to place artworks and viewers on 
the same plane of concrete existence, thus arriving at a condition we can say 
the human body ‘figures’ itself. The point of the question here is that the self of 
these ‘figures’ is looked at from the outside as if it was something separated and 
independent from the inner self, appearing as a subject dispossessed from its 
interior tension and much like objects, posited as though without a content of its 
own, confirming the analogy between objects and subjects – almost like a figure 
without a figure.   
 																																																								
84 The original quote is as follows: “By forcing on us this eccentric position relative to the centre of the work, 
the Double Negative [Michael Heizer’s work from 1969] suggests an alternative to the picture we have of how 
we know ourselves. It causes us to meditate on a knowledge of ourselves that is formed by looking outward 
toward the responses of others as they look back at us. It is a metaphor for the self as it is known through its 
appearance to the other.” in Rosalind E Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, 280 
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Of course, to dismiss one’s personal history, character or emotional drives, or 
even to reduce free will to a series of arbitrary decisions, serves a rhetoric of 
objectivity and the logic of Minimalism well. But it also narrows the engagement 
with the work into a simple physical exchange where behaviour results primarily 
from exterior conditions, in this case defined, or regulated, by the props. In other 
words, looking at the work from a certain distance provided by the mezzanine, 
created the critical distance that one could say, showed participants as not only 
anonymous, interchangeable, non-judging selves, but also as subjects, evoking 
Morris’s earlier search for movements, without interior meaning, where actions 
are like empty verbs – activities about nothing else other than the activity itself. 
An experience that is about meaning, but one that has no meaning.  
 
This is to say that the relation between the image produced from the mezzanine 
of the action taking place during Bodyspacemotionthings revealed, if it is 
possible to conceive, what I called earlier the ‘blind area’ of Minimalism. The 
situation meant that the subject of the work was created right there, not because 
of accumulated knowledge or historical references, but because of the 
‘experiencing’ of the work consisting in the discovery of the body in space and a 
form of body awareness produced through the engagement with the props. At 
the same time, in line with Minimal art’s demand for a collective and external 
perception, Bodyspacemotionthings asked for an objective, and therefore 
disembodied and mental, perspective of the work; a perspective, normally 
theoretical, that was now, as it were, materialized by the view from the 
mezzanine. Overlooking the work with the necessary distance, a distance that 
can be well referred to as the ‘objective distance’, solved a series of questions at 
play in minimal art. The engagement between viewers and non-illusionistic 
objects, the possibility to resolve the mind/body problem through a series of 
activities about nothing else other than the activities themselves - marked by a 
conceptual void, and the communal aspect of such engagement as carried out 
by a group of undifferentiated viewers, were all made externally visible, indeed, 
externally verifiable.  
But the point to be made here is that the mezzanine materialized not only as a 
perspective normally reserved to theory, but as a theoretical slip between two 
contradictory, yet central, principles of Minimalism that should be invisible in 
order for the minimalist conceptual theory to hold; a slip between the principle 
that says minimal art is concerned with a bodily experience and the principle 
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that says that it needs an externalization of the body. Indirectly staged at Tate 
Modern, the aporia was set up by the impossibility to simultaneously ‘experiment 
with art’ in the Turbine Hall and to occupy a position up on the mezzanine where 
the whole situation could be seen as an ‘externalization of selves’. Easy to 
ignore otherwise, the problem is found right at the very core of the minimalist 
project, as Krauss seems to note in a rare passage where the contradiction 
appears only to be left unexplored: “Part of the meaning of much of Minimal 
sculpture issues from the way in which it becomes a metaphorical statement of 
the Self understood only in experience.” 85 
It is this inconsistency between a movement that wants to purge illusion and 
metaphor and the fact that it actually ends up functioning as a metaphor - and 
that I content minimal art cannot think - that the exhibition at Tate exposed with 
the contradiction between the importance of a bodily engagement with the work 
and the way the work came together as an external overview of such 
engagement.  
What if we assume for a moment that this is just a minor conceptual mishap, a 
mere detail as it were, that we can easily ignore in the face of what the setting at 
Tate Modern produced? As seen from the mezzanine: the possibility of offering 
the priority of truth - in the version of self-identical objects and experiences 
about nothing else other than those experiences - its very own vivid and 
verifiable image. Then to return to Rorty again, we may seem to be holding on to 
the habit of looking for truth for its own sake, taking truth to be a noble pursuit 
and priority in itself and independently of the use it may or may not have for its 
receiver. Chances are we might be forgetting to question the importance of the 
pursuit itself and altogether ignoring reality.  
Let us see: the theoretical framing of Minimalism is already tautological in the 
sense that it translates a form of art that is tailor-made to structural analysis and 
objective inquiry. That being said, what the view from the mezzanine has made 
explicit – in the live image of people engaging with an artwork through moments 
of bodily awareness (as a value in itself), and where this awareness is produced 
by a series of frivolous activities without a real consequence, relation or any 
sense of contribution, let alone commitment, to what is going on outside such 																																																								
85 In Rosalind E. Krauss “Sense and Sensibility: Reflection on Post '60s Sculpture” in James Meyer, ed., 
Minimalism, 256 	
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experience - is the bankruptcy of the relation between verification, objects and 
experiences beyond the limits of Minimalism’s self-legitimizing and circular 
argument, which reclaims criticality whilst denying any attempt to reconfigure the 
world.  
 
Hence, we could say that Minimalism completes modernity’s compromise to 
resist any forms of idealization and render notions of truth concrete and 
verifiable. That it corresponds to a form of realism, obviously not in terms of 
mimesis, but in the way that it involves objects and real people in a direct way. It 
is this priority given to the presentation of things and people being in themselves 
that grounds minimal art’s claim to critical and political traction, whilst preventing 
by its very logic, an address of reality beyond what ‘already is’ on a physical 
plane.  
 
Once again this is illustrated metaphorically by how viewers who stood on the 
mezzanine were asked to contemplate an idea, that of a situation involving 
objects and real people, but not to create any. The idea was ‘down there’, out of 
reach, where people moved as instructed by similar props decades before. And 
the viewer, or knower, who in this case could enter and leave the image but only 
as an accident, remained an outside spectator of what was to be known: 
something that cannot be reached, touched, or even comprehended unless with 
theory or with an over-viewing platform.   
 
So in completing the four steps set out earlier – Minimalism’s commitment to 
truth, the question of verification, the absent model of agency and what I have 
called a ‘blind area’, now placed in connection to the analogy between object 
and subject – we can, lastly, return to the initial proposal and respond to 
Krauss’s focus on the appropriation of the ‘code’ of Minimalism, with my own 
hypothesis stating that the real problem is how the latter prevents us from 
thinking beyond ‘what is already in place’.  
 
Bodyspacemotionthings gave us the counter example to “exercises in sensory 
reprogramming” 86 (such as that of James Turrell’s work, which Krauss identifies 																																																								
86 Krauss elaborates on a work by Turrell called Blood Lust from 1989. She writes: “The Turrell piece, itself an 
exercise in sensory reprogramming, is a function of the way a barely perceptible luminous field in front of one 
appears gradually to thicken and solidify, not by revealing or bringing into focus the surface which projects this 
colour, a surface which we as viewers might be said to perceive, but rather by concealing the vehicle of the 
colour and thereby producing the illusion that it is the field which is focusing, that is the very object facing one 
that is doing the perceiving for one”; what she sees in close relation to “a subject that no longer does its own 
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as the wrong sort of Minimalist revision), by positing something different to the 
unrealized technological subject that Krauss considers is behind the 
misappropriation of Minimalism by the logic of late capitalism, i.e. that of a 
general industrialization of all aspects of life, including culture and art. Simply 
put, what Bodyspacemotionthings suggests is that the problem is not really how 
Minimalism anticipated its own technological update and a problematic 
articulation of space, and the fact that the work is not ‘technological’ is the key 
here, but rather questions of a different nature.  
 
We can recognize in Bodyspacemotionthings, Krauss’s own idea that “meaning 
… is unintelligible apart from … the (semiological) conventions of a public 
space” 87, as well as Morris’s early conviction that “much of the new sculpture 
makes a positive value of large size” 88 that he sees in terms of producing a 
public mode of viewing. Both quotations point to the centrality of space for 
Minimalism, which is precisely the element that seems to determine most of the 
decisions that go into exhibition-making today, alongside a rhetoric of presence 
according to which the experience of viewers is at the core of exhibitions. In that 
regard, curatorial decisions behind the programme for the Turbine Hall have 
been exemplary for their extraordinary inclusivity – one of the main concerns 
within a contemporary understanding of art, for which Minimalism was with no 
doubt instrumental. However, Morris’s 2009 installation also made evident some 
of the negative aspects of the transition from an initial phase of Minimalism to a 
present-day context, especially in comparison with its original version. 
Bodyspacemotionthings has posited a body that is no longer a site of 
institutional critique and indeed, a subject in search not of affect, but of 
gratuitous ‘intensities’.  
 
Once again, the most important question does not seem to be whether or not 
Minimalism, in its relation to the industrial object and a decentred subject, has 
anticipated, or even prepared for the transformation of the end of grand 																																																								
perceiving but is involved in a dizzying effort to decode signs that emerge from within a no longer mappable or 
knowable depth”. An experience associated with what Jameson as mentioned here, calls the hysterical 
sublime, which is to say the hyperspace. In Rosalind E. Krauss, “The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalist 
Museum” in October, Vol. 54, nº 104,12 
87 In Rosalind E. Krauss “Sense and Sensibility: Reflection on Post '60s Sculpture” in James Meyer, ed., 
Minimalism, 255  
88 In brief, Morris argues that when an object is much smaller than the body, it tends to produce the illusion of 
existing in an imaginary space and to create a personal mode of viewing by asking viewers to reduce the 
distance to it.  Works with larger dimensions on the other hand, require the viewer to step back and look at 
them from a distance. That is a public mode for between the viewer and the work there is now a space that 
can be shared by others. For more details, see: Robert Morris “Notes on Sculpture part 2” in David Hulks, Alex 
Potts, Jon Wood Jon. eds., Modern Sculpture Reader, 238 
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narratives into the utter fragmentation of the post-modern subject and its role 
within the logic of late capitalism. Instead, the most important question seems to 
be that in a time when it is crucial to propose something other than a subject 
who experiences life as “an increasingly instrumentalized being”89, the logic of 
objectivity in Minimalism prevents any alternative, other than that of a 
compensatory experience, because its priority is to present the subject to itself 
in a direct, non-idealized form as well as to generate terms of engagement with 
concrete objects, themselves characterized by indifference.  
 
Seen from another angle, this means that in privileging knowledge as a form of 
finding out about reality indeed in trying to correspond to ways of knowing, 
Minimalism and the logic of objectivity withdraw from exploring ways to cope 
with reality and hence exclude, to use Rorty’s terms, “coordination of 
behaviour”90.  
 
Additionally, Minimalism as discussed earlier, presents itself as a democratic 
form of art, one where the democratic assumes a conservative condition 
because it seeks to cancel difference and to achieve a form of consensus that 
prevents change. Together with its rhetoric of presence, one that is conceived 
exclusively in terms of the presence of living bodies, Minimalism cannot be 
conceived, with a nod to what will be discussed later, in terms of a democracy of 
promise.  
 
Thus, these are some of the reasons why the logic of Minimalism, or Minimalism 
as no-figuration, stands in the way of the task of reimagining a subject capable 
of a meaningful action, as well as objects capable of introducing indifference, 
beyond what objectively, externally, already exists. In the end, Minimalism seeks 
to resolve philosophical problems such as the question of verification, the body-
mind problem, and how to achieve a communal perception that once becoming 
a priority in themselves, and especially if we are to consider the context outside 
the scenario where these terms are rehearsed and eventually formally and 
structurally resolved, appear as pseudo-problems when it comes to the ambition 
of answering to reality as opposed to corresponding to (structures) of reality. In 
sum: if for the philosophically-informed Minimalist artists and thinkers, “what 																																																								
89 In Rosalind E. Krauss, “The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalist Museum” in October, Vol. 54, nº 104, 9  
90 In its originating form: “Inquiry that does not achieve coordination of behaviour is not inquiry but simply 
wordplay” in Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, London, Penguin, 1999, xxv	
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sculpture was is insufficient because founded on an idealistic myth” 91, then for 
someone concerned with the relation between art and reality, Minimalism’s own 
insufficiency is that of not allowing re-descriptions.   
 
 
Moving towards figurative sculpture 
 
 
The impact that Minimalism had for a theoretical, critical and practical break with 
representation and specifically, for undermining the (represented) human figure 
is undeniable. This being the reason that it has been discussed at the beginning 
of the argument. Choosing to begin with the opposite of figurative sculpture 
means that a connection has been established between the evacuation of the 
human figure and a concern for questions of truth, with which Minimalism can be 
associated, via its attempt to refuse any forms of idealization, or the appearance 
of truth, which it replaces by concrete forms in real space. Despite its centrality 
to the theme, the oceanic dimension of the concept of truth had to be replaced 
by the more graspable logic of objectivity in Minimalism, which allowed a few 
conclusive points that I will summarize below.   
 
Firstly, the realization that the awareness of viewing produced by minimal art is 
made possible, under the principle that formal variations can be verified, and 
that verification is enabled because of the facticity of objects in space, indeed, 
because of their objectivity. This condition is also what supports the claim that 
Minimalism presents itself as a public form of presentation. 
 
Secondly, I discussed the reasons behind the dissolution of hierarchy and 
composition in minimal art, observing that both objects and the viewing 
experience become neutral this way. This can be explained by the fact that 
nothing is really brought to question or produced besides the experience itself. 
In connection with this, I reasoned that Minimalism aligns objectivity, repetition 
and indifference, and how, once looked at from the perspective of the industrial 
process of fabrication, it is difficult to associate Minimalism with a model of 
agency, which is also repeated in works that altogether refuse intention in favour 
of chance operations or any other forms of random decisions. 																																																								
91 In Rosalind E. Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, 242 	
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Thirdly, as observed throughout the texts presented here, the recognition that 
indifference and repetition have an equal effect on the subject of Minimalism, 
and that the promise of a decentred subject at the heart of minimal art - one that 
that does not cohere as a form of idealization but rather opens to its context, 
coinciding only temporarily- leads into a subject incapable of a meaningful 
action, or a figure without a figure as I called it, as well as into an analogous 
impossibility for objects to be aligned with the introduction of difference.  
 
Finally, the concluding examples allowed us to sketch/identify a connection 
between the idea of a complete externalization of self and the easiness with 
which Minimalism, and we can conclude its decentred subject, has been 
appropriated by capital, and crucially, to argue that the real problem is that of a 
logic that altogether renounces a position where the articulation between subject 
and object can be thought beyond a concrete order of things.  
 
I owe a few lines to Michael Fried, whose diagnosis of Minimalism is perhaps 
the closest to my own and a good way to bring the chapter to its end. The 
connection should come as no surprise as his influence is felt throughout this 
text, specifically in regard to the relation between ‘literal art’ as he calls it, and 
theory, in his words: “The enterprise known variously as minimal art, ABC art, 
Primary structures, and specific objects is largely ideological. It seeks to declare 
and occupy a position – one that can be formulated in words and in fact has 
been so formulated by some of its lead practitioners” 92 ; also about 
Minimalism’s hidden anthropomorphism, already quoted, and most importantly, 
in regards to a situation that neutralizes the viewer:  
 
 
My critique of the literalist address to the 
viewer’s body was not that bodiliness as such 
had no place in art but rather that literalism 
theatricalized the body, put it endlessly on 
stage, made it uncanny or opaque to itself, 
hollowed it out, deadened its expressiveness, 
denied its finitude and in a sense its 																																																								
92 Michael Fried, Art and Objecthood, 148 
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humanness, and so on. There is, I might have 
said, something vaguely monstrous about the 
body in literalism.93 
 
 
Besides that, Fried’s preoccupation with the weakening of the distinction 
between art and non-art and its effects for a culture defined, at the time of the 
publication of Art and Objecthood, by a growing consumerism (being that which 
he thought distinguishes the two is a capacity of the first to suspend its own 
materiality, which he thinks modern painting in contrast to Minimalism still 
achieves because of the frame and its capacity to be ‘wholly manifest’) continue 
to hold relevancy for today’s culture – a culture that more than ever before is 
precisely constituted around acts of consumerism.  
 
However, I do not subscribe to his ‘optical’ reading of sculpture, since the 
condition of sculpture as an object in space, regardless of configuration and 
position, seems always better understood when described in terms of space and 
time. I am closer to Krauss on this matter. Similarly, the way Fried tries to 
restore the importance of an ideal fixed moment – an instant moment of grace94 
– seems too close to the logic of objectivity (minus the duration of Minimalism). 
It is therefore questionable, we could argue more than in Minimalism, when it 
comes to the possibility of a relation between a work of art and a wider non-
artistic context.  
 
That is to say that I do not think ‘theatricality’ (of objects) is the enemy and 
neither that it is necessary to suspend the ‘objecthood’ of works of art in order to 
distinguish art from non-art by means of a clear-cut separation from the real. On 
the contrary, there seems to exist a space between ‘objecthood’ and ‘non-
objecthood’, as if a vibration between art and non-art, that is capable of offering 
us the possibility firstly, to think about objects using a different logic from that of 
consumerism, and secondly, precisely because materiality is never fully 
suspended, to rethink the subject in its projection as an object. That is, to think 																																																								
93 Ibid., 42 
94 The expression is mine but it is related to Fried’s claim that the presence of the minimalist artwork in space 
brings to question the distinction between art and non-art. A distinction that he thinks can be reinforced 
through what, in contrast to presence, he refers to as presentness – a capacity of an artwork to reveal itself all 
at once and that he associates with the experience of grace: “We are all literalists most of all our lives. 
Presentness is grace.” Michael Fried, Art and Objecthood, 168 	
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about the subject in terms of becoming-object, using its sense of traction, 
consequence and decision-making problems found therein as a platform to 
rethink the subject.  
 
I am of course, moving in the direction of figurative sculpture. And the premise is 
this: if, as Minimalism posits, the question of truth will always undermine the 
possibility of associating figuration with a project with critical and democratic 
ambitions, whilst at the same time the priority of truth is what prevents us from 
thinking beyond ‘what already is’, what happens if, to return to my previous 
Rortian position, we replace truth as a goal of inquiry with a question, for 
instance, on how to coordinate decisions and behaviour? How can we think 
about defining a meaningful action and an object of difference? This is what will 
be discussed in the next chapter where, in summary, I will try to dissolve the 
association between representation and correspondence to truth by replacing it 
with representation as construction seen in relation to necessity and use, via a 





























In the previous chapter I identified how the priority of objectivity grounded the 
evacuation of the human figure by minimal art. I also discussed how such 
evacuation combined an attempt to break with idealization with a form of art that 
could be more democratic, by locating the source of its meaning solely in the 
experience of art - marking a traditional critical position that tries to reveal the 
world of appearances as such and the ideological construction behind it. The 
chapter concluded with the idea that there is a necessity for some sort of 
figuration that can help us to reimagine the subject in separation from a priority 
to ‘correspond to reality’. I will now discuss how this can be considered through 
the notion of ‘the hero’.  
 
The proposal of course, is not innocent. It comes with a nod to the historical 
relationship between sculpture and the hero, produced by the celebrative 
function of public sculptures: a relation that has much contributed to the 
dismantling of figuration in sculpture. The historical factor, however, is not the 
main reason behind the choice of this uneasy concept, but rather the hope that it 
might help to build an approach leading to the possibility of reversing what is 
normally understood as an artistic constraint - the danger of conservatism and 
celebration - into the critical potential of figuration. This in turn is related to two 
other factors: the first, the combination of problems of representation with 
politics in a way that involves a moment of affirmation and a constant 
negotiation of what constitutes heroic significance; the second, how the hero is 
related to invention and in that sense, how it allows an exploration of 
representation as construction rather than as correspondence.  
 
Therefore, this chapter will argue that a rearticulation of the hero allows the 
possibility to see matters of human representation in terms of construction and 
political determination, and that this involves constant negotiations that ground 
the theme of figuration as a form of dialogue with reality. The idea is to reason 
why the concept is productively contingent and polemical, as well as to discuss 
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how its plasticity and elasticity, meaning the possibility to be moulded together 
with its resilient implications, offers us useful possibilities for a consideration of 
what we might call a contemporary subject. This is achieved by gathering a 
collective of voices – often contrasting – gathered from literary and philosophical 
examples, which allow for a more insightful take on the conceptual implications 
of the hero. The attention to the visual arts will, for that reason, be temporarily 
suspended until the third chapter where I will discuss how a then rearticulated 
notion of hero helps to reposition contemporary figurative sculpture. In sum, the 
chapter reads from a series of authors who have explored questions of heroism 
in order to identify what makes the hero an interesting conceit of representation.  
 
One of the points I will try to make clear, is that any discussion on the hero ties 
in with problems associated with the notion of a collective; indeed, that many of 
the difficulties that come along with a reflection on the hero, are similar to those 
found at the heart of problems to do with notions of community. Like the idea of 
democracy, for instance, which can be both formal  (one that lives on repetition, 
stability and order, therefore of power) and radical (one that opens into the 
critique of the very concept of democracy, therefore opening to emancipation), 
the notion of the hero too seems to follow two general and conflicting lines of 
thought. It is often seen that the figure either upholds sovereignty or defies its 
order. Neither of the positions can be ignored, but I want to focus on the second, 
which has a more comprehensive potential for discussion. 
 
There is no point in denying the affects of war narratives in our culture - 
appearing in many guises - nor the pervasive influence of a political 
subconscious that is mostly populated by male figures worldwide.  Indeed, it 
would be hard to contest that the archetypal idea of the hero, the idea that most 
immediately comes to the mind of most people, corresponds to a male figure. 
Although war and masculinity are culturally connected, the intention here is not 
to explain why this happens and neither to explore the relation between the hero 
and masculinity, on the contrary, it is to establish and discuss the term beyond 
gender specification. This is where I will start. Furthermore, the question of war 






Reading Antigone as a hero with Judith Butler 
 
 
In order to dissociate the hero from the question of gender, I will begin with a 
brief discussion on Judith Butler’s reading of Antigone found in Antigone’s 
Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death 95, where she reads across Sophocles’ 
trilogy. Butler writes of the connection that is set out between the way Antigone 
represents kinship in a state of deformation and between the need to recognize 
and legislate the right to care, suffer and mourn for those who are loved outside 
of today’s heterogeneous family, parenting and intimate alliances. Butler 
establishes this connection with a confessed hope that the process of reading 
Antigone may move us into forming a legal precedent where these alliances can 
be publically and politically recognized. 
 
Since references to the trilogy will appear throughout the text, it is useful to 
summarize the Theban plays96. Written in a different order to the chronological 
sequence of the dramatic events – Antigone is the last in terms of the plot but 
the first to be written, followed by Oedipus king and Oedipus at Colonus. The 
trilogy presents some inconsistencies of narrative, but a story can be deduced, 
very shortly, as thus.  Beginning with the Oedipus as the king of Thebes, here 
the idea of hero appears hand in hand with that of the political leader. He’s 
married to Jocasta, who is also his mother and together they have two sons, 
Esteocles and Polynices, and two daughters, Ismenes and Antigone. After 
discovering that he had killed his father and married his own mother, Oedipus 
blinds himself and leaves Thebes and Jocasta, who commits suicide. Years 
later Oedipus arrives in Athens. Although the term only appears much later, it is 
not completely without sense to say that at this stage, Oedipus appears in the 
form of the anti-hero.  After Oedipus’ death whilst still in exile, his two sons kill 
each other in battle for succession. Having gained power Creon, Jocasta’s 
brother and uncle to all four of Oedipus’s children, and to Oedipus himself, 
orders Esteocles’ proper funeral rites, since he was considered a hero of the 
city. Meanwhile the dead body of Polynices, who king Creon views as an enemy 
to the city, ought to be left unburied, outside the city walls. In this narrative one 																																																								
95 Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000. 
96 I read from the 1984 combined edition of The Three Theban Plays, translated by Robert Fagles and 
published by Penguin Books. See Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays. Antigone, Oedipus the King, Oedipus 
at Colonus. London: Penguin, 1984, 82 	
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can interpret a broader observation on the relationship between war, territory 
and a conservative distinction between hero and enemy, which we can still find 
at work today.  Antigone, meanwhile, decides to bury Polynices thus disobeying 
the law of Creon, and for this reason is condemned to be enclosed in a cave, 
leading to Antigone’s suicide by hanging. Here the figure of the hero is close to 
that of the political dissident.   
 
And so departing from two influential readings of the myth, that of Hegel and 
that of Lacan97, Butler makes a case for the relevancy of Antigone beyond 
gender specification. Firstly, by underlining how the play invites the reader to 
think of Antigone as a man, because of the way she confronts, and in a way 
mirrors, Creon; and crucially, by underlining that Antigone occupies multiple and 
contradictory symbolic positions within the structure of the family. Secondly, 
Butler’s argument establishes a connection between Antigone’s act of 
disobedience and her speech-act.   
 
In relation to the first point, Butler reasons that Antigone’s ambiguous and 
unfixed symbolic position within the family, the love for her brother and even for 
Oedipus in Oedipus at Colonous, puts her beyond the incest taboo.  A 
prohibition that Butler sees as the principle behind the traditional form of the 
family and the key to a dominant heterosexual logic based on the priority of 
biological reproduction, which she sees as the structuring element of our cultural 																																																								
97 Butler reads from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and from Lacan’s Seminar 7: The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis. In the first, as she interprets it, kinship is derived as a result of blood relations rather than of 
social norms and is therefore unable to sustain what is universal or to have a real political implication. This is 
clearly the discourse of the state seen in terms of an order structured around the suppression of the individual, 
which the character of Antigone represents. In this view, corresponding to an aristocratic model of heroism, the 
function of the family is only to consolidate the state, namely by preparing men for the activity of war. No less 
important is the concept of legal rights that is established by what crime prepares through the recognition of 
guilt – as observed in Oedipus and significantly not in Antigone. This means Hegel places the latter outside 
what he calls an ethical order because of the consciousness of her act and her lack of guilt; preferring instead 
the figure of Creon [the ruler of Thebes after Oedipus and simultaneously Antigone’s great-uncle and uncle] 
and Oedipus, precisely because of Oedipus’s unconscious motivation and consequent guilt. Oedipus’s crimes 
– the killing of his father and espousing his mother – are done unknowingly, and as the play tells us he is 
consumed with remorse whereas Antigone is not. Lacan on the other hand, as also read by Butler, maintains 
the separation between family and the state but focuses on the family instead and more specifically on the 
subject as a unit. Here, kinship is seen essentially like a function of the symbolic that arrives from the 
interrelation between language – its very source – and the relative position occupied by a subject within a 
nurturing environment. So maintaining the incest taboo as the limit of culture, what is interesting for Lacan is to 
find Antigone at the border of culture and necessarily at the threshold of the symbolic. She comes to represent 
the limits of the culture she finds herself in, thus establishing but also redefining it. Furthermore, the fact that 
her actions and act of defiance through speech are directed at a state-regulated symbolic order but originate 
from the family sphere, represent a connection between love, or true desire, and the necessity to have the 
ontological and legal status of her brother being recognized. In fact desire and necessity are interchangeable 
in Lacan’s reading of the play, and they both have to do with singularity: it is for this brother and not the other 
that Antigone’s sacrifices her life. Yet, as Lacan teaches us, Antigone’s desire is also for the idealized or 
symbolic brother, and hence, that such unmeasured desire can only lead to death precisely because it is at 
odds with, and seeks to defy, the state-regulated symbolic order that threatens Polynices “pure being” - 
arriving at the famous “second death” formulation that holds as a subject orientated symbolic realm, which is 
achievable only by the evacuation of the living body. See: Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between 
Life and Death, 1-25 
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and legal understanding of kinship. So in bringing into question the way in which 
Lacan conceives of the subject as being formed in relation to a series of relative 
positions and their translation into linguistic nominations – mother, father, 
daughter, son, brother, sister - as well as the distinction he makes between the 
symbolic and the social, Butler is able to posit that Antigone’s claim does not 
hold according to an understanding of the symbolic order structured around a 
notion of law that (still) regulates desire according to a prohibition against incest.  
 
In relation to the second point, Butler calls attention to what she sees as the 
political potential that is born out of Antigone’s action(s) and out of her capacity 
to speak the language of power, as well as to speak in the face of power. That 
is, the act of burying her brother against the order of the law and the way this is 
matched by her verbal confirmation of this act directly to Creon98: “Of course I 
did. It wasn’t Zeus, not in the least” 99. A defiant act - subversive to the point of 
almost mocking Creon whose power, as Butler maintains, resides in the fact that 
“she cannot make her claim outside the language of the state but neither can 
the claim she wants to make be fully assimilated by the state”100 Butler’s 
reading, in others words, signals the possibilities that are open when an 
abnormal, unregulated actor who can speak the language of power 
simultaneously creates a space eccentric to power where it is possible to say 
something different.  
 
Summarily put then, Butler argues that reading Antigone holds relevancy for 
today’s political challenging environment, more exactly, for the need to legally 
recognize alternative forms of kinship - where love may not sustain biological 
reproduction - because of three things. Because the character of Antigone can 
be read beyond gender specification and beyond the heterosexual structuring of 
the family; because of the implication of her defiant act(s) and the way she 
disturbs the order of the law; and crucially, because she represents a process of 
forming and deforming political subjectivities that arrives from her performativity, 
that is, from the combination of action, the use language and gestures that put 
																																																								
98 Part of Butler’s argument relies on the play’s ambiguity between ‘deed’ and ‘word,’ and the way Antigone 
intertwines physical and linguistic acts. Therefore questions of agency and language arise as equal moments 
of defiance. Here is an example: “because she acts in defiance of the law but also because she assumes the 
voice of the law in committing the act against the law. She not only does the deed, refusing to obey, but she 
does it again by refusing to deny that she has done it, thus appropriating the rhetoric of agency from Creon 
himself” in Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death, 11 
99 Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays. Antigone, Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus, 82 
100 Ibid., 28	
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into play the possibility to state an alternative within the language of power, as it 
were, presenting an example of how to change power from within power.  
That being said, in exploring how Antigone dismantles the logic of the family and 
the ordering of behaviour according to social position, Butler comes to terms 
with Lacan in regard the interest they both share: the way Antigone disturbs a 
stable notion of community; an interest which contrasts to Hegel’s negative 
reading of Antigone based, in short, on how she acts against an established 
ethical order. In fact, a lot of what Butler points out is anticipated in Lacan’s 
Seminar VII: Ethics of phsychoanalysis, namely the political possibilities opened 
by Antigone’s radical incompatibility with a discourse of power based on, as 
established in the context of Sophocles trilogy, repetition and patriarchy 
structures.  
 
In fact, both explore the way Antigone’s act subverts (such) modalities and, if 
only indirectly, the instrumental logic of capitalism. Lacan in terms of the 
‘disinterest’ of Antigone, which he discusses along with Kant’s notion of the 
beautiful and on the lines that an act, which follows nothing else other than a 
personal ethical demand, that is, a ‘beautiful’ or ‘pure’ act that puts everything at 
risk without any attainable compensation in mind. Meanwhile Butler, who as 
mentioned, sees Antigone without a fixed subjecthood and on the lines of an un-
predetermined action that foregrounds the latter against an idea of gender 
constituted around the repetition of normative behaviour – an argument that 
goes back to the idea of gender as performance, or as she puts it in Gender 
Trouble “a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frames that 
congeal over time to produce the appearance of a nature sort of being”101. There 
is also the fact that by displacing the question of heroism from Oedipus and the 
competition of the two brothers, and instead focusing on Antigone, in a way 
Lacan anticipates Butler’s argument by inverting the patriarchy structure of the 
play and reflecting on the implications of Antigone for a larger, present-day 
context, including politics and Freud’s legacy for psychoanalysis. 
 
However, the differences between the two are indeed significant. The tenets of 
Lacan’s proposal are singularity and authenticity (the singularity of Antigone, of 
her brother and the authenticity of her ‘desire’), and the centrality of action in 																																																								
101 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, London: Routledge, 2002, 43 
 	
	 75	
face of an ethical demand and the possibility of an ethical action to rupture the 
established symbolic order. Butler by contrast, brings to the fore the question of 
multiplicity, in order to construct a theory made to elicit the idea of a continuous, 
less violent, performative process of deforming and forming political 
subjectivities outside any regulatory framework.  
 
In all cases, it is relevant to establish a quick parallel between Antigone and the 
current climate of political and economic crisis and draw a line between Butler 
and Lacan in order to distinguish two forms of non-inscription in the discourse of 
late capitalism. The first, closer to Butler, is the position that affirms itself as a 
form of resistance structured around subversive acts. It is the position that thinks 
new subjectivities are possible to be formed through moments of political 
disturbance, engendered by multiplicity and performativity and a general 
disregard for power. At a time when the economical-instrumental logic of power 
consumes notions of multiplicity and produces a permanent ‘demand for 
performance’, it is perhaps worth considering the second form of non-inscription, 
closest to Lacan, which affirms that the situation can only be overcome with a 
fracturing action and a complete transformation of the ‘symbolic order’ in place: 
that is, the idea that a different direction asks for a rupture and a completely new 
logic of affiliation between the subject and the world.  I will come back to this and 
Lacan later. With regard to Butler’s position, what is important to register at this 
point is that she allows for the figure of the hero to be clearly separated from the 
problem of gender specification by her reading of Antigone - which as 
preliminarily established, can be seen as a hero – beyond the symbolic structure 
associated to a set of relative, yet fixed and hierarchical positions originally 
created within the logic of the family, and hence, beyond a system of thought 
structured around the male subject. Butler, in short, gives witness to the idea of 
the hero beyond gender specification by arguing that reading Antigone holds 
relevancy for recasting contemporary politics of kinship.    
 
There is a second line of thought running through Butler’s text that is worth 
considering. She reasons that the trilogy brings into question the notion of 
representation and the idea of a representative function: a function that Antigone 
no longer holds according to a normalized version. She says:  
 
Indeed, it is not just that, as a fiction, the 
mimetic or representative character of Antigone 
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is already put in question but that, as a figure 
for politics, she points somewhere else, not to 
politics as a question of representation but to 
that political possibility that emerges when the 
limits of representation and representability are 
exposed.102 
 
There is little room for doubting that, on the plane of fiction the tragic 
circumstances of Antigone’s life places her outside any patterns of 
representation and brings her to the limit of her political and ontological being. 
She demands for recognition whilst having no recognizable social position, which 
means her position cannot be successfully repeated within the patterns of 
normativity. So Butler’s argument is a logical one. She thinks Antigone offers an 
alternative to normalized forms of social representation and the 
heterosexualization of the family by denying a reproductive dimension of 
representation - a negation played out in the very idea of reproduction, which 
Antigone’s contrived refusal of maternity breaks with103. 
 
This concept only works as long as we see representation as a form of 
repetition, which is an association that does not hold all the way through. In fact, 
the disruption of the representative function in terms of repetition seems integral 
to the concept of the hero itself - for a hero has to represent something, so that 
he or she may be called a hero, and at the same time so it makes sense to be 
called a hero, he or she has to have introduced difference and somehow 
departure from conventional forms of representation. The most obvious 
counterexample to Antigone is Oedipus and the way we tend to read him, 
specifically after Freud, as a figure that gives in to the patriarchal order and that 
reifies its logic of repetition; whilst in fact Oedipus occupies an unstable 
symbolic position and does not accept representation in terms of repetition. 
From a psychoanalytic perspective, Oedipus interrupts the cycle of 
representation and repetition and is in fact a hero only because he is also a 																																																								
102 Ibid., 2 
103 Antigone’s sacrifice, as you will remember, entails the contrived choice of leaving behind the possibility to 
become a mother, and thus cancelling the biological, but also the political principle of reproduction. But the 
opposition between reproducibility and singularity is also present in the way Antigone affirms the singularity of 
her brother – the fact that he is not replaceable – as the reason for her disobedience: “Never, I tell you. If I had 
been the mother of children or if my husband died, exposed and rotting – I’d never have taken this ordeal upon 
myself, never defied our people’s will. What law, you ask, do I satisfy with what I say? A husband dead, there 
might be another. A child by another too, if I had lost the first. But mother and father both lost in the halls of 
Death, no brother could ever spring to light again”. In Sophocles, Three Theban Plays. Antigone, Oedipus the 
King, Oedipus at Colonus, 105   
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patricide, that is, someone who symbolically asserts his own beginning by killing 
his father and thus becoming his own symbolic father.  
 
Seen this way, Oedipus’ character also reads as being consistent with a general 
definition of the hero as a category that remains radically open and that connects 
to the occurrence of the new. And what this suggests, if we are to be rigorous, is 
that it is impossible to conciliate the hero with the continuation in time of a regime 
of representation. Because, and to put it another way, referring to a figure as a 
hero presupposes that an idea of heroism is not only being represented but also 
that difference is at work, that such a figure introduces some form of meaningful 
singularity. This is present in Antigone but also in Oedipus, in the sense that he 
represents a changing of orders, from that of father to that of the son. So seeing 
the hero together with the occurrence of the new, which is a necessary condition 
for heroism in the terms being discussed here, allows us to say that the hero is a 
concept found at the limits of representation, and by implication, that what counts 
as heroism disappears once it is repeated because once repeated it is no longer 
heroic, or finally, that the condition of heroism is difference and that difference 
cannot be repeated.  
 
But the question of representation is also at play in a sphere exterior to that of 
fiction. Butler’s own argument, for example, suggests that Antigone has a 
representative function which operates not only by putting ideas about multi-
positionality and performance at work within the text, but according to the 
representative dimension that these acquire externally: that is, for the process of 
rethinking contemporary forms of the family and its politics. Once again, this 
indicates that it is the stability and reproducibility of the representative function - 
read according to fixed indicators - and not the function itself that Antigone 
displaces.  
 
In connection to the external work of the dramatic text and the way it affects its 
readers, there is one last aspect in Butler’s appropriation of Antigone that I want 
to mention. Butler does not use the aid of objective demonstration to put her 
ideas forward. She does not say: legal precedents should be open for new forms 
of kinship because statistics show these have an increasing electoral 
representativeness. No. What the reader encounters is not an attempt to 
establish an objective implication between the political context of the play and 
contemporary politics, but instead, an invitation to read. This may sound too 
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oversimplified, but indeed the text relies on the hope that reading Antigone - a 
figure that posits a subject formation that is both transformed through the text 
and that transforms the text, and crucially, one that allows for a similar 
transformation to be experienced by the reader - might eventually permit an 
updated articulation of the subject at play and from there open into the possibility 
of an actual legal change. Similar to the method found in the original play, Butler 
involves the person who reads, who does not remain separate from what is 
being discussed, in the form of what we might call a subject-of-change. A subject 
to whom questions are not simply offered (or impose upon) but instead asked to 
work those questions out through the very process of reading. This is of course 
what Sophocles himself and famously other ancient Greek writers like Plato do: 
their writing involves the thought process of the reader as the very condition for 
the subjects being discussed. And there is no coincidence here. We know Butler 
is part of a larger group of thinkers, in which Lacan can also be included, that 
frequently return to Classical Greek texts as a source for philosophical debate 
and as an alternative to the scientific-epistemological paradigm that, specially 
after Foucault, can be identified with a disciplinary framework of knowledge. That 
being, a framework built around objectivity and that operates under the principle 
that it remains necessary to separate the process of reading from the argument 
that has been written down.  
 
The growing influence of continental philosophy has normalized this mode of 
theoretical writing. However in the context of my own argument this gains a 
different dimension. One can establish a direct connection between the negative 
of objectivity and the figure of the hero. Using figures that call into question 
notions of heroism, for instance, by describing ordeals or the consequences of 
action, asks the reader to work out mentally what the text enacts internally. For 
the reader, who from the outset is recruited to think alongside the hero, 
dismantles the very continuity between argument and the normative structures of 
objectivity - because his very self is called to articulate those notions. This has 
another implication. It’s hard to think of a way to ask a reader to consider 
problems of heroism and to expect him or her to accept what heroism means in a 
passive and apolitical manner.  
 
On that note, Butler allows us to think about the hero beyond the question of 
gender, as a mechanism of deformation and formation of political subjectivities, 
and as such, as a pivotal conceit for a reflection on the subject at the intersection 
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between the personal and the political. Following in the footsteps of Antigone, 
heroism implies being close to, and simultaneously distant from power, which 
means: to be able to speak the language of power and at the same time have 
the capacity to say something different. In this view, the hero disputes what can 
be done or said. It is also possible to state, if only provisionally, that the figure of 
the hero carries an association with representation but not with repetition, and 
finally, texts that work through the problem of heroism are texts with ideas that 
are not transferable as facts, but instead demand an active/imaginative 
participation of the reader.  
 
It is possible to say that finally, the hero represents the idea of a subject capable 
of a meaningful action and of changing the perspectives of what is possible for 
individuals. In that sense, it also appears as the idea of someone who produces 
a political disturbance by renegotiating the terms of the engagement between 
individuals and a given community. As explored later in more detail, this implies 
that ‘what a hero is’ is neither a neutral or universal definition, but instead a 
concept that permanently brings claims to universality into question; which in turn 
suggests that whilst the figure of the hero represents something, it does not have 
an essence, because what counts as heroism, and therefore what constitutes a 
hero, is effectively always changing. In other words, we cannot really speak of ‘a 
truth’ about ‘what a hero is’ and neither about a stable form to represent the 
‘heroic’ because both are idealizations that change according to political, 
philosophical (and artistic) contingencies. And yet, precisely because of this, 
‘what constitutes a hero’ opens the process of reimagining a subject who is 
capable of a meaningful action by exercising non-regulatory and non-objective 
forms of thinking, against any predetermined version of what a subject is 
supposed to be. A process that seems possible to align with key contemporary 
preoccupations, such as finding ways to constitute and render emergent political 
subjectivities. The idea of unstable representation and the possibility of 
introducing difference in the process of deforming and forming political 
subjectivities is the very basis for my argument. In what follows, I widen the 









Alain Badiou and the political necessity of the hero 
 
 
In a study on the anti-hero in modern European literature, where the term was 
first introduced, Victor Brombert suggests the anti-hero hero can be 
characterized as presenting an opposition to the dominant values of a given 
time while being a creation of the critical spirit specific to that same era104. He 
also notes that he normally appears as a self-conscious, anonymous, ironic and 
reflexive figure – often to the point of paralysis – and that whilst being outside 
the norm, the anti-heroic figure often demonstrate resistance in the face of 
power, with a great capacity to destabilize and, importantly, to demonstrate 
alternative forms of courage. In a chapter dedicated to Georg Büchner’s 
Woyzeck for example, he observes that in assuming anti-military and anti-
rhetoric positions, the anti-hero undermines grandiloquence and idealistic views; 
he connects to the ‘tragedy of the everyday’105 and to the common person via 
the maintenance of a certain existential fear106. Furthermore, reading from 
Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, he observes that the anti-hero often 
appears as a literary device used to question the very process of conceiving a 
text in terms of internal coherence and that the anti-hero introduces a voice of 
critique by means of infinite reflection and fragmented, interrupted and 
unfinished writing exercise107. The bottom line is the anti-hero appears in culture 
as a strategy to shift the attention from action to critique; he appears as a 
subject of critique.  
 
The question then is this: if the anti-hero is a reinterpretation of the hero that 
carries a heroic potential, if it posits a decentred subject that as many argue, is 
more in tune with contemporary values and post-modern sensitivity, what after 
all, are the tenets of the heroic and more specifically, what is value of the hero as 
a figure of thought in a contemporary context? In other words, what do we gain 
from figuring the hero?  																																																								
104 See Victor Brombert, In Praise of Antiheroes. Figures and Themes in European Literature 1830-1980, 
London: The University of Chicago, 1999 
105 Woyzeck is often called a ‘working-class tragedy’. As quoted by Brombert, George Steiner describes it in 
terms of a “dissociation of tragedy from poetic form” and as a “tragedy of low life. It repudiates an assumption 
implicit in Greek, Elizabethan, and neo-classic drama: the assumption that tragic suffering is the sombre 





In recent times, there has been an interesting overlapping of an anti-heroic and a 
heroic mode – between acts of resistance, protest and occupation and a 
pressing necessity to introduce change. Consistent with the question of protest, 
or to be more precise, with the question of changing tactics in the context of 
contemporary politics of resistance, Simon Critchley attempts to connect 
philosophy, politics and invention. If we consider his idea that philosophy does 
not start with wonder but with disappointment108, with the experience of a failed 
transcendence that produces an infinite demand, which is the result of an ethical 
subject divided between a demand and his or her incapacity to be the same as 
that demand, then we can read the recent wave of protest – with a peak during 
2011, and in cases such as anti-austerity protests and the Indignats and Occupy 
movements - as a demonstration of disappointment in the form of what Critchley 
has defined as non-violence at the limits of violence109:  
 
 
an energy that is predicated not upon the 
heroic figure of the political actor, but on the 
existence of a common form: a collective force 
that creates distance from the state in the 
alternative spaces of democracy; spaces that 
permit the deconstruction of traditional 
categories of opposition and their rearticulation 
as forms of resistance. The same that 




108 Immediately, in the opening paragraph, Critchley writes: “Philosophy does not begin in an experience of 
wonder, as ancient tradition contends, but rather, I think, with the indeterminate but palpable sense that 
something desired has not been fulfilled, that a fantastic effort has failed. Philosophy starts with 
disappointment. Although there might well be precursors, I see this as a specifically modern conception of 
philosophy” in Simon Critchley, Infinite Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance. London: 
Verso, 2012, 1 
109 The exception would have to be the more violent uprisings in the Arab world and the more recent situation 
in Ukraine.  
110 The original source for this and the points being presented here through the theories of Critchley and 
Badiou relates to a conversation between the two in November 2007 at the Slought Foundation, Philadelphia, 
under the title: “Democracy and Disappointment: On the Politics of Resistance”. 
http://slought.org/content/11385. Badiou’s remarks were later published in Alain Badiou "Comments on Simon 
Critchley’s Infinitely Demanding" in Symposium (Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy / Revue 
canadienne de philosophie continentale): Vol. 12: Issue 2, 2008, 9-17. The text is also available at: 
http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/symposium/vol12/iss2/3. This particular quote, however is directly transcribed from the 
audio file.  
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Critchley believes that the claim to universality is going to permit such political 
subjectivity to be constituted and held together, that this universality will assume 
the precise form of an infinite ethical demand that exists under the shared feeling 
that a situation is unjust. In his words, the result of this consensus of feeling 
corresponds to a form of neo-anarchism, a form of anarchism predicated not on 
freedom but on responsibility: “An anarchism that abolishes my autarchy, my 
autonomy, my self-sufficiency, my self-satisfaction and opens me to the other’s 
infinite demand”111.  
 
In conversation with Critchley, Alain Badiou notes that the tension between the 
negativity of disappointment and the affirmative side of an infinite demand 
demonstrates firstly that it is not easy for us to accept our limits and that if we 
are to accept the possibility for an infinite demand, than there is something 
infinite in us. Secondly, it is not easy to accept and articulate the infinite beyond 
the infinite demand itself. Such is the tension he sees dividing the subject in 
Critchley: a distinction between the subject that experiences disappointment – 
that he calls a “dividual” – and the ethical subject that results from the demand.  
 
In fact, Badiou’s philosophy connects the problematic of the subject to a 
speculation on the condition of heroism and is for that reason, helpful to 
consider with some detail. However some coordinates are necessary. Instead 
of his more technical texts, such as Being and Event and Theory of the Subject, 
I will consider smaller, more intelligible texts where first the figure of the hero 
and then the hero and the subject of art can be recognized. I will begin with the 
conversation abovementioned, where Badiou reasons that it is possible to part 
ways with heroism conceived in terms of authenticity, the true origin and self–
sufficiency, proposing instead a heroism of the void, that is, the heroism of the 
becoming subject in a concrete situation.  
 
I [Badiou] define heroism as the possibility for 
an individual to become subject (…) We exist 
as individuals; we exist finally as something 
like human animals. And in some 
circumstances we have the chance to become 
subjects. And there is heroism, not at all 																																																								
111 Ibid.		
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because it is much more authentic to be a 
subject than to be an individual or something 
like that, but simply because the becoming-
subject goes beyond the popular limits of our 
existence as individuals.112  
 
Therefore, one of the problems of a non-heroic model and Critchley’s neo-
scepticism, as Badiou continues, is the negativity of modesty; a negativity that 
may conceal a desire to remain in the individual state and become a pacifying 
instrument. That is, to “…be modest, stay in your place!”, and inversely the 
problem of anger, the first political emotion and one that produces political 
movement but not the political subject 113. For Badiou, the shared feeling of 
wrongness, leading to a demand, is not the creative element of a new political 
subject. Instead what generates a new political subject is the beginning brought 
about by the discovery of new means and a small victory. What really fuelled 
events in may 68’ was not injustice, he argues, but the small victory that came 
when the government decided to demobilize the police from the Sorbonne. That 
was the moment that unleashed the entire movement, or what he calls the 
“power of affirmation, the positivity of ethics”114.  
 
So what Badiou seems to be suggesting is that there is a tension between 
negativity and affirmation in the political process and that the moment when the 
individual (singular or collective) becomes a political subject is always an 
affirmative moment; a moment that does not come from inside the individual 
alone, but from its exteriority too. From a specific context and a specific 
situation. 
  
The point is the relation between the question 
of the limits of the individual, the potentiality of 
something that happened outside the 
individual and the opting for something which 																																																								
112 In Alain Badiou "Comments on Simon Critchley’s Infinitely Demanding" in Symposium (Canadian Journal 
of Continental Philosophy / Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale): Vol. 12: Issue 2, 14 
113 “I [Badiou] think anger is very important, and, contrary to the classical tradition, in Seneca say, I think it is 
the first political emotion. It is often anger that moves the subject to action. Anger is the emotion that produces 
motion, the mood that moves the subject (…) My problem is that this sort of beginning is a negative one: the 
sense of injustice, the revolt against the wrongs of the world, the feeling of anger. But, I think that this cannot 
create a new political subject. This is my difficulty. I think that we can have, naturally, negative feelings, 
negative experience concerning injustice, concerning the horrors of the world, terrible wars, and so on. But I 
do not think that all that is the creative part of a new political subject.” Ibid.,10 
114 Ibid., 16	
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is beyond the individual limits, which is 
precisely the beginning of a new subject which 
of course is composed of the individual, but it 
is also beyond the limits of individuality.115 
 
So even if the non-heroic has been the slogan in recent strategies of resistance 
- constituted around a field of anonymous people coming together in shared 
discontent - the moment is not completely anti-heroic. There is a necessity for 
action and as Badiou’s response to Critchley proposes, a potential place for 
heroism. Parallel to this, an anonymous subject is a subject that is not yet 
articulated, which by contrast, brings us back to the idea that the figure of the 
hero might allow us to reimagine the political subject with a positive affirmation.  
 
Badiou puts it in surprisingly simple and useful terms. If, in “any period of time, 
in any sequence of history, we have to maintain a relationship with what 
exceeds our possibilities”116 especially in a time of disorientation. He continues: 
 
we must create a symbolic representation of this 
humanity which exists beyond itself, in the 
fearsome and fertile element of the inhumane. I 
[Badiou] call that sort of representation a heroic 
figure. ‘Figure’ because the action of a figure is a 
symbolic one. ‘Heroic’ because heroism is 
properly the act of the infinite in human 
actions.117  
 
That is why courage, and from here, war as a field of courage, is so important as 
“the expression of human capacities beyond risk, beyond death”. This explains 
two things: the nostalgia for the old figure of the warrior 118 thus “a combination 																																																								
115 http://slought.org/content/11385. This direct quotation from the audio file does not appear in the published 
version of the event.  
116 In Alain Badiou “The Contemporary Figure of the Soldier in Politics and Poetry” in Simon Critchley. LEVY, 
Aaron Levy. eds., Democracy and Disappointment: On the Politics of Resistance, DVD (booklet) Philadelphia: 
Slought Foundation, 2007, 2. The text is also available at http://www.lacan.com/badsold.htm. 
117 Ibid.   
118 What Badiou refers to as the nostalgia for the warrior figure meets the idea that we are already witnessing 
a return to the heroic. A view that raises the idea, in terms of today’s celebration of the body and how status is 
increasingly acquired in a space of appearances through the media in particular, is that the body rather than 
the ideas or convictions of that subject, is what ultimately matters; views that in short, make an association 
between an obsession with the body, celebrity culture and the cult of heroes. I am thinking in particular about 
Boris Groys and the argument in “The Hero’s Body” as here presented in a longish quote: “But what is a hero? 
What distinguishes a hero from a non-hero? The medium of the heroic is not the mind but the body. The hero 
is someone who risks his life regardless of the consequences. The heroic act turns the hero’s body from a 
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of victory and destiny, of superiority and obedience,”119 which is both a symptom 
of disorientation and an instrument of crisis; and because “war in our days, has 
become an obscure slaughter,”120 the need for a political gesture consisting of 
imagining a form of ‘immanent immortality’ after the figure of the soldier, the 
“first dialectical unity between courageous death and immortality, without 
reference either to a personal soul or to a God [a] democratic glory, which 
creates something immortal with collective and anonymous courage”121. So the 
task, as Badiou concludes,  
 
is a very precise one. We are after the period of the 
aristocratic warrior, and after the period of the 
democratic soldier, but we are not in a peaceful end of 
history. On the contrary, we live in confusion, violence 
and injustice. We must create new symbolic forms for 
our collective actions122.  
 																																																								
medium into a message. In that respect the hero’s body is distinct from that of the politician, the scientist, the 
entrepreneur, or the philosopher. The bodies of the latter are concealed behind the social function that they fill. 
When a body manifests itself directly, however, when it explodes the shell of the social roles, that it usually 
plays, the result is the hero’s body (…) And these are not bodies at rest, they were battling, enthusiastically, 
emotionalizing, vibrating, explosive bodies – that is to say, heroic ones. The heroes of antiquity had such 
bodies, when they were seized by an unbridled passion and were prepared to destroy or be destroyed. Italian 
Fascism and German National Socialism adopted the artistic program of making the medium of the body the 
message and made it a political one. They did not side with convictions, theories, and programs but with 
bodies – those of athletes, fighters, and soldiers. Making the body the message requires above all an arena, a 
stage – or alternatively, it requires modern reporting, a public created by the media. This is why we are 
experiencing today a vast return of the heroic, even if it is one that is not always explicitly avowed, because we 
live amid a world theatre in which everything ultimately depends on the body. (…) Today’s media stars 
become stars entirely by mean of their bodies, not by what they say or do. (…) Above all we shy away from 
asking the crucial questions: What distinguishes the heroic body of a media star from the non-heroic bodies of 
the audience? Where lies the magic border separating the hero from the non-hero on a purely physical plane? 
These questions arise because on the ideological plane a democratic equality of all bodies is postulated that 
does not in fact exist in the reality of the media. For in today’s media democracy, all ideologies, theories and 
discourses are equal, and hence also irrelevant. Yet bodies are all the less equal for that.” (The details of the 
citations are given at the end of the footnote). Others underline the problematics of action figures and their 
status in culture, as seen mostly in popular cinema, most often coinciding with violence as rhetoric for political 
decisions. A view that understands heroism as a product of, as much as represented by, neo-liberal imagery, 
specifically cinematic, where we can easily recognize an obsession with the body and with victory. Here we 
see the figure of the warrior, and its translation into language via an abundant use of a vocabulary of violence 
– everywhere from sporting fields to boardrooms. A tone that accompanies the rehearsing of a post-tragic 
heroism, i.e. the tragic without death, which as Amanda Beech argues in her PhD thesis, comes in support of 
a rhetoric of autonomy and violence as decision and in support of a naturalization of belief associated with a 
specific idea of justice. I think Both Groys’s and Beech’s observations are fair, but only rightly so because they 
mostly rely on an oversimplifying and traditionally aristocratic understanding of the concept; one that goes 
hand in hand with a superficial archeology of term and the habit of considering the hero and the intellectual as 
two irreconcilable figures. My point of departure, by contrast, is that the hero constitutes a fractured figure that 
carries the possibility of reconciling action, the question of the body and critical thinking – which for the specific 
use here – we can directly connect with figurative sculpture.  For Groys’s citation see Boris Groys, “The Hero’s 
Body” in Friederike Fast, Véronique Souben, Michale Kröger, eds., (my private) Heroes, Germany: Kerber, 
Marta Herford, 259. For Beech, see: Amanda Beech, Heroic Realism: Rhetoric and Violence in Narratives of 
Justice and Discourses of Decision, (Ph.D. thesis, Goldsmiths, University of London, 2003. Available at: 
http://eprints.gold.a.c.uk/174/ 
119 In Alain Badiou “The Contemporary Figure of the Soldier in Politics and Poetry” in Simon Critchley. LEVY, 
Aaron Levy. eds., Democracy and Disappointment: On the Politics of Resistance, 4  
120 Ibid. p. 8  
121 Ibid.  
122 Ibid.	
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As much as this seems to clarify the emergency of the hero, thinking about the 
necessity to figure the heroic through Badiou (being a ferocious defender of a 
return to truth), it is not without a sense of contradiction with the initial proposal 
to disconnect representation from the priority of truth. However, the figure of the 
hero appears in a paradoxical position in the work of Badiou, which as 
discussed below undoes the contradiction, where I disambiguate the 
contradiction between Badiou’s take on the hero as a subject of truth and my 
own effort to establish the hero as a conceit of representation without the priority 
of truth, by elaborating on the hero and the positivity of the moment when a 
subject is formed. Here we find a perfect moment in Badiou’s praise of 
transformative ruptures, vis-a-vis the attempt to explore the potential of 
universalizing innovation at the heart of the question of truth in the latter, which 
precisely, the hero destabilizes. Furthermore, this will allow me to establish an 
important connection between the hero and art and elaborate on how such a 
connection ties in with courage. I will begin by describing in a summary manner 
the areas in Badiou’s thought where these problems can be located.  
 
In the first instance, Badiou considers ‘truth’, or ‘truths’, to be infinite and 
unchangeable. Yet he also conceives of truth to be something different from 
metaphysical or objective truth. He tells us truth is a generic form of thought that 
does not wait to be discovered but rather one that is brought to the fore by four 
different types of procedures or events - art, politics, science and love - all 
capable of creating the new. And truth for Badiou is always new, and more, 
produced locally yet with the quality of including what is universal. Located 
somewhere between a contemporary version of Platonism and a form of 
Constructivism, Badiou’s body of thought is also known for combining ontology 
and mathematics with the historical, and for rendering the question of being 
inseparable from that of appearing.  
 
Importantly, the notion of event, which is the kernel of Badiou’s philosophy, is 
seen as an eruption that takes place because of the accumulation of something 
that is missing from circumstances - that Badiou sometimes refers to as “the 
state of things” – an eruption that ultimately produces truth. One needs to 
consider though, that truth is something that Badiou separates from knowledge, 
which he disqualifies because of its instability. Often making the association 
between the nature of knowledge and that of encyclopedia knowledge (with its 
constant need for revision) as being marked in terms of a series of ‘subsets,’ 
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which truth always exceeds. Truth is viewed both as the object of knowledge 
and as that which gives origin to knowledge. It is, to put it more simply, not 
knowledge but what is beyond knowledge.  
Finally, it is the event and the new that produces the subject through the 
subject’s fidelity to the event. This fidelity is what gives the subject the 
opportunity to connect (in fact the opportunity for a commitment to take place) 
with something beyond the condition of the individual - a moment when it 
becomes possible to connect the infinity of truth, to the finitude of the individual. 
This brings us to the question of ethics. A question articulated around a 
commitment to a given situation, that demands something from the subject; and 
since an event is always a collective moment for Badiou, this commitment is one 
that involves a self but, and significantly, a demand that can only be properly 
described as a demand of the Other. Writing in Ethics: An essay on the 
Understanding of Evil Badiou explains that in being subsumed to the question of 
desire - the unattainable desire for the other, the unconscious unknown - ethics 
is a field of not-knowing, and therefore that the demand it produces cannot be 
communicated. It begs for an encounter and a commitment, a fidelity, that I and 
no one else experience, because: “ To enter into the composition of a subject of 
truth can only be something that happens to you”123.  
 
So confirming what is written before, the subject in Badiou can indeed be seen 
as a kind of heroic subject. It connects to an event, where something new is 
produced, crucially via a commitment to a sphere larger than that of the 
individual. The subject appears with an answer given to an ethical demand, a 
demand to take action, brought upon the subject by something that happens to 
the subject. After ethics, this introduces the question of politics, which can 
summarily be described as the only of the four procedures where the infinite, in 
the form of ‘for all’ 124, appears as the first goal; intertwining with ethics in the 
sense that in Badiou’s terms a political event is always a collective and 
interdependent with the formation of a subject.  
 
But then we have another question: if the ethical subject is formed because of 																																																								
123 Significantly, Badiou writes the passage with a reference to Lacan’s notion of ethics. In Alain Badiou, 
Ethics: An essay on the Understanding of Evil, London: Verso, 2001, 51  
124 Badiou posits the formula ‘for all’ as the first condition of politics as truth procedure – an idea announced 
throughout this work and explicitly when he writes: “’Thought’ is the name for the subject of a truth procedure. 
The use of the term ‘collective’ is an acknowledgement that if this thought is political, it belongs to all.” in Alain 
Badiou, Metapolitics, London, Verso, 2005, 141   
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the fidelity to the event, why should we think about the hero?  Why should we go 
in that direction instead of exploring the complexities of ‘a procedure of truth’? 
The question has two possible answers. The event, Badiou tells us, cannot be 
known. The subject has to ‘name’ it in order to understand in which ways what 
happens can affect and change the circumstances. Indeed, the subject has to 
‘name’ the event in order for the possibility of understanding whether or not what 
occurs constitutes a ‘truth’. So one way to answer the question is by identifying 
the hero with the moment of nomination; that is, as strategy to think the event 
and measure the relevancy of what happens, and how this modifies the state of 
things. So ‘heroism’ here is the name for the consequences of the event. But in 
my opinion the real answer rests with the notion of figuration. If what occurs is 
what originates a subject, and not the other way around, why the necessity to 
imagine a figure of heroism? What is at stake in the very process of figuration? 
Considering Badiou’s interpretation, one has to struggle to think about what 
comes before the event. His philosophy starts when something occurs so when 
we say that it is important and perhaps even necessary, to imagine a figure for a 
new type of heroism, a figure that can represent a relationship to what 
transcends the possibilities of individuals, we are opening a paradox in Badiou’s 
thought. Whilst most of Badiou’s philosophy is post-event, the moment when he 
suggests that it is the importance of imagining a figure for a new type of 
heroism, he’s pointing in the direction of a subject that does not yet exist, and 
therefore, evoking the subject of a political ‘pre’ or even ‘para’ event. This is 
what connects the hero to invention and with invention, to art.  
 
As he establishes in Handbook of Inaesthetics, Badiou views art as a procedure 
capable of producing its own truth and that such truth results from the procedure 
that it involves. The truth of art is both singular and immanent. He says: “Art is a 
thought in which artworks are the Real (and not the effect). And this thought, or 
rather the truths that it activates, are irreducible to other truths – be they 
scientific, political, or amorous.”125 Having putting it like that, in “Fifteen Theses 
on Contemporary Art” 126, he also considers if only indirectly, that art is never 
completely autonomous, that art is something that is always about something 
else; that unlike politics, where the infinite is the first goal, art is what is capable 
of producing the truth of something else, by producing something infinite in finite 																																																								
125 In Alain Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, Stanford: Standford University Press, 2005, 9  
126 In Alain Badiou “Fifteen Theses on Contemporary Art” in Lacanian Ink, Vol. 23, Spring 2004. It can be 
found at http://www.lacan.com/frameXXIII7.htm 
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forms. This is the reason why the the hero is close to the work of art as 
conceived by Badiou, because similarly to art, the hero appears as a figuration 
of something universal – an attempt to represent something universal within the 
limits of a figure.  
 
This is illustrated in the text mentioned above, where he reasons that the task of 
contemporary art is to produce new possibilities and to “reverse the infinity of 
the desire for new forms and the finitude of the body, of the sexuality, and so 
on”, into, “precise and finite summarization.” By which he means to undermine 
the fetishization of transitory stages at the heart of present day capitalism 
(youth, sex, the spectacle of death, fashion and do on), by creating an infinite 
body in a finite body - a body, as it were, without a body – because real desire, 
he argues “ is subversive desire, is the desire for eternity. The desire for 
something that is a stability, something which is art”127.  The three citations 
summarize Badiou’s first two theses on contemporary art and I risk saying all 
the other 13. They make clear that although art and politics are generally seen 
as different procedures, in Badiou’s view art is necessarily political because its 
task is to create new political paradigms and to produce, within the limits of its 
material existence, a form of universal truth - a form that can oppose the logic of 
a global market-based economy and the ‘universality of money,’ which as he 
contends in the same text, is the only form of universal truth we know today. 
And between the list of reasons why we need to raise barricades and start 
something new, something meaningful, heroism is the word that never gets to 
be spoken, but one that that has a particular traction within the argument as a 
finite manifestation of something infinite. In this sense, the presence of the hero 
is felt as the proper figure to the truth of art.  
 
And yet, if “Fifteen Theses on Contemporary Art” crystallizes Badiou’s 
expectations for art, it also shows the vulnerability of his instructions and the 
relation between these and their unspoken connection to heroism. On the one 
side, it is not difficult to associate the notion of heroism with that of a new 
political paradigm, where a claim to universality can be found beyond the truth of 																																																								
127 Badiou’s first two theses on contemporary art derive from two theoretical problematics. The first being is 
as the author outlines:, “The artistic obsession with novelty, of critique, of representation and so on, is really 
not a critical position about capitalism because capitalism itself is the obsession of novelty and the perpetual 
renovation of forms”; the second, the idea that “in our world there is something like an ideology of happiness. 
Be happy and enjoy your life and so on. In artistic creation we often have the reverse of that sort of ideology in 
the obsession with suffering bodies, the difficulty of sexuality, and so on. We need not to be in that sort of 
obsession. Naturally a critical position about the ideology of happiness is an artistic necessity, but it’s also an 
artistic necessity to see it as a new vision, a new light, something like a positive new world. And so, the 
question of art is also the question of life and not always the question of death”. In ibid. 
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money; whilst on the other, the idea that we can imagine a figure of heroism 
disturbs any claims of universality. This is why.   
 
Within Badiou’s scheme of things, the inconsistency of the circumstances 
leading up to an event cannot be repeated. This in turn implies that it is not 
possible to conceive a definitive figure of heroism, a figure that would completely 
exhaust the relationship between individuals and what transcends the condition 
of the individual. In other words, what counts as heroism cannot be fixed or 
hermetically configured.   
 
Looking again into Handbook of Inaesthetics, we could perhaps force a 
definition of the hero as an “artistic configuration”, which Badiou defines as an 
artistic truth that thinks itself through multiple “subjective points” created 
locally128. An idea that translated into the hero would register as the implication 
of different situations to different definitions of heroism. But the difficulty here is 
that heroism cannot be described as something generic and unchanging, which 
is the very condition of truth as defined by Badiou. What counts as heroism is 
not the same everywhere, all the time. In fact, it could be said that the challenge 
presented by a “precise and finite summarization”129 has a parallel in the 
insufficiency of any definition of heroism; or in other words, that the difficulty in 
imagining a figure of heroism in the mode of the generic is similar to the difficulty 
of art.  
 
This can perhaps be explained with the necessity of limits –that exists in 
something finite- and the tension produced when it comes to claim that 
something universal is sustained within those limits. But where there are limits, 
there is also politics. So limits are at once what brings to question any claims of 
universality and the condition for a possibility of politics in the figure of the hero. 
What this tells us, is that the hero does not correlate to the mode of the generic, 
but instead to the mode of the common. The difference between the two is this: 
whilst the term ‘generic’ means ‘for all,’ where this ‘all’ appears as an abstraction 
(with no place for cultural or political differences) the term ‘common’ refers more 
clearly to a situated collective with shared beliefs and shared necessities (where 																																																								
128 Badiou offers a comprehensive discussion on why it is necessary to define an artistic truth as an artistic 
configuration in the introduction to Handbook of Inaesthetic, which I think is well summed up here: “In the end, 
a truth is an artistic configuration initiated by an event (in general, an event is a group of works, a singular 
multiple of works) and unfolded through chance in the form of the works that serve as its subject points.” In 
Alain Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics, 14 
129 Badiou in Alain Badiou “Fifteen Theses on Contemporary Art” in Lacanian Ink, Vol. 23, Spring 2004.  
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precisely differences are brought to the fore). Therefore, if trying to imagine a 
figure for a new type of heroism is a way of articulating a subject subordinated to 
something that transcends the individual condition of the human, it is 
complicated to say that there is a universal equivalent, indeed a universal form, 
associated to what heroism is. At best, a claim to potentially universality, 
heroism, and in the end, is not a generic definition but instead one that belongs 
to the sphere of the common; where it appears as something that is relevant, 
not because of mere novelty or formal games, but because what it introduces is 
considered meaningful - which in turn involves non-generic negotiations about 
what is meaningful130.  
 
It might be hard to think about negotiation as being heroic, especially if 
negotiation is understood as necessarily requiring compromise.  And then again, 
is it possible to describe what the word heroic actually means without some form 
of negotiation? The answer, if only intuitive, seems to be no. What people 
consider heroic changes and often appears in distinct, often conflicting, contexts 
and under different guises and therefore requires negotiation. As intuitive as this 
might be, the question marks an important point of my general argument and 
requires further attention and a short detour.   
 
Badiou continues to be a good interlocutor here. As already pointed out, he tells 
us that the subject, a figure of finitude, is produced through an event and more 
exactly through the occurrence of something infinite, e.g. truth, which the subject 
needs to connect with in order to be qualified as such.  Once defined in these 
terms, however, the event also excludes the subject because it correlates to 
something infinite, which is precisely the other of the subject.  A second difficulty 
is born out of the relationship between the finitude of the subject and the 
infinitude of truth. In Badiou’s system of thought, the event has to be named - 
insofar as the event needs to register the recognition of how it changed the state 
of things in a given situation. This means that because an event can only be 
recognized as such through its naming, not as it happens, it is only constituted 
after the proper event has already taken place, which further means that there is 
a kind of permanent deferral within Badiou’s logic of the event131. 																																																								
130 At this point it becomes relevant to say that using ‘the hero’ in the context of an argument that wants to 
undermine the idea of the universal presents a clear problem: the article ‘the’ posits the universality of the 
name it prefaces. The decision to use this form and no another was made to facilitate writing and not to 
confuse reading. In other circumstances, to use the conjunction in the graphic form ‘the hero’ would have been 
more appropriate and a good alternative.   
131 For a more detailed account of the problems with Badiou’s theory of the subject in terms of its finite-infinite 
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In turn, it is possible to say that the hero is a name that establishes a 
relationship between the individual and transcending the dimension of the 
individual, but that is not the same as what we would call infinite. Its very 
condition, a condition defined by the extraordinary, is realized by the new but 
also by moments of negotiating whether or not what is done and brought forth is 
relevant and of a heroic status.  
 
In other words, it appears that the hero needs to be understood according to two 
different moments: that of difference and that of negotiation, and ultimately this 
process is rooted in culture. One might think of Antigone here once again, for 
what qualifies her as a hero is her courage and trangressive actions and the 
way these introduce difference in the form of a renewed sense of what was 
possible for an individual to do within a given historical, that is fictional, setting. 
But it is also the fact that such actions, which in the play are described as being 
against the law of a community, have been culturally renegotiated and reclaimed 
as a feat of heroic resistance against power.  
 
Still, one could argue that what I am describing here does not seem that much 
different from the temporal leap one finds in Badiou’s account of the event, but 
there is a fundamental difference. As soon as we consider culture as the field 
where the heroic is negotiated, what we are saying is that what heroic means is 
defined according to terms gathered by a collective, terms that may or may not 
have to do with fundamental political truths. The point of the matter here is that 
this ‘negotiating’ is not exhausted or fully determined by truth as defined by 
Badiou: something generic and universal. Rather, it is a process that needs to 
be seen together with political but also cultural contingencies. The heroic, in its 
broad sense, does not descend from fundamental political truths located 
‘elsewhere’.  
 
Indeed it is very common for an action to be perceived as heroic in one place 
and time and as its absolute opposite in a different place and time, which 
underlines the fact that heroism is a complex and often conflicting notion that 
depends on social circumstances and on a shared and situated sense of what is 																																																								
schema and the temporal deferral this schema produces, see for example: Simon O’Sullivan “ The strange 
Temporality of the Subject: Life In-between the Infinite and the Finite (Deleuze contra Badiou)” in Simon 
O’Sullivan, On the Production of Subjectivity. Five Diagrams of the Finite-Infinite relation. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012  	
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more meaningful and less meaningful. Holding this in mind, we can therefore 
say that the hero is a figure that exists in a double temporality defined by 
difference and negotiation. We can also say that, in a sense, this temporality 
replaces the defferal that exists in Badiou’s logic of the event, and furthermore 
lends itself to the rehearsing of the extraordinary from the intelligibility of culture. 
Once the cultural root of this double temporality is considered, then it is possible 
to conclude that the hero appears not as the belated recognition that something 
infinite has occurred, but as a positive affirmation located in culture that 
rehearses but also invents, as suggested below, versions of a subject capable 
of a meaningful gesture.  
 
This brings us back to the assertion that the hero operates as a concept of 
figuration and therefore that it is more than a simple word designating the 
recognition of the occurrence of truth. Holding this in mind, one might also 
define it as a figure that allows us to project cultural conceptions of what lies 
beyond the dimension of the individual. Furthermore, that it operates as a figure 
where ideas about how a given culture might transcend itself can be rehearsed, 
whilst simultaneously, because it is formed locally, calling into question any 
attempts to universalize matters.    
 
These problems skirt around a distinction I invoked earlier between ‘common’ 
and ‘generic’ that needs to be clarified further. On one hand, we have the thesis 
saying that there are fundamental political truths, such as equality and freedom, 
which are universal and generic and that need to be reclaimed and rehearsed 
within local historical ‘sites’. Under these terms, ‘generic’ can be defined as 
something universal in quality and that can be shared by, and applied to, all 
without belonging to anyone in particular. Seen this way, ‘generic’ registers as 
something that does not belong to this or that community but is instead related 
to an abstract collective. In contrast to this definition, by ‘common’ I designate 
the nature of something shared by what we might refer to as a non-abstract 
collective. In other words, a community defined around a sphere of shared 
necessities and beliefs, which are both specific to that community, and one 
might say transformative and in transformation, for it is safe to say that members 
of any community will be influenced by that community, which in turn evolves 
because of transformation such influences have produced in its members132.  																																																								
132 The distinction that I am making here is based on a definition of community that presupposes the 
existence, albeit not necessarily in a fixed way, of limits. This definition is in tension with Badiou’s philosophical 
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Democracy for Badiou corresponds to a form of adjustment between equality 
and freedom133, and part of his longstanding, and often attacked, critique of 
contemporary forms of democracy stems from what he perceives as a 
problematic privileging of liberty over equality that characterizes the latter. He 
thinks that in order for political truths to be produced, the particularity of liberty 
has to be limited and the universality of equality necessarily enhanced.  
 
Equality and freedom are beyond the subject of my discussion here but I think 
Badiou’s argument is solid. And yet it is difficult to describe all the different 
aspects that take part in and influence the state of democracies around the 
world solely by reflecting on equality and freedom. How can we think about 
democracy as a space of emancipation, for example, without developing a 
capacity to reflect on and put into practice, the right to difference and the 
possibility to produce influence in the public sphere? Therefore, how can we 
think about democracy without thinking about difference? It seems complicated 
for a definition of democracy based on an idea of adjustment between equality 
and freedom to leave space for any of the important subtleties inherent to 
democratic life. So there is perhaps a simple conclusion that can be draw here. 
Any attempt to address communal complexities beyond those found in generic 
forms will inevitably ask for the plurality and specificity of social phenomena to 
be recognized. And this, at least in some ways, is what supports the distinction 
between the sphere of the generic and that of the common.  
 
Picking up from there, the fact that we can use the word ‘hero’ in a wide variety 
of situations - and still make sense when using it - that may or may not bring 
matters of equality and freedom into play, suggests, or more exactly confirms, 
that it is the common, not the generic, that is the privileged sphere for giving the 
name heroic to this or that figure. 
 																																																								
project. On one side, we have the notion of a social unity defined in terms of its boundaries together with the 
post-modern idea of community as a site of decentralized discourses. These definitions are hard to reconcile 
with Badiou who sees politics as being deprived of its subversive force due precisely to the designation of 
community, the dividing of the world as “the inherent impossibility of our world”, as he writes in Conditions (for 
reference see below). On the other side, community comes to the fore along with the idea of communism, the 
right political hypothesis as he calls it in works such as The Communist Hypothesis and The Meaning of 
Sarkozy, in which he tries to map out the basis for emancipatory politics in the twenty-first century. However, 
the problem remains. In order for a community to be a community of all and for all, which is the condition of 
politics according to the latter, it requires boundaries to be non-existing and therefore to posit a form of radical 
openness. This means that to Badiou, community is defined and thought over through its own impossibility and 
ultimately that it does not, properly speaking, belong to the real world. It is a community that, in reference to 
the work of Maurice Blanchot, Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben, Badiou has called: unavowable, 
inoperative and perceivable only as a coming community. See Alain Badiou, Conditions. London: Continuum, 
2008, 148 
133 Alain Badiou, Metapolitics. London: Verso, 2005, 151	
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So in coming to the end of this section, the implications and flaws of Badiou for 
a discussion on the contemporary hero can be outlined as thus. Before the 
necessity to reconfigure the political imaginary, Badiou tells us that the moment 
when a subject is formed is always a positive moment.  This moment shares 
with the notion of heroism the passage from the condition of individual to that of 
a subject, and a connection with something larger than the individual: something 
collective and infinite, something non-human. But ‘heroism’ also implies a series 
of ideas that are difficult to reconcile with the concept of generic truth because 
there are strong reasons to doubt an address of heroism that leaves out cultural 
aspects and how these may influence the very notion of heroism.  
 
So having followed Badiou’s lead in recognizing the relevancy of the hero as a 
figure of thought for the task of thinking about the contemporary subject, it was 
suggested that the latter holds a double temporality. The first moment of this 
temporality involves the occurrence of the new and secondary to a process of 
negotiation based on cultural contingencies. It was also suggested that it is 
precisely through culture, not through generic truths, that one might articulate a 
sense of collective meaning. Culture is our best chance to harbour the infinite, or 
more exactly the promise of something we might choose to refer to as infinite.  
 
In this sense, to think about the hero begs for a series of cultural, political and 
even generational negotiations and hence cannot rely upon unchanging 
definitions.  For as soon it is equated with the knowledge of new possibilities, 
something that can transcend mere formalism and that can be used to 
reconstruct new symbolic forms for our collective actions, then this thinking 
takes place less in terms of what is truth or not truth, and more in terms of what 
is more meaningful or less meaningful, more useful or less useful. In turn, this 
implies that to work with the hero is to work with a conceit of representation that 
places the subject beyond itself whilst introducing a demand for a constant 
revision of what constitutes heroism.  
 
In summary, along with Badiou, we can consider the hero as a positive 
affirmation through which one might think about a subject capable of a 
meaningful action. However it is difficult to describe questions of heroism in 
terms of generic truths. In fact, we can expect descriptions about what 
constitutes a hero to produce disagreement and bring to question claims of 
universality. In turn, I have reasoned that questions of heroism demand a 
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distinction between what is generic and what is common and need to be 
considered as culturally determinable. This suggests that the hero calls for a 
discussion on the space of language. In what follows next, I will attempt to 
explain this relationship between the hero and language in terms of a dialogue 
with reality, and to establish the latter in terms of what I shall call, an idealism of 
necessity. This will allow me to move further away from the question of truth, get 
closer to the notion of redescription and furthermore, relate the hero to an 




Answering to reality: on the uses of the hero and its principles  
 
 
The figure of the hero makes a rare appearance in the writings of Maurice 
Blanchot, most notably in Infinite Conversations where Blanchot proposes that 
his reader rethink the association between the hero and authenticity, through a 
relation between origin and beginning134. The hero, he contends, needs to be 
seen in terms of being, and more importantly, in terms of action. And what he 
means by this, is that the origin of the hero is not origin as such, i.e. proper 
name or family lineage, but rather action; because it is not before an action that 
the hero proves himself to be legitimately heroic.  
 
This clarifies the question of potentiality. We do not need to see the hero as a 
transcendental subject, a figure becoming something it already is, the 
predestined, the natural, and so on. On the contrary, the hero is a figure that 
becomes what it is in the process of introducing the new. But Blanchot also tells 
us, correctly in my opinion, that the hero involves not only the sovereignty of the 
act and a beginning, but the inscription of both in speech:  
 
 
The hero, the active man par excellence, 
owes his existence solely to language. (…) 
Measured speech and heroic lack of 
measure have this in common: both affront 																																																								
134 Here I am reading from an essay entitled “The End of the Hero,” found in Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite 
Conversation, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, 368-379  
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death. But speech is more profoundly 
engaged in the movement of dying 
because it alone succeeds in making of 




This brings the hero closer to inventive procedures but also to a public condition. 
Once again in Blanchot’s more trained hand:   
 
One could say that he represents the first 
form of what will later be meant (but in a 
sense still scarcely elucidate) when one 
speaks of an existence that is public, for he 
has no other presence than an exterior 
presence, and seems solely toward the 
outside; hence also corresponding to the 
speech that quite wholly produces him and 
that he in turn translates.136   
 
Let us consider the two ideas announced in the citations: the relation between 
action and language and the hero as a public subject. These produce a series of 
sub-questions, for instance: if action is the proper field of heroism, what 
separates action from other human activities and what is the distinct aspect of 
heroic action? And where does language come in? Gathering thoughts on these 
questions, Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition is a good place to start 
looking for answers.  
 
Arendt divides human activity into labour, work and action. She tells us the first 
is what one does when trying to meet immediate necessities, such as the 
necessity to eat, drink, sustain a household and so on; the second one does as 
an instrumental activity but where the necessities being addressed are not as 
immediate as in the first case, and where there is normally technical knowledge 
involved and a form of accumulation, be it material or immaterial; and finally the 
third, action, Arendt conceives as a type of non-predetermined activity, that is, 																																																								
135 Ibid., 371 
136 Ibid., 378	
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as an activity that remains its own cause. Labour is strictly located in the 
domestic sphere, action meanwhile is envisaged as being proper to the public 
sphere, while work, well understood, is found between the two. Drawing on the 
example of Classical Greece and the clear separation between private and 
public life model, Arendt concludes that action is the activity of politics practiced 
by free citizens in the absence of any form of coercion, material or other, with 
expression within and for the public sphere; where it is recognized amongst 
equals through its translation into speech.  
 
Moving on from this analysis, Arendt suggests the passage from action to 
speech holds sway against the weakening of the political subject, the 
instrumental use of reason with an economic schema and against the erasure of 
the public sphere – an erasure she identifies with a series of historical changes 
that caused the notion of public sphere, and indeed politics, to evolve in a 
direction where discourse was to be replaced by, or regressed to, the priority of 
a domestic-like preoccupation with material sustainability137. Crucially, Arendt 
also underlines the potential of action as that which produces novelty and 
knowledge.   
 
And it is in this sense, as a call for extraordinary action, that Arendt’s view 
affirms itself clearly, albeit not directly, as a discourse on heroism138. 
Confessedly influenced by Aristotle, Arendt sees in the image of a scientist 
working in a laboratory – someone who is free from basic preoccupations, and 
who works without knowing in advance the results of his or her own work – as a 
modern translation of the sort of heroism she recognizes and praises in 
Oedipus, that is, presented in a position separate from a state of not-knowing to 
another form of knowing. A movement she regards as the very engine of 
development and that which makes it possible to move beyond the limits of ‘the 
human condition’. An idea she illustrates, with a clear nod to universalism, with 																																																								
137 One of the strands of the argument in ‘The Human Condition’ is the idea that the technological advances 
at the heart of modernization guided knowledge towards a means/ends scheme and that in turn this lead to an 
idea of the public sphere as a system that in its essence exists to regulate the balance between production 
and expenditure; which according to Arendt is a logic that belongs more to the domestic sphere - with its 
necessity for material sustainability - and therefore what registers the erasure of the public sphere. This is also 
the nature of her critique of Marx, who’s she accuses of reducing the social to the perspective of the humans 
specie. For more on this, see: Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, London, The university of Chicago 
Press, 1998, 109-118  
138 In the introduction to The Human Condition (in the edition referenced here) Margaret Canovan reminds us 
that Arendt is often negatively accused: “Many readers have taken offense at Arendt’s derogatory references 
to social concerns, and have also assumed that in criticizing the conformist materialism of modern society, 
Arendt intends to recommend a life of heroic action. But that reading misses the book’s complexity, for another 
of its central themes concerns the dangers of action, which sets off new processes beyond the actor’s control, 
including the very processes that have given rise to modern society” in Margaret Canovan. “Introduction” in. 
ARENDT, Hannah Arendt,The Human Condition,. xiii 
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the image of the satellite as an example of development and human capacity for 
changing its fate and transcending biological necessities and political limitations. 
Finally, heroic action for Arendt is what carries the promise of new beginnings139 
and the improvement of life delivered by new knowledge.   
 
But this image of the scientist working in a laboratory does not clarify all the 
complexities of Arendt’s proposal, in terms of the relationship between the figure 
of hero and the public sphere. In fact, the hero for Arendt is not someone hidden 
and unknown to the world nor someone special, but anyone who, in possession 
of freedom, is capable of courage. As she observes, the main political currency 
in ancient Greece, meant no more than a capacity to abandon domestic life in 
favour of public life:  
 
 
The connotation of courage, which we now 
feel to be an indispensable quality of the 
hero, is in fact already present in a 
willingness to act and speak at all (…) And 
this courage is not necessarily or even 
primarily related to a willingness to suffer 
the consequences; courage and even 
boldness are already present in leaving 
one’s private hiding place.140 
 
 
Positing heroic action as a crevice in the repetition of everyday life, and as a 
form of visibility associated with public life, means we cannot conceive action as 
anonymous activity but instead as the activity that discloses the singularity of the 
agent of the action, within a common domain constituted by others capable of 
recognizing it through speech; a domain formed by an “existing web where their 																																																								
139 The word “beginning” has a special relevancy in The Human Condition, as Arendt clearly places a great 
hope in the idea of new beginnings, that is, in the idea that humans are capable of responding to life by 
beginning something new. In fact, as suggested in the citations below, part of the general argument of The 
Human Condition is that the unpredictable nature of action and new beginnings are tied in together. ”To act, in 
its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin (as the Greek word archein, “to begin,” to lead,” 
and eventually “to rule,” indicates), to set something into motion (which is the original meaning of the Latin 
agere)”; “The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability, 
which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty; the new therefore always appears in the guise 
of a miracle. The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that 
he is able to perform what it infinitely improbable.” Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 177-178 
140 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 186 
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immediate consequences can be felt”141. This relates to the passage from action 
to speech that Arendt underlines as a kind of permutation between the question 
‘Who am I?’, a question I ask of myself, and the question ‘What am I?’, a 
question I ask about what I am to another person, who perceives me according 
to what I do.  
 
So Arendt allows a definition of the hero as a political subject characterized 
firstly, by introducing difference in the public sphere through action and through 
the translation of action into speech – or to make the use of term broader, we 
can call language; and secondly, by the disclosure of singularity set out within a 
transition from the private to the public sphere. The hero, in short, appears as a 
form of an ideal public self.  
 
Paradoxically, this also implies that what determines the hero, a figure of action 
par excellence, is not action alone but in fact, as it was already been suggested 
through the reading of Blanchot, through language. The moment of nomination 
and the construction of narratives are the elements that seem to establish the 
hero as such. In fact we can say that the hero is produced by the transformation 
of action into language. Significantly, this means that the hero does not have the 
full authority of its own condition. It is tied in with language and therefore, 
dependent of language and of those who use it. In a way, the hero is always 
constituted as fiction142 and dependent of someone else – so, in this sense, the 
hero is never truly autonomous. It is important to keep this in mind for later.  
 
In the meantime, one must acknowledge that a discussion of the hero is one 
always at risk of sounding outmoded, which I don’t think is much different from 
when Arendt wrote The Human Condition almost half a century ago. Yet 
considering the way late capitalism has worked to reduce life to a series of 
instrumentalized activities, it is also hard to ignore the vitality of an argument 
that identifies the political and historical necessity of a subject of heroism in the 
way she does. A necessity identified together with the importance of 																																																								
141 Ibid., 184 
142 Arendt makes a distinction between hero and author. In fact, the distinction allows her to conceptually 
prevent action from becoming an instrument of execution (circumstances, motives, or necessities, constitute 
action for Arendt, more than intentions or instructions). This produces an inconsistency between the hero in 
action and in speech, which Arendt resolves, albeit only superficially, by noting that the hero is always 
manifest as a double and a paradox form in a scenario of interdependence between authoring an action and 
authoring its inscription into language, as Arendt herself notices here: “Even Achilles, it is true, remains 
dependent upon the storyteller, poet or historian, without whom everything he did remains futile; but he is the 
only ‘hero’, and therefore the hero par excellence, who delivers into the narrator’s hand the full significance of 
his deed, so that it is as though he had not merely enacted the story of his life but at the same time also ‘made’ 
it.” In Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 194	 	
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extraordinary and non-instrumentalized action, for a break with the political 
abstraction introduced by economic calculation and the loss of meaning 
associated with the universalisation of numerical quantification of everything. 
And it is not only the introduction of difference in the public sphere per se that 
gets to be underlined, it is also the notion of singularity as a necessary condition 
for the democratic process itself, one that in her view promotes pluralism and 
prevents totalitarianism.  
 
With that said, Arendt’s heroic subject, indeed the Greek heroic subject, cannot 
be taken at face value. It is difficult to reconcile action with a critique of 
instrumental reason – one that is based on a disinterested pursuit of knowledge 
- with contemporary politics. In contrast to the privileges brought to ancient 
Greek democracies by slave labour, finding the means to material subsistence 
and the distribution of material and immaterial production, needs to be on 
today’s political table. Put another way the problem in appropriating Arendt’s 
model is that it does not allow for the political dimension of the private sphere 
nor the political dimension of labour and work (or indeed workers as political 
agents). Whilst Arendt gives us further evidence of the relationship between the 
hero, action and language, and of how these two aspects intertwine with the 
notion of public sphere, her writing also reveals, if only indirectly, that within a 
contemporary context the relationship between action and a disinterested 
pursuit of knowledge is not enough for a rearticulation of the hero.  
 
 
If a relation between action and a disinterested pursuit of knowledge is not 
enough for a rearticulation of the hero, what happens if we add ‘necessity’ as a 
third element to the equation between ‘action’ and ‘speech’? Is this conceptually 
possible? Intuitively speaking, it’s actually difficult to separate necessity from the 
possibility of heroic action, but is this true? Is necessity actually a condition of 
heroism, and if so, how can the relation be thought out? The question can thus 
be translated. If we consider  ‘technique’ to be the application of knowledge as a 
means for a given necessity, then surely the theme of knowledge and the theme 
of ‘technique’ need to be worked together rather than separately, so this what I 
will now attempt to do.  
 
Let us continue along the lines of Bernard Stiegler’s theory and consider a 
notion that has much in common with what Arendt has to say on the division 
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between private and public life, i.e. the notion of ‘individuation’. Stiegler 
considers that what is ‘public’ has, by definition, a relation of mutual possibility 
and mutual exclusion with what we calls the ‘private’ sphere. The logic is that 
what is public, is public insofar as it belongs to all and not solely to one or just a 
few, and inversely, that what concerns the individual needs to be recognized 
and accommodated by what is public. Politically too, there is a relation between 
defining what is public and defining the individual subject, since democracy is 
born hand in hand with the notion of the citizen. This evokes the idea of 
democracy as a non-totalizing political system that requires individual difference.   
 
But ‘individuation’ also covers a different ground. It is a process of distinction 
and mutual possibility of the public sphere and the private sphere that Stiegler, 
with a nod to Gilbert Simondon, has called collective and psychological 
individuation, and that corresponds to the process of responding and adapting to 
effects and concerns that make the individual and collective mutually 
individuate. In Stiegler’s words, “I only individuate myself psychically, insofar as 
my psychic individuation meets the individuation of other individuals within a 
collective individuation, which, precisely, is not only psychic but social”143. 
 
One way to understand this process of mutual individuation of the collective and 
of the individual is through writing, which Stiegler conceives as something that 
allows a community to come together under a shared language, what allows for 
‘singularity’ to become public (by means of publication), but also provides the 
possibility to criticize and transform the process of collective individuation itself. 
In other words, it appears as a tool that allows the subject to think of himself as 
a citizen and as such, to introduce ‘difference’ in the public domain. Again, this 
does not sound too distant a concept from that of Arendt’s and what she has to 
say on speech. But if writing is indeed a form of speech, it is also a form of 
inscription that involves an element that is not necessarily at work in oral 
communication, and that is, the presence of technical supports.   
 																																																								
143 The text I am quoting from was published in Portuguese only and constitutes part of a book commissioned 
and published by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in 2010: A República Por Vir. Arte, Política e 
Pensamento para o Séc. XXI, which can be translated as: The Republic to Come. Art, Politics and Thought for 
the XXI Century. This excerpt is my translation, which in turn, was translated by Luís Leitão from, what I 
imagine, was the original French version: "Só me individualizo psiquicamente na media em que a minha 
individuação psíquica vai ao encontro de outros indivíduos psíquicos numa individuação collectiva que, 
precisamente, não é apenas psíquica, mas social." as featured in Bernard Stiegler, (2010) “Literal Natives, 
Analog Natives, Digital Natives. Entre Hermes e Héstia” in Rodrigo Silva, ed, A República Por Vir. Arte, 
Política e Pensamento para o Séc. XXI, Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2010,132  
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Mutual individuation, as Stiegler remarks, is only possible because there is also 
the “individuation of technical objects forming a system of technics in constant 
evolution”144. A system that includes writing that is also constituted by other 
causes, materials, structures and institutions, that gives form to the public 
sphere; which once again and in short, is constituted by what concerns all 
individually but not privately. This also means that individuation is a problem of 
material and technical causes and therefore that it involves both the human and 
the non-human. A relation described earlier through the reading of Badiou, in 
terms of truth that can now be identified with the public sphere viewed as the 
non-human fabric that supports collective and psychological individuation and in 
fact, life beyond the condition of the individual.   
 
In Technics and Time,1. The Fault of Epimetheus Stiegler argues that the use of 
technology is in a process of becoming second nature -a process he calls 
“technization”- and that this involves a great loss of memory (increasingly 
located outside the body in some type of technology-based device).  As Stiegler 
views it, this confirms the worst anxieties surrounding the question of technique: 
the progressive transformation of technology into a form of domination, which 
(de)regulates the political through the automation of activities, leading to a 
progressive erasure of language, the numbing of our capacity to make decisions 
and ultimately, the danger of de-individuation – all threats that he identifies with 
capitalism. So there is a “necessity of return (to things themselves, to 
metaphysics) as well as to that of a major overturning”145, which he proposes, is 
possible by means of rethinking the separation between technique and the 
question of knowledge.  
 
Hence he overlaps the theme of anticipation in Heidegger, where being equals 
being-towards-death146, with two temporalities found at the heart of the problem 																																																								
144 As I have explained in the previous note, this translation is my own. The original quote, published in 
Portuguese, reads as follows: “…este jogo diferencial só é possível porque se produz, além disso, uma 
individuação técnica, em que objectos técnicos formam um sistema técnico em evolução constante” in ibid., 
133  
145 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1. The Fault of Epimetheus, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1994, x 
146 Stiegler, on Heidegger: “Dasein [i.e. being, human existence] can in its activity always not “possible” the 
being-towards-the-end that forms its very essence, refusing thereby to open itself to its future as it is its own, a 
future that is as radically indeterminate as the “when,” and “why,” and “how” of its end (…) Dasein can live its 
own possibilities as  its inconmmensurable “ipseity,” refusing to retreat before the essential solitude in which 
the antecipation of its own end ultimately always leaves it (by the publicness of being-in-common) as the death 
of Dasein, which can only be its own, is only its own because, radically indeterminate, death can remain 
nothing but unknown to it. Its death is what it cannot know, and to this extent, death gives the “mine-ness” its 
excess. Death is not an event within existence because it is the very possibility of existence, a possibility that 
is at the same time essentially and interminably deferred. Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1. The Fault of 
Epimetheus, 5-6 
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of technique: fore-thinking and after-thinking. Two modes that he identifies with 
the mythological figures of Prometheus and his often forgotten brother 
Epimetheus. In just a few lines, the myth tells of Prometheus having to steal the 
knowledge of technology from the gods as a consequence of Epimetheus 
realizing, only too late, that he had forgotten to distribute ‘equipment’ for the 
humans in due time. Importantly for Stiegler, and relevant for what I’m trying to 
say here, the myth introduces the question of necessity through problems 
associated to the body, or rather the necessity of a living body for equipment due 
the precariousness of the human-animal: and the necessity of a body that dies 
and thus produces the demand for reflection and the inscription of singularity; a 
double default as Stiegler puts it, of those who are born unprepared into a 
community of those without community - a community constituted by the radically 
singular members of humans.  
 
This may sound similar to what Arendt has to say about the individual and the 
collective, but the marriage between “individuation” and “technicity” introduces 
the notion of necessity, which is absent from Arendt. This allows for a slightly 
different, yet significant, take on the hero. Stiegler himself does not refer to 
Prometheus or Epimetheus as heroes, but the fact we can see them as 
representing the division of being, thus suggests it is possible to see them as a 
form of divided hero.  
 
In his reference to Heidegger, the history of being appears in Stiegler’s theory as 
the inscription of being in “technicity”, which the latter defines as “the pursuit of 
life by means other than life”147. True to its duplicity, the formulation includes a 
circular argument that moves in two complementary directions. It says that 
technique requires a form of examination to be constituted as equipment for life, 
and inversely, that reflection without “technicity” does not prepare for death. So 
once broken down, the term implies the possibility of a subject to write down and 
inscribe his or her singularity in a system of ‘technics’ which allows the subject to 
becomes intelligible to, and significantly a part of, a collective. The term, in other 
words, implies the possibility to exercise a capacity to make decisions based on 
a reflection on life and on the anticipation for death. And this is what really 
fleshes out the question here: The necessity of being to be realized beyond 
biological limitations produces the necessity of meaning which coincides with the 																																																								
147 Ibid.,17	
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urgency to inscribe being beyond the living body, to improve the equipment for 
living and indeed to improve life.  
 
After Stiegler, we can perhaps call heroism the reconfiguring of ‘individuation’ 
and the hero a conceptual tool for this process, a figure through which a 
distinction between new beginnings and important new beginnings can be 
rehearsed - according to how the occurrence of the new answers to the 
necessity of meaning found at the intersection of individuality and collectiveness. 
With a connection to the hero’s double temporality discussed a while ago, this 
process also involves the existence of technical supports where being may be 
rehearsed and, registered as a potential to become public, inscribed in life 
beyond life itself.  
 
Richard Rorty is another voice that attempts to disrupt the division between 
technique and knowledge, and someone who makes a great effort to argue, 
using a far less cryptic language than others that I have been discussing, that 
we ought to focus on finding ways to improve our lives and the health of 
democracy rather than pursuing an ideal of truth. He will help us to understand 
the pragmatic implications of using the hero and lay the basis for my own 
definition of how such use can be drawn.  
 
To start with, Rorty’s defence of irony and occasional sentimental tone seems at 
odds with any notion of heroism, but I dismiss this quickly by noting that with 
Rorty, the term irony does not refer to an end or a form of philosophical 
discourse in itself, but rather to the activity, mainly private, of doubting one’s 
own vocabulary. For Rorty irony is, in other words, essentially a tool of critique 
and an attitude that refuses to believe that one’s own specific way of looking at 
the world is the definitive way to understand life.   
 
It is also important to note that Rorty’s project does not seek to re-describe the 
world simply for the sake of playing a linguistic game. On the contrary, he tries 
to maintain an ongoing and serious attempt at improving vocabularies and 
decision-making skills - without omitting affirmative concessions. For instance 
solidarity in Rorty’s work is philosophically, politically and socially as important, if 
not more important, than irony. This explains why the ideal subject for Rorty is 
actually not an ironist – someone who remains in a state of self-centred 
relativism – but rather a liberal-ironist – someone who acknowledges private 
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obsessions as an opportunity to improve liberal, i.e. democratic, societies. 
Critchley when discussing Rorty, defines this as “someone who is committed to 
social justice and appalled by cruelty, but who recognizes that there is no 
metaphysical foundational to her concern for justice”148.  
 
This connects to another aspect of Rorty’s philosophical project. It is a project 
that privileges the individual and entertains the idea of self-creation and self-
improvement, that is somewhat opposed to descriptions made by larger groups, 
which thus creates a tension. At the same time this position is one that posits a 
holistic view. Put differently, it is a project that opens a space between private 
obsessions and social hope, that refuses to totalize the subject and to contribute 
to what he describes as a society without society; but also one that argues that 
social construction depends on a relation between the literacy of individuals and 
the good health of public institutions, and from there: that ethics ought to be 
approached without any principles other than the ‘demand for the other.’ 
Crucially, furthermore, that we ought to stop using the vocabulary of 
metaphysics as grounds for decisions and instead replace it with non-
metaphysical negotiations. This comes in line with a turn to linguistic philosophy 
and the decision to work under the logic that the principle task of language is not 
to produce an image of reality but to produce the means to interact with it – a 
position that considers it insufficient to make truth claims with no other purpose 
than truth itself.  
 
The theme of language as a philosophical theme appears as a major 
preoccupation in Rorty’s body of work, with his lifelong championing of Dewey, 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein, but it is the idea of philosophy as literature that 
ends up taking the lead in Rorty’s mind; an idea he explores through his later 
works and specifically in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity through close 
readings of Nietzsche, Proust, Derrida, Nabokov and Orwell. By working through 
his theory that the best philosophy can hope to achieve is to provide us with the 
tools to reflect on what sort of human beings we would like to be, Rorty’s 
position - known for being the anti-philosophy philosopher - comes in line with 
his continuous appeal to the general reader, and more notoriously to 
professional philosophers, to abandon one’s preoccupation with theory and 
focus on practical problems related to how to improve life under the conditions 																																																								
148 In Simon Critchley “Deconstruction and Pragmatism: Is Derrida a Private Ironist or a Public Liberal” in 




And in turn, this is behind the argument that we ought to replace truth claims for 
redescription in order to improve vocabularies and produce the means for a 
better literacy which, as Rorty sees it, is not only an opportunity to develop 
practices of self-improvement but an opportunity to open such practices to 
vocabularies and ways of being different from our own, and hence generate 
empathy, educate and increase solidarity. This is why Rorty defends the 
importance of continuous and diverse reading habits for an acquisition of new 
vocabularies and the priority of literary criticism (that Rorty suggests should be 
called “cultural criticism”) for intellectual work which he thinks is most valuable 
when creating new vocabularies and “placing books in the context of other 
books, figures in the context of other figures”149.   
 
Although Rorty focuses chiefly on literature, he has given us enough reasons to 
believe we can extend his ideas to a more general definition of art and still hold 
the argument that it is possible to produce an increasingly embracing activity of 
thought as a form for constructing social hope. For instance, he would almost 
certainly agree with Schiller’s idealistic views on art – idealistic in a way that 
says that ideals are not to be found but invented, that in believing that this might 
be achieved through the invention of ideals, created by art, society matures. 
This is not to say that Rorty is interested in recuperating something similar to 
Schiller’s aristocratic positions, but rather, similarly to Schiller, he thinks the gift 
of literature, and we could say art, is the possibility to improve our capacities to 
make decisions about how we would like to live our lives, by the “playing off 
figures against each other”150 with effect for both self and social improvement.  
 
But can the hero be inscribed within this theoretical framework? The fact that 
when we speak about the hero we are making a reference to a notion that is 
both ontologically unstable while related to language seems promising. So does 
the link between the hero and the occurrence of the new, and crucially the 
awareness that ‘the hero’ does not speak about true or false, but rather about a 
meaningful gesture.  
 
																																																								
149 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 80 
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The notion itself only makes sense when the subject at play is formed after an 
answer given to some kind of necessity. Is there any other way - once we 
exclude metaphysics, religion and politically indoctrinating ideas - to conceive of 
what a hero is, other than through the notion of necessity? Gathering ideas from 
different points presented above, the hero appears as an actor who introduces 
something that was missing, something which was a necessity, and is therefore 
constituted as a positive affirmation. At the same time, this also brings us to 
question and negotiate the situated condition of heroism. As discussed before, it 
is difficult to conceive of a generic and unchangeable form of heroism.  
 
Significantly, it is the relationship between the hero and language and the fact 
that the latter is constituted after the construction of a narrative that really allows 
us to connect the hero to the framework proposed by Rorty. At the same time, 
this brings me to a pivotal point in my argument: the possibilities that are opened 
when we shift from analysing the ‘figure’ to ‘the use of the figure’. This shift is 
made possible by inverting the terms of the relationship between the hero and 
language and by working under the principle that language itself is capable of 
producing and questioning notions of heroism; a proposal that joins Rorty’s own 
proposal and my own project, that is, to consider language - in my case 
sculptural figuration- not as a medium, but as a tool.  
 
The association itself is mine, and Rorty does not encourage at least explicitly, 
any writer-philosopher to invent figures of a contemporary type of heroism. Yet, 
from the angle of pragmatism, there is no reason why we shouldn’t describe the 
use of the hero as a philosophical and narrative device for building new 
vocabularies. So what does the hero add to the theoretical framework proposed 
by Rorty and what are the main conceptual implications for what I’m discussing? 
In the first instance this: using the figure of what we might call a hero 
immediately asks for an ethical position, because nominating a hero as such, 
directly or in any similar terms, determines that the pragmatic implications of 
what is being said is not only positive, but meant. In other words, being able to 
describe a subject capable of an ethical commitment and declaring it to be 
heroic constitutes in itself a commitment.  
 
Another point is that the hero has no essence. The terms of his or her character 
changes according to necessities and views specific to a given place and a 
given time. This reinforces the adequacy of the hero as a conceit for inventing 
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new and historically located vocabularies, and dictates that proposals need to 
be in a constant dialogue with reality. More than that, it asks from the subject 
producing such vocabulary, a predisposition to work under the premise that art 
is, or ought to be, accountable for life. This means, in other words, that using the 
hero as a conceit of figuration –literary or otherwise- introduces a principle of 
answerability - a principle that places art under the priority of an attempt to 
answer to reality.  
 
However, this ‘answer’ can only be constituted as a moment in series of 
substitutions; a method for playing figures against other figures with no final 
conclusion, because after all a definitive, stable, idea of what heroism is, can 
never truly exist. This is something that I allude to in the title of the thesis, i.e. 
Dialectics of the hero: the notion of the hero as a dialectical device understood 
as redescription rather than objectivity rhetoric. Indeed, to the idea of a positive 
affirmation in a series of substitutions or, in the words of Rorty: “as the attempt 
to play off vocabularies against one another, rather than merely to infer 
propositions from one another, and thus, as the partial substitution of 
redescription for inference”151. And it is important to underscore, that because it 
can never support a claim of universalism, heroic affirmation does not cancel the 
possibility, as it were, to conceive of the world from within, and in fact produces 
the conditions of irony; understood, with an obvious nod to Rorty, as the 
possibility for a critique to be mounted from private, non-totalized and smaller 
spheres.  
 
Consequently, any attempt of heroic figuration is one that exposes and brings to 
question the division between the community and non-community, or rather, 
between a community of those who share a similar contingency, and therefore 
similar necessities, and the community of others. In general terms then, the hero 
presents itself as a figure structured as the representation of collective meaning, 
whilst at the same time, exposing the limits of what shared meaning actually 
means. In fact, if there is one thing we can expect from any conversation 
concerning the figure of the hero it is dissent, which here I consider as a positive 
activity, again in the sense that it produces movement of thought, discussion, 
debate, perhaps even conflict. Negotiation, we can conclude, is another 
principle as much as the value that can be ascribed to the hero.  																																																								
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This brings us to the question where the contrast between the hero and Rorty’s 
position is more accentuated. Rorty praises writers including Nabokov, Flaubert, 
and Proust, for making a contribution to our collective life by exploring the 
intricacies of the differing mental states belonging for the most part, to private 
life. Writers who allow readers to examine the interior, personal life, whilst 
increasing the empathy for others by increasing the map of their own feelings 
and perhaps revealing elements of their conceptual toolbox to perceive the 
world, - again in line with Schiller’s idea of art as sentimental education – 
therefore help to improve the state of (our) democracies. Introducing the mode 
of the heroic to this context means to open the space from the private sphere to 
the political, and yield open the way to vocabularies that focus on the condition 
of the individual as a political subject. Indeed, the mode of the heroic is located 
in the passage from the personal to the collective and produces a subject who is 
capable of introducing difference on a public level. But let me underline the word 
heroic here. Heroism, as a lexicon of thought, presupposes an intensification of 
vocabularies. Together with difference, intensification is the last of the principles 
I want to set out.  
 
These principles, mostly the last two, bring the idealistic logic of the hero to the 
fore. The logic of what it is now possible to call an ‘idealism of necessity’. I will 
call this the ‘idealism of necessity’ for the problem of reimagining the 
contemporary subject where ‘idealism’ appears not in a transcendental sense, 
but in the sense of a positive and, precisely, intensified affirmation of difference; 
‘necessity’ because heroism, understood in the context that we have come to 
explore, is something that answers to what is missing from reality, or to put it 
another way: what constitutes an answer to reality which is contingent to, and 
determinable by, necessity.  
 
So looking back at the beginning of this section, we started with the idea that it 
is difficult to combine questions of heroism with generic notions of truth. In turn, 
we have established that the hero is intelligible along the lines of an answer to 
reality, and following the idea of language as a tool, that to describe what a hero 
is, is to produce the knowledge of new possibilities, which can work as an 
example of what can be achieved by everyone, beyond the condition to the 
individual. With some ambition, this can be translated as: a contribution to 
collective life made in the form of an idea about what, in a given situation, 
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counts as a heroism. And right above, the section closes with a definition of the 
hero as an idealism of necessity not without before underlining the principles of 
negotiation, answerability, difference and intensity, as well as locating the mode 
of the hero between the person and the public. What follows in the last section 
of this chapter, is a consideration of this important relation between the personal 
and public, through the question of desire.  
 
 
Desire and courage  
 
 
We’ve traversed the ground of positivity and by now, it is possible to change the 
concept of what a political actor is or could be. Positivity is central to the hero, 
but as a theme it also brings the text close to an idea of heroism as that, which 
can only uphold an established order. This is a precarious crossroad, where it 
is important to remember the way in which heroism registers positivity comes 
with a problem. Can true positivity exist without first existing as a radical 
refusal? How far can we go in speaking about heroism without speaking about 
a crime? Judging by how hard it is to find references where the hero is not 
involved in some sort of crime, not very far. From antiquity to the contemporary 
world, from Oedipus and Prometheus, from the soldier to the hacker, the figure 
of the hero is often interchangeable with that of the criminal. This involves, of 
course, the question of whether a crime is done for a community or against a 
community, or at least against the legislation of a community.  
 
The first kind registers, executes, expands, and replicates one power over 
another power; the second disrupts the structures and jurisdiction of power. It is 
this second case that I now want to return too in order to deepen the discussion 
on how the hero renegotiates the terms of the engagement between the 
individual and the collective. It is useful, therefore, to return to Lacan’s reading 
of Antigone and the way in which he is able to demarcate heroism as reform, 
progression and revelation of knowledge, and in turn, underline the notion of 
singularity and authenticity at the heart of a positivity affirmed in terms of a 
break with the order of power.  
 
What interests me is not so much the notion of crime as such (this would open 
up a whole other discussion in the argument) but instead, it is what lies behind 
	 112	
the crime, that is, the ethical imperative that precedes the crime that is key here. 
It is the conflict between singularity and power, and in the case to be explored, 
the fact that Antigone’s heroic crime responds to what threatens the structure of 
her symbolic being.  
 
Lacan is very convincing when telling us that Antigone enacts a refusal of the 
instrumentalization of being – a refusal to yield to the law of Creon and give up 
the fight for the dignity of her brother and most importantly, to give up on her 
own ethical integrity. He focuses on the connection between the ethical demand 
to bury Polynices’s body, that only Antigone reaches a point of making it a 
priority, and the fact that she commits herself knowingly to such demand and 
thus, that she would put herself at risk and eventually, die for this ‘crime’. What 
is more, he recognizes Antigone’s feelings at that point as based in a desire and 
crucially stresses that pure desire as he finds in Antigone, is in fact, a desire for 
infinite desire, a desire that isn’t attainable – that, finally, what Antigone really 
desires is the pure, symbolic brother. This is the reason why Lacan considers 
the scenario created by Antigone in terms of beauty, which he identifies -after 
the Kantian notion of disinterestedness – as being composed of gestures, which 
are not motivated by any warranty of compensation.   
 
Another central aspect in Lacan’s reading, is the identification that the play 
works metonymically both on an internal and external plane. For instance, how 
in the plane of fiction the question of desire works as the symbolic replacement 
for the question of ethics and how Antigone’s sacrifice represents the 
sublimation of such demand. Also how externally, the play works in the opposite 
way to the Aristotelian idea of catharsis (one that operates a form of didactic 
control over its audience by producing pity and horror), and instigates its 
audience not to give up on true desire.  
 
Except of course, the question of sublimation is not that simple. Placed between 
the ethical call and a reality that stands in its way, Antigone’s act of 
disobedience, as we know, leads to her death. So death is the vehicle of 
Antigone’s ethical being, for she can only by faithful to her own authenticity by 
accepting the possibility of death. Here too the play works metonymically. After 
being immured by Creon’s order, Antigone commits suicide by hanging.  A 
death that corresponds to what Lacan famously calls a second death, which is in 
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fact also a symbolic death that re-enacts the conscience of the decision that 
brought her to that moment.  
 
More important than seeing Antigone’s suicide as a form of re-enactment, it is 
necessary to consider the act as the only option Antigone has. That being, the 
only act she is left with to reclaim the construction of her own ethical symbolic 
universe. It is no longer the desire for her brother and the demand to bury his 
body that is at stake. In Lacanian terms, Antigone’s suicide corresponds to the 
transition from desire to drive, that being the true moment of sublimation when 
the subject stops interpreting the desire of the Other – the unreachable, 
impossible object of desire, and replaces it for another ‘object’ constructed 
around the first. It is the moment of a truly active voice, when the subject takes 
full responsibility for his or her own contingency and is able to reconstruct their 
own symbolic universe. This is the moment when someone stops claiming that 
they carry out the action(s) for family, for one cause or another, and instead 
begin to say: I do it because it is my own will, because it is important to me, 
independent of being important to someone else. In the case of Antigone, this 
object, this drive, is realized through her own death, the only thing she is left 
with and that which gives her the opportunity to reclaim her own symbolic 
position in the word.  A moment that finally, corresponds to the goal of therapy: 
the moment when someone is able to redescribe him or herself152.  
 
So we have the possibility to recognize at least one similarity between the 
therapeutic process and art.  A similarity suggested throughout Seminar VII and, 
in my view, interestingly gathered in the single term “extimacy”, which Lacan 
introduces very discretely (it appears more frequently in later texts) to speak 
about prehistorical art in relation to site.  This relation is not what interests me, 
but rather what the term itself designates: “the central place, as the intimate 
exteriority or ‘extimacy’, that is the Thing”.  A citation that firstly, provides what 
the construction of the neologism suggests: something that is at once external 
and intimate; and secondly, the fact that Lacan associates “extimacy” with the 




152 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: 1959-1960. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. BOOK VII, 
London, Routledge, 1999, 2013-17,293 
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will always be represented by emptiness, 
precisely because it cannot be represented 
by anything else – or, more exactly, 
because it can only be represented by 
something else. But in every form of 
sublimation, emptiness is determinative 
(…) All art is characterized by a certain 




“Extimacy”, then, designates at once the symbolic landmark that one always 
returns to and the central place for the construction of a symbolic universe: 
something that the subject constructs around a void left by the original object of 
desire, and crucially, what allows for sublimation. A conceptual object, as it 
were, simultaneously intimate and external that enables for redescription around 
the emptiness left by desire whilst determining the very condition of sublimation; 
a domain that understood within the theoretical context established by Lacan is 
one that is shared by psychoanalysis and art.   
 
Right at the beginning of this chapter it was asked why, in comparison to multi-
positionality and performativity, is it worth considering notions of singularity and 
authenticity? In order to try answer to this we can perhaps start by claiming that 
the Lacanian subject is realized in the moment of sublimation, which is always 
an intimate moment and therefore one that involves the singularity of the subject 
at play. Consequently, one can add that a true rearticulation of the subject takes 
place through authenticity, but where this authenticity takes the form of a fidelity 
to the object of desire, and crucially, the form of something that is constructed 
around the void left by it. Authenticity, in other words, comes out as something 
that is both fundamental and something that has no core.  
 
Now, Antigone is of course a play that speaks of a profound incompatibility 
between individuals and the collective as represented by power, speaking of the 
point at which the process of individuation is no longer possible. So Antigone 
appears as a character, who is simultaneously a-political and supra-political, a 																																																								
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character in a situation that dictates her to actions and where these actions 
taken result in an eclipse of the order of power, leaving this power permanently 
changed. She exposes the malaise of a dysfunctional relation between power 
and an individual, disjoins the social categories, the do’s and don’ts of that 
society, and thus demands for recognition and new social links. This is the case 
where the hero appears as a figure that helps to renegotiate the terms of the 
engagement between individuals and the collective. Not just by simply adding 
new possibilities, but rather through a crime that disrupts the very basic 
fundaments of what a community is, an act that tears the symbolic order that 
has been up to this point in place and thus opens the potential for a new 
symbolic constellation. 
 
Yet, if there’s one key lesson in the story of Antigone, it must include the 
realization that the political possibilities opened by Antigone’s act asks for a 
commitment; that such commitment depends on the subject being capable of 
reconstructing a sense of authenticity, after a radical break with the order of 
power. In fact, an ethical demand, especially in a situation of conflict, seems to 
ask for a redefinition of what authenticity is. It asks for the rethinking of what is 
truly important. So the value of authenticity as construction is that it combines 
redescription with commitment.  
 
And if this is one of the main strands in Lacan’s account of Antigone, then we 
can perhaps see the following as his own lesson: the idea that breaking with the 
logic of an increasingly instrumentalized life begs for three simple, yet difficult 
things. It begs for acts of resistance against the order of power that 
anaesthetizes the mind and domesticates true desire with moments of instant 
satisfaction, or with what he calls the “service of goods”154 (the goods of 
consumerism and wealth, the goods of puritanism, the goods of industrialized 
knowledge and so on); it begs for the construction of authenticity, because acts 
of resistance and the construction of the ethical subject passes through the 
construction of authenticity; and what to me is his key proposal: the 
consciousness that ethical subjectivity requires a commitment, and that such 
commitment can be only realized through a willingness to pay the price, that 																																																								
154 The following citation does not give a clear definition of what Lacan means by “the service of the goods,” 
but it does clarify the logic of the expression and my own use of the phrase: “ The Ethics of psychoanalysis 
has nothing to do with speculation about prescriptions for, or the regulation of, what I have called the service of 
goods. Properly speaking, that ethics implies the dimension that is expression in what we call the tragic sense 
of life.” Ibid. 313.  
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comes with the construction of an ethical subject – the price of a sacrifice whose 
weight clarifies and sublimates desire.  
 
So it seems almost logical that Lacan describes an ideal hero as someone who 
acts knowingly of the consequences for not given up on true desire. In a rather 
odd formulation, he actually defines a hero as “someone who can be betrayed 
with impunity”155, which although sounds strange at first, does come in line with 
the fact that Antigone decides to sacrifice herself whilst being fully aware that 
this will put her at risk: the risk, precisely, of being “betrayed with impunity”. In 
short, what appears to interest Lacan regarding Antigone as a figure of thought 
is that which links to courage and where this courage implies an awareness of 
the price. The message of Antigone, in the end, is that, “the only thing one can 
be guilty is giving ground relative to one’s desire”156, which the psychologist 
would translate into: have you followed the path of the hero? What is essential 
and have you stayed true to what is unattainable, yet essential to you? Can you 
describe yourself as able to challenge the conventions that stand in the way of 
your ethical self, and can you sacrifice yourself for it?  
 
On the opposite side, he tells us, that for the ordinary man “the betrayal that 
almost always occurs sends him back to the service of goods, but with the 
proviso that he will never again find that factor which restores a sense of 
direction to that service”157, leading to the conclusion that: “There is no other 
good than that which may serve to pay the price for access to desire – given 
that desire is understood here, as we have defined it elsewhere, as the 
metonymy of our being”158.  
 
Two final observations can be made here. The first that heroism, as Lacan sees 
it, cannot be conceived of in terms of the everyday - or to put it in colloquial 
terms, that the price he’s talking about cannot be paid, using an everyday 
currency. Heroism must involve saying something different, something new, 
something that cannot be repeated by everyday discourse, because it is 
precisely what introduces an alternative space to the everyday. The second 
observation, results from the method in which Lacan addresses action and the 
problem of not-knowing versus knowing. He stops us from bracketing heroism 																																																								
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between a mode of acting without knowing, knowing and therefore not acting, or 
acting because one has the advantage of knowing something that nobody else 
does, by associating heroism, as I have said more than once, with the courage 
of acting knowingly of the consequences (ultimately, sublimation requires 
conscience). This knowing, however, means above all that there is a willingness 
to accept the burden of the action one must take, regardless of being certain of 
what will be achieved. Heroism, as Lacan tells us, relates to that which is 
needed, something that we can call an internally articulated necessity.   
 
This is a good moment to formulate a working definition of the hero. We know 
from ideas presented earlier on, that the hero posits a subject capable of 
introducing difference through a meaningful act. It follows that imagining a hero 
correspond to a process of imagining new possibilities beyond the condition of 
the individual and what a meaningful act could actually be. This involves 
invention and an attempt to organize a sense of collective meaning. 
Furthermore, the hero is a figure who represents a possibility available to 
everyone, a possibility to re-describe his or her place in the world without using 
the subterfuges of the everyday, and crucially, one that gathers the idea that to 
do so requires sacrifices.  
 
To summarise into a shorter version: this uneasy figure can be described in 
terms of a double that is born out of a necessity to articulate an ethical subject in 
the face of the reality of ethics coming under threat. A figure that presents itself 
as a subject for reinventing the available vocabularies to describe a politicized 
selfhood and thus, radicalize the processes we have come to describe as 
individuation. It constitutes an idealism of necessity, and difference, 
answerability, negotiation, and intensification, are its principles.  
 
Coming to an end, I would like to return to the question of art and sketch a link 
between the hero, Lacan and figurative sculpture, as this is important to open 
some question for the next chapter. In Seminar XX, Encore, Lacan makes a rare 
reference to a sculpture, that being Bernini’s Ecstasy of Saint Teresa (1645-52). 
The reference to this baroque sculpture is strategically placed at the end of an 
essay on feminine pleasure (Jouissance). Overseen by two masculine figures 
and one Cupid - but clearly not minding them – her body in contraction, her eyes 
closed and her facial expression as one of pleasure, the figure of Saint Teresa 
clearly represents a moment of solitary sexual rapture. Here Lacan precisely 
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reflects on the sculpture in order to bring a discussion on pleasure, emancipated 
from the object of desire, to a conclusion159. One must understand that here 
Lacan brings into play not only the question of sexual pleasure as such, but 
rather the idea of a realization beyond what prevents pleasure, which means, 
beyond the order of power associated with the idea of the masculine.   
 
The discussion of this particularly sculptural work nor Lacan’s reading of it is of 
particular interest to me. Rather it is the presence of sculpture in a seminar full 
of references to the baroque and to the interior/exterior logic of the ‘fold’, which 
the discussion brings to mind: that it is perhaps possible to establish a 
connection, albeit speculatively, between the idea of sculpture and the 
conceptual object at work with reference to the notion of ‘extimacy’. The 
fundamental questions for this speculation are of course in regards to the 
materiality of sculpture as a form of externalization (which significantly in the 
case of Bernini’s sculpture, is followed by the many folds of the composition, 
where the surface constantly becomes both interior and exterior), and the body.  
 
To approach these questions requires a short detour on ethics, the body and 
heroism. To begin, ethics can perhaps be broadly defined as an inquiry into the 
interrelationship between notions of good and action, that is, as a philosophical 
inquiry that focuses on the problem of how to act according to a notion of good. 
It is also possible to say that this question needs to be worked out by the subject 
to which it is posed and the answer has to be given willingly - otherwise the 
question is never truly answered since it did not involve a real choice. With a 
nod to Badiou, we can even say that the ethical subject is formed through a 
fidelity to a demand, the demand of the other, whose answer must be both 
responsible and accountable. This in turn means that such demand has to be 
internally articulated by an individual self - it is something that happens to me, 
and that I need to feel - and in that sense, it is always experienced as an 
embodied experience. So an ethical demand calls for the sort of commitment 
that, in extreme circumstances, such as in the case of Antigone, may come to a 
point where the subject at play is asked to risk everything and to put his own life 
and body in danger. Thus, we can also say the body is, in a sense, the real 
frontier of the ethical. 
 																																																								
159 Jacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality. The Limits of Love and Knowledge. Book XX, Encore 1972-1973, 
London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999, 76-77 
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So there is the idea that an ethical demand, the infinite demand of the other, 
cannot be completely realized through a living body, because it requires a body 
ready for its own potential extinction. The relationship between the hero and the 
body is a fundamental one, but it has nothing to do with the typified body of 
celebrity culture. The hero, most of all, expresses a disregard for the body.  
 
The body of the hero is a body located between the limits of a living body and a 
symbolic body, complete only at the same moment of its potential cancelation. 
An impossible body, we can conclude, that can only be fully realized through a 
symbolic construction. Conceptually, and in terms that are familiar by now, it is a 
void and at the same time a construction around that void. Once put in relation 
to the larger context of the present thesis, the intimation implicit here is that 
figurative sculptures carry the possibility to externalize, in a literal physical way, 
the symbolic construction of a subject that is required to be internally articulated, 
yet can never be fully accomplished except by being externally formed. The 
idea, to put this another way is that figurative sculptures, which are a kind of 
body without having real bodies in them, can be theoretically viewed as stand-in 
objects for the hero conceived in terms of the ethical subjectivity. The next 
chapter attempts to translate this to a contemporary setting and further explore 
the implications of using the hero as mode and conceit of figuration via the 
principles pointed out in the working definition. 
 
Just before that, I would like to finish with the theme of courage and try to 
resume what has been said up until this point by claiming that the figure of the 
hero always combines a form of idealism with a form of pragmatism. This can be 
done by looking into how Plato addresses the question of heroism not in terms of 
action but in terms of subject formation, and how he attempts to redescribe a 
communal subject by exchanging a Homeric subject for a Socratic subject. This 
will be done via a study offered by Angela Hobbs who examines how Plato uses 
notions of heroism according to his own ethical principles160.  
 
Hobbs observes that questions of heroism and courage are important for Plato in 
relation to what Socrates, debating with Callicles in the Gorgias161, posits as the 
most important question of all: how should one live? Plato tries to respond to this 																																																								
160 Angela Hobbs discusses Plato’s use of notions of heroism across The Gorgias, The Republic and in The 
Symposium. Angela Hobbs, Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006,  
161 See ibid., 1 
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question by asking what produces happiness or, in his own terms, a ‘flourishing’ 
of life: reason, as argued by Socrates, or pleasure as Callicles maintains? In 
order to answer to the question, he proposes a tripartite model of soul and its 
correlation with parts of the state. The ideal state would be a state where all 
parts would be in a position of equilibrium, but where reason, and rulers would 
respectively play the most important part. Yet Plato’s theory of the hero focuses 
on a specific part of the soul, the thumos162 – the mettle-spirited part of the soul 
where he crucially locates the tendency to emulate role models163.  
 
Plato suggests, as Hobbs continues, that the solution for how the parts come 
together, both on the level of the subject and that of the state, would be a result 
of a reprogramming of values through the reconfiguration of what counts as a 
hero. In other words, Plato makes use of the question of heroism to introduce 
and establish an articulation between the subject and the state, according to 
ontological principles (what a subject is and what it should be) and political 
principles (how a subject relates to others and how he or she comes to be part of 
a state). 
 
Courage becomes important here. By presenting courage as the “knowledge of 
what is to be feared and not to be feared”164 - as opposed to simple 
fearlessness-, Plato is able to associate courage with virtue and then to assert 
that the practice of philosophy involves courage. This means that far from 
dispensing courageous acts, what Plato wants to do is redefine them and rethink 
the relationship between courage and subject formation.  
 
Plato shows that the pursuit of truth and the act of resisting a life of appearances 
asks for the endurance of the soul: such endurance requires courage, which is 
also necessary for producing happiness. Plato is able to clarify the source of 																																																								
162 According to the glossary provided by the author, the term thumos signifies: “ life-force, mettle, the spirited 
part of the psuché.” The author also argues that whilst thumos is important for a series of key aspects in The 
Republic,, the term remains scarcely explored. A theoretical deficiency that she attempts to correct and that I 
here borrow for my own purpose. Additionally, Hobbs touches upon thumos in relation to the work of Aristotle, 
Nietzsche, Adler, Freud and Fukuyama here and there. See Angela Hobbs, Plato and the Hero: Courage, 
Manliness and the Impersonal Good, xvii 
163 Plato’s ideal state relies upon a tripartite model of the soul and of the state to correspond between each 
other. In The Republic, more precisely, he divides the soul into reason, appetites and thumos, each 
corresponding to a social class: reason to the rulers, thumos to the auxiliaries, and the appetites to the 
producers. In turn, this relates to the three different states of being: reason and democracy, thumos and 
timocracy, and appetites and oligarchy. Furthermore, Plato considers that for each of the elements to be at 
harmony with each other, reason needs to be the dominante element, because reason is what is in tune with 
the divine world of forms. However, he also recognizes that the thumos is the part of the soul where 
motivation, the sense of personal value and indeed the disposition to look for role models, are located; and 
therefore, that thumos is a key element for the connection between soul and state.  For a summary of Plato’s 
tripartite model of the soul its correspondence to the state, see for example: Ibid., 3-6.  
164 Plato in Protagoras, as cited in ibid., 9 
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happiness and by doing so, demonstrate that mortal thoughts are not the source 
of happiness but rather a divine ideal. Thus, that Socrates is a better heroic 
model than Callicles or than Homer’s hero Achilles165, because philosophy 
requires more courage than a life dedicated to pleasure or action. 
 
This theory of Plato’s is, of course, normally read within the context of 
metaphysics, but the way he uses the hero to combine the personal and the 
political show something different. Nietzsche was perhaps the first to have noted 
the contradiction at play between an argument that wants to claim that reality lies 
some place else, in a world of perfect forms that supposedly organize the entire 
universe, and the fact that Plato is himself inventing ideas as he continues to 
write, thus that prior to anything else, Plato’s is a literary project. And if we are to 
begin with Plato’s intentions, then the result will be a utilitarian Socrates, which 
undermines the whole division between knowledge and technique at the heart of 
Metaphysics. Plato’s way of working through notions of the hero brings these 
contradictions to the fore.  
 
One contradiction relates to notions of happiness as that which is articulated 
externally around a concept of impersonal good, located in the realm of ideas but 
also associated with a collective form of life, which Plato tries to organize. In fact 
Plato’s subject is articulated by combining the subject and the state (a necessary 
condition in Plato’s republic) – or, rather, through a mutual conflict of the two. 
And the question of heroism is right there, to introduce the questions ‘what 
counts as courage?’; ‘how should one live?’ and ‘who should one be like?’.  
 
What I am suggesting here is that it is possible to read works such as The 
Republic or The Symposium as spaces of literature and theoretical utopia 
constructed around an idealized version of Socrates. For what Plato does is not 
only to work out metaphysical questions, he also composes a political subject by 
means of inscribing the question of subject formation in technicity, or in other 
words, in terms of ‘who’ becoming ‘what’, of ‘who should one be like’. This meets 
something Rorty has remarked on when commenting on a suggestion made by 
Heidegger who identifies Platonism as a form of pragmatism: “Being, which Plato 																																																								
165 Hobbs suggests that Plato’s attempt to replace a Homeric ideal for a Socratic ideal is largely based on a 
comparison, albeit disguised, between Achilles and Socrates. She argues, more exactly, that Plato used such 
comparison as an attempt to undermine the allure of Achilles as a role model for the culture of his time. For 
more on this comparison, see: ibid., 178-186 
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thought of as something larger and stronger than us, is there only as long as we 
are here”166. Rorty’s declaration gains a particularly clear resonance with 
reference to Plato’s use of the hero, which, from an opposite perspective to 
mine, aligns a relation between the prospect of reorganizing politics and the 
need to rearticulate subjectivities.  
 
Plato’s suspicion of democracy is something to worry about but I think there is 
something relevant in Plato’s use of the hero. Forming a paradox with his own 
thinking, Plato suggests that the notion of hero can be utilized to redescribe 
ways of living, because the very idea of heroism plays out with one’s sense of 
self worth – allowing, in different words, to ‘educate’ the thumos and its yearning 
for the things that provide such feeling. And this hits a nerve with respect to the 
present-day society. A society largely organized around acts of consumerism 
and that promotes an idea of worth associated with those very acts. So what we 
might say after Plato, is that reconfiguring notions of heroism would produce the 
conditions to reconstruct a sense of worth, using a completely different logic 
from that of consumerism. However this does come with a caveat. Since the 
hero appears when associated with social value it tends to produce models of 
behaviour. Models have huge implications. So the hero also speaks of how it is 
the collective responsibility of a society as a whole to decide who to admire and 
what to elect as the source of status. With that being said, the fact that the ‘hero’ 
is a situated and non-neutral concept somehow leads to its own, constant, 
revision - a revision that needs to be practised. In the next chapter I will consider 
what has here been discussed, mostly in connection to literary and philosophical 
sources, in relation to the subject of figurative sculpture. Furthermore, I will 
continue later by introducing the notion of the dialectical-becoming-object and 








166 Richard Rorty, “Heidegger, contingency and Pragmatism” in Essays on Heidegger and Others,  
Cambridge, Cambrige, 2008, 33 
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THIRD CHAPTER: Figurative sculpture as medium of the heroic;  






So far we have seen how minimal art ties in with the tradition of examining 
figurative sculpture using an appearance/reality distinction, and how this tradition 
discredits figuration under the argument that what figuration does is basically to 
constitute an illusion, or more simply, a lie. We’ve also considered the way the 
subject of the hero diverges from the question of truth and how this works as a 
conceit of figuration. In this chapter I return to sculpture and attempt to 
understand what relevancy the project of sculptural figuration holds today and 
how this relevancy, if there is one, can be explored without the 
appearance/reality distinction. I do this by combining Bruno Latour’s object 
orientated ontology, specifically his take on composition, and the hero, and by 
using a twofold movement: on the one hand, to do with the idea of sculpture as a 




The strange condition of the figure in sculpture    
 
 
Let us start with a simple, yet I think, efficient association of ideas. Any figurative 
sculpture constitutes a fact of truth in the sense that it has a physical existence. 
However, for this same reason it is also something not quite true because the 
‘figure’ in figurative sculpture, the ‘thing’ being represented, does not really exist. 
This is what a reality/appearance distinction tells us, that figurative sculpture can 
only pretend to be something else. But the distinction is actually not appropriate 
when thinking about figurative sculpture in the first place, precisely because it 
ignores the other side; the side where figures really exist in the world. To put it 
another way, a reality/appearance distinction presents a scheme that overlooks 




If we approach the question from a different angle, the problem remains. 
Opposite to what happens with lens-based mediums, for instance, sculpture 
does not allow for an indexical relationship with reality.  To be more precise, it 
may accept the indexical mark, like in Giacometti’s hand work in clay/bronze, 
and allow for an indexical relationship with the reality of the event of making 
(which in the terms I am developing here is an important relationship because in 
a way is what enables the sculptural object to exist as a figurative object and 
simultaneously affirm its own material condition) but not with what it represents. 
Even when we speak of resemblance in sculpture, there is no direct relation with 
the represented object. Direct casts or objects produced using 3D scan and 
printing technology exemplify this well. Despite having a direct connection to an 
originating object, these technologies do not carry the possibility of an ‘indexical’ 
relation to reality in the sense that the object that is produced, the positive double 
of the first object, exists as another entity with its own concrete existence. It is, in 
short, complicated to make truth claims about the existence of what is 
represented in figurative sculpture beyond the materiality of sculpture even when 
the objects have been produced as doubles of something else.  
 
Surely, the same could be said when considering, for instance painting. 
However, the physical presence of sculpture makes the connection to reality 
quite different. Without being able to enter the philosophical complexity of the 
question here, it’s enough to say that what figurative sculpture does, that other 
art forms are unable to do, is to posit ‘the figure’ in a mode of fleeting vibration 
between absence and physical presence. A mode comprehended, to return to 
the point just made, between the non-truth of something that does not really exist 
and the truth of its presence in space. A quality, that with a nod to Fried, we 
could say makes the ‘objecthood’ of figurative sculpture intermittent, but never 
fully suspended – for even when we encounter a sculpture where it exists as an 
efficient resemblance, the materiality of such sculpture will prevent a complete or 
a stable suspension of disbelief.  
 
Resemblance, of course, does not need a pre-existent object. It can also be 
produced in art and even invented to a point of ‘resembling’ something that 
clearly had to be imagined; which means the question of belief is not always at 
play. But the point of the matter is that even when belief is plausible, and this is 
where I wanted to get to, the material condition of figurative sculpture 
undermines the usual logic of belief: one is asked to think about what is being 
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represented but not to believe in it. In other words, what sculpture seems to do 
best is not so much to allow us to see an object as a subject, but rather to allow 
us the opportunity to think about someone as an object. Therefore, the better 
figurative sculpture is able to ‘imitate’, the more it seems to lose the strength 
specific to that object. I’m here thinking of the affect produced by hyperrealist 
wax or silicone figures which, as impressive and most of all disturbing as they 
are at first, are incapable of producing a lasting interest.  
 
The above tells us that, from the viewpoint of a distinction between reality and 
appearances, the strange condition of figurative sculpture - being true and not 
true at the same time - and the impossibility to recognize in it an indexical 
relationship with reality, give reasons to those who in holding truth to be a priority 
artistic inquiry, doubt the relevancy of figurative sculpture. On the other hand, 
and if only by oversimplifying the problem at this stage, it also tells us that such 
distinction is not adequate because it focuses on what sculpture is –or, more 
exactly, on what sculpture is not, when on a formal level such a question is never 
really at work. So let us move direction and try to understand not what sculpture 
is or is not, but what sculpture is capable of doing.  
 
 
Sculpture and death 
 
 
The claim that what figurative sculpture does better is to allow us to see 
subject(s) as objects, rather than the other way around, carries a connection 
with death which is important for my argument and therefore needs to be 
established. In his book Statues (yet to be translated into English), Michael 
Serres speaks about figurative sculpture and the connection to death, posited 
on a relation with the corpse. Kenneth Gross, a reader of Serres who presents a 
rigorously translated account of the book, writes:  
 
The corpse is for Serres, the first object, the form in which 
we first confront our troubled awareness of things outside 
us, things fading away or in exile. The statue, the second 
object, becomes a way of stabilizing our relation with the 
corpse, with the idea of death (…) it conceals what is 
revealed by the fact of a corpse, our decaying materiality, 
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our being’s entanglement with alien, apparently inhuman 
processes or substances, our bondage to a lifelessness 
we inhabit or once inhabited (…) it helps kill the body’s 
living lifelessness (..) The opaque statue thus becomes 
the paradoxical ground of our ideas of subject and object, 
securing the relation of one to another, and to the fact of 
death. Marking and concealing the site of the dead body, 
the statue, on which the words ci-git (here lies) seems 
always inscribed, also appears to Serres as the 
foundation of our sense of place, of our knowledge of 
what makes place significant; the statue is a cynosure, 
the definer of axes of views, centres of attention, and 
fixities of memory, the anchor of what is volatile, the 
guardian of what is about to flee.167 
 
In a similar line of thought, Gross draws on the Freudian image of the mind as a 
place populated by statues and fragments (that the mind, according to the latter, 
produces in the process of internalizing the object of desire in order to be able to 
abandon it and protect it at the same time) to suggest that sculpture functions as 
a strategy of mourning as well as a metaphor for human presence beyond 
death168. What this suggests, and insofar as it is possible to replace the word 
statue for the expression ‘figurative sculpture’ 169, is that we can describe the 
latter as the field of objects that carry a relation to death by enunciating the idea 
of a body-as-an-object introduced by death. We can also further conceive of it as 
a way to compose the subject in its projection as an object, and finally, as an 
announcement of death thus rendered not necessarily as suffering, but in fact, in 
terms familiar to us: as a promise of “life by means other than life”170.  
 
The proposition allows us to sketch some initial ideas about sculpture as a 
medium of the heroic. As set up in the previous chapter, the heroic cannot be 
predefined or understood in terms of generic truth. Rather, it demands for a 
constant dialogue with the flow of different necessities produced by different 																																																								
167 In Kenneth Gross, The Dream of the Moving Statue, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992, 21-22. 
168 Ibid., 35 
169 I am here assuming that it is possible to replace the word ‘statue’ with the expression ‘figurative sculpture’, 
based on the idea that a statue is by definition, a sculpture with a civic function. Although this does not mean a 
statue has to be a figurative sculpture, but this is in fact its most common form in relation to more traditional 
understanding. It also corresponds to the way Serres uses the term.  
170 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus,17	
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situations and realities. From here it was also established that the hero is a figure 
constituted as an invention that registers a positive affirmation and a redefined 
knowledge of what is possible. Sculpture enters this scenario then, not only 
through the abovementioned connection with death, but as a technical support 
for the invented body; one that undermines any truth claims about what is being 
represented but that at the same time, allows for an inscription of the human 
figure in the concrete order of things via a rather literal combination between the 
human and the non-human.   
 
And again, although this could be extended to other supports, the medium of 
sculpture allows not only for the invention of a symbolic body but for its presence 
in real space. Therefore for the staging of a situation where people and 
sculptural figures share, to use a Heideggerian expression, a common dwelling. 
To put it another way, in being capable of producing a physical hybrid between 
the human and the non-human, figurative sculpture also introduces the question 
of co-habitation between the two. This theory of seeing the subject as object in 
relation to death should be kept in mind for later in the fourth chapter, where I 
discuss the implications of death and sculpture to subject formation.  
 
 
Greek sculpture, Jacques Rancière and democracy 
 
 
Let us return to the reality/appearance distinction for a second. Classical Greek 
sculpture is of interest here because of the profound implications that the untrue 
likeness found in sculpture from this period had for Greek democracy. A form of 
likeness that allowed for the composition and the inscription of an idealized 
democratic subject in the physical reality of materials, and that made it possible 
for this ‘subject’ to become part of a shared spatial reality. Giving witness to the 
material root of democracy, so well captured in the expression public matter, in 
short Classical Greek sculpture is an example that speaks volumes about the 
political dimension of forms of coexistence between real people and figurative 
objects.  
 
Writing for Making Things Public: Atmospheres of democracy, a curatorial and 
editorial project that sough to question what an object-orientated democracy 
would look like today, Peter Weibel starts a speculation on the possible role of 
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artworks within contemporary democracies by referring to Greek sculpture, more 
exactly to Polykleitos’ Doryphoros171 (circa 440 BCE). A clear example, as he 
describes it, of how the “The aesthetic canon and social canon were mutually 
determining”172. A lot could be said, indeed a lot has been said concerning this 
figure, but it is the relation between its proportions and the “social canon” what 
matters the most here.  
 
As indicated by different sources173, Doryphoros combines proportions 
established by Polykleitos using mathematical and theoretical principles together 
with the average measurements of a high number of people, with a pose that 
looks unnatural, and in fact is anatomically incorrect, and that, more than a 
normalized subject, posited a relation to the idea of an exemplary subject. This is 
reinforced by the visual movement of the figure and the way it appears as if the 
body is simultaneously at rest and in action; an in-between state that we might 
assume must have appeared as the perfect moment for the Greek contemplative 
mind after the introduction of an ethics of action in Greek culture during the 
Greco-Persian wars in 5th century BCE.  
 
A pose that might also suggest a relation to the notion of isometry as well as to 
that of the isonomic subject: the notion of a subject that fulfils the ideal of the 
citizen as one that is not only an equal amongst equals, but an equal to power; 
and crucially, one who is capable of introducing difference through action174, thus 
an idealized, indeed invented, version of the citizen. In fact we know that Greek 
art is not an art of the portrait but rather, if I’m to generalize, an art of heroicizing 
people by providing the material means to override the biological body and 
achieve excellence (the Greek arête) in the form of a public self. This being, the 
best of a public self, standing quite literally between the living and the non-living; 
an ‘ideal amongst citizens’ that answered to the necessity of a public body 
beyond the individual, biological life - a subject position that cannot be formed or 
occupied otherwise.  																																																								
171 Familiar to the English world as the spear-bearer, Doryphoros is known only in the version of a roman 
copy. The original bronze is from circa 440 BCE. 
172 Peter Weibel, “People Making Art Making People”, in Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel, eds. Making Things 
Public. Atmospheres of Democracy, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005, 1008 
173 A general account of Doryphoros and some aspects of its production can be found in:  John Boardman, 
Greek Sculpture: The Classical Period, London: Thames & Hudson. For a comprehensive and very rigorous 
study on Doryphoros and the work of Polykleitos see: Warren G. Moon, ed., Polykleitos, the Doryphoros and 
Traditio, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
174 I am here relying on Hannah Arendt’s intimation that the Greek polis was not conceived of as a 
democracy but as an isonomy; for unlike the democracy, which relies on a form of rule, announced in the suffix 
‘cracy’, isonomy in turn denotes political freedom and a state of ‘no-rule’ where there is no distinction between 




Overall, what the human body represents for the Greek sculptor is a form of 
organizing the universe that, especially in a pre-Socratic period, echoed at once 
a strong sense of concreteness and the belief that decisions concerning the 
human demos and the material structures forming the basis for public life are to 
be taken not by the gods, but between fellow citizens - that is, between humans, 
not the divine. A logic for which a body without a body clearly provided a field 
where decisions about being and politics could be played out, and literally 
become part of the Greek agora. In fact, considering how much sculpture was 
part of public space, it is not hard to imagine the Greek citizen thinking of himself 
as potential sculpture175. 
 
Actually, we know that sculptural developments paired the mutual appearance of 
the notion of citizen and the emergency of democracy, and that similarly to 
theatre, it provided a form of appearances where the individual condition of 
citizens could be played out and be given a physical presence in space. Far from 
being disqualified because of a reality/appearance distinction, sculpture 
connected to the part, or period, of Greek culture that saw the spirit as a 
concrete thing (being as part of the physis). A view of the world that sculpture 
was able to translate in terms of a political subject but also in terms of rhythms 
and forms found in nature. The rhythm of waves and mathematical relations, for 
example, that Greek sculpture thought and combined with the human figure 
through the treatment of forms, notably, with undulating visual movement and 
part/whole relations established after numeric relations. It was not only the figure 
in the world, but also the world in the figure. Reasons why it is not surprising that 
Actor-network theory (hereafter ANT)176 and Heidegger before ANT found a 
connection with pre-Socratic philosophers, especially with Anaximander, who 
conceived of the human and the material world in the same order of things.   																																																								
175 Nigel Spivey notes on this matter that the “polis was obliged to provide the means of cult for those who 
died defending it”. Significantly, what this suggests is that whether on the battle field or in civic life, an acting 
citizen would know his decisions could open the possibility for his life to be monumentalized in sculpture. To 
the centrality of death in Greek culture, of being towards death, sculpture added the perspective of becoming 
an object; a second body, beyond death, whose idealized form would take up a place in public space. The 
citation is found in Nigel Spivey, Understanding Greek Sculpture. Ancient Meanings. Modern Readings, 
London: Thames and Hudson, 1997,107 
176 Actor-network theory, or ANT, is an approach to social theory and research based on the claim that 
objects and other non-human entities can affect, and indeed are a part of, what we normally call ‘the social’. 
Critical of a human/non-human divide, ANT also avoids using conventional and fixed sociological categories 
and to give essentialist explanations about events - focusing instead on mapping the interactions between 
different agents and knowing how these form networks of influence. Key proponents include Michel Callon and 
Bruno Latour who is discussed in the main text. The interest of Latour for my project ties in with the way his 
writing allows us to change the focus from what objects are and into what objects do.  	
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I immediately hear the critic’s voice saying that we can not seriously consider 
Greek sculpture as a model for repositioning contemporary figurative sculpture; 
that despite its continuing influence on our understanding of the relation between 
figurative sculpture and politics, as the great reference for the western tradition, 
we cannot regress back to the Greek model, because our priorities and 
necessities are completely different as is our ‘technical’ and artistic settings and 
modes of living. And I agree, even if we take into consideration that most of our 
prejudices about Greek statues are the result of conceptual misappropriations by 
regimes that have transformed a certain ‘classical look’ into an instrument for 
totalitarianism, we cannot redefine figurative sculpture through the Greek model. 
However, it remains relevant to explore the marriage between the human form 
and the material world and this is why. 
 
Greek sculpture tells us that a contribution to the process of individuation, 
established elsewhere as the process of mutual development between the 
individual, the social and the technical, can be made in the form of a subject 
posited beyond the biological body; a subject composed by means of combining 
the human figure and the concrete order of things. In brief, Classical Greek 
sculpture introduces the idea of becoming-object as a form of rethinking the 
political imaginary, by providing the sort of technical support needed to articulate 
and make physical a public, indeed ethical and political, subject. And if this is 
what Greek Sculpture tells us, then the logical step is to ask if there can be a 
contemporary equivalent to such becoming-object of sculpture.  
 
We find something in Rancière that allows us to set up a transition between 
Greek sculpture and contemporary art. In Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic 
Regime of Art Rancière draws on a previous reading from Winckelmann and 
reasons that the Belvedere Torso 177 signals a break from the classical paradigm 
(which, furthermore he recognises as marking a moment of freedom for the 
Greek people) because of the way in which the missing members of the 
sculpture suggest an action without determining it and in that sense posit an 
emancipated movement. This is also present on a metaphorical plane, given that 
																																																								
177 The Belvedere Torso is an over life-sized fragment of a Greek marble sculpture from the first century, BCE 
or CE, now believed to be a copy of an earlier version. It belongs to the Vatican Museum. You can imagine it 
as the figure of a seated male nude, with no head or arms, with legs missing below the knee and in a position 
as if turning slightly upwards to the left side. 
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the absent head suggests the idea of a non ruling member, and therefore of no 
hierarchy or intentional command. He says: 
 
A mutilated statue is not only a statue lacking parts. 
It is a representation of a body that cannot be 
appreciated any longer according to two main 
criteria used by the representative order: firstly, the 
harmony of proportions –that is to say, the 
congruence between parts and the whole; 
secondly, the expressivity –that is, the relation 
between a visible form and a character –an identity, 
a feeling, a thought – that this visible form makes 
recognizable in unequivocal traits.178  
 
The argument is more complex than how I am revealing it here, but what is 
important to note is that what interests Rancière is not only what Winckelmann 
reads in the object as such, but the fact that the latter believed the torso could 
translate the Greek experience to his 19th century contemporaries - exactly 
because it exists as a fragment. In other words Winckelmann, as Rancière points 
out, thought that the Greek experience of plenitude was no longer possible to 
perceive in terms of addition but instead required a form of subtraction. An idea 
that Rancière underscores by reasoning that in breaking with the classical sense 
of hierarchy and the harmonious relation between the parts and the whole, as 
well as in dissolving a formal coherence between artistic intention and reception, 
the torso registers the possibility of aesthetic autonomy and of including the 
viewer in the event of art by putting him or her in a position of completing the 
missing part of anatomy and the unfathomable action. Once again in his own 
words:  
 
It is the power, which remains obscure to the artist, 
of doing something other than what he does, of 
producing something other than what he wants to 
produce, and thus giving the reader, the spectator 
or the listener the opportunity to recognize and 
differently combine many surfaces in one, many 																																																								
178 In Jacques Rancière, Aisthesis: Scenes From the Aesthetic Regime of Art, London: Verso, 2013, 3-4	
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languages in one sentence, and many bodies in a 
simple movement.179 
 
Now, to think about figurative sculpture in terms of the fragment, the potential for 
a multitude of bodies and the possibility of invention and plural composition, 
never to be actualized, never finished, always in transformation180, constitutes a 
good point of departure from the Greek model. Furthermore, I think useful for a 
general reconsideration of contemporary figurative sculpture.  
 
Rancière’s reading of Winckelmann’s consideration of the Belvedere Torso takes 
us through his re-conceptualization of the viewing experience in terms of an 
autonomy/heteronomy tension (between the concrete presence of the object and 
the cultural milieu of a community that reads it and that thus participates in the 
production of meaning)181. It reminds us that it is important to break with a 
‘classical’ ideological unity between the parts and whole. Rancière also makes a 
convincing case for art, useful as a form for breaking with any ordering that 
predetermines a unity between action and thought and therefore any fixed 
‘ordering’ of ‘who is what’ and ‘who makes what’. He defends in short, an idea of 
art as a space of mobility, or what appears most frequently as distribution, which 
I think is a key idea for the project of figuration today.  
 
And yet, in closely examining the citations from Rancière, one might presuppose 
that the subject of composition and the subject of democratic emancipation 
oppose to each other. In the terms explored therein, emancipation corresponds 
to a moment when thought and physical gestures are liberated from a political 
and artistic order, which correlates with a structural mobility and that, as 
Rancière seems to suggest, is incompatible with the materiality of sculpture; a 
materiality that appears with the mark of a formal stability and the hierarchy of 
part/whole relations that he associates with the order of power. Thus he brings 
us to a situation where what remains for figurative sculpture is to frame the 
performative and produce a situation where multiple and potential compositions 
can be imagined by the viewer.   																																																								
179 Ibid., 11 
180 Rancière reaffirms this view in a later episode of the book by speaking of the fragment as a module of re-
composition and the notion of active surface, viz. a surface that reacts to the movement of the viewer, in the 
work of Rodin. Jacques Rancière, Aisthesis: Scenes From the Aesthetic Regime of Art, 155-170	
181 Ranciere speaks about the work of art as existing between a condition of autonomy and heteronomy with 
more care than I could include here. For more on this, see for example: “The Aesthetic Revolution and its 
Outcomes: Employments of Autonomy and Heteronomy” in New Left Review 14, 2002, 133-151 
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To put it another way, Rancière aligns the Belvedere Torso with the need for the 
redistribution of the sensible182 and with a subject that is formed after a reaction 
to something that has been preformed - something given in advance to a 
‘spectator’ that even if emancipated, is still a subject that engages with 
something that has been given to him to engage with183.  He does not predict the 
position of the subject of composition, and in my view, the need not only to 
reconfigure experiences that can “create new modes of sense perception and 
induce novel forms of political subjectivity”184, but also to reconstruct the sensible 
material upon which those subjectivities can be enacted.    
 
Showing some common aspects with what has been discussed in relation to 
minimal art, this is in a way linked to an inadequate and limiting translation 
between political inequality and difference in art, that is with reference to the idea 
that a democratic form of art begs for the structural cancelation of difference, 
part/whole relations and what Rancière calls the unity of expression. And on the 
other hand, to the belief that democracy in art manifests itself mainly in the way 
the viewer engages with the work – a belief that naturally devalues the 
origination of the art objects and with it, the introduction of difference on a 
material level. Consistent with his suspicion of representation, Rancière’s view if 
briefly put, misses the ‘matter’ in the ‘public matter’.   
 
So to summarize: the perspective that Rancière brings to figurative sculpture via 
the Belvedere Torso is preoccupied mainly with reception of art and in particular 
the actual moment of perception. It underlines the potential of the fragment – the 
power of the absent part, the importance of the multiple and especially the 
importance of the viewer negotiating meaning. He introduces key ideas for the 
task of rethinking sculpture and its politics outside the Greek model. However, to 
limit ourselves to these ideas would mean to accept that everything that 
figurative sculpture is able to do functions within a space of negotiation. Instead, 																																																								
182 Right at the beginning of The politics of Aesthetics, Rancière outlines what he calls the “distribution of the 
sensible” as a system of rules that conditions what is possible to see and hear, to say and think, or in other 
worlds, what determines the conditions of possibility of thought and what is possible to apprehend by the 
senses and therefore establishes forms of inclusion and exclusion. See, for example: Jacques Rancière, The 
Politics of Aesthetics. The distribution of the sensible, New York: Continnum, 2006, 12-14 
183 This somehow echoes the way Rancière understands the question of representation, as elaborated in The 
Politics of Aesthetics and elsewhere, in terms of the relations of power established by a subject in power 
against another not in power, between rulers and the common person. By opposition, he suggests the 
contemporary ‘aesthetic regime of art’ as one that in breaking with the active/passive divide in the reception of 
art announces the possibility to break with an authoritarian ordering of activities and social positions (as well 
as with the many ‘partitions’ that the contemporary art world itself produces). This, he identifies, occurs without 
offering an address of the moment of composition, which I believe relates to the fact that he mostly thinks 
about art from the perspective of the viewer.  
184 Jacques Rancière, The politics of Aesthetics: the distribution of the sensible, London, Verso, 2006, 9	 	
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a deeper reflection on contemporary figurative sculpture requires a consideration 
of the formal structures internal to figurative objects and the way these are able 
to promote specific negotiations by force of the ideas inscribed therein. For 
example, the question of the ‘multiple’ is important, but surely, it is also important 
to ask: a ‘multiple of what?’. 
 
In the end Rancière’s reading of the Belvedere Torso raises important questions, 
but at the same time leaves us with a very limited account of figurative sculpture. 
Indeed it recuperates the vision of figurative sculpture as an art of power, an art 
in tension with the spirit of modernity. It is for sure not a coincidence that he has 
placed the discussion on the Greek fragment right at the beginning of the 
abovementioned book where he lays out, in more or less chronological order, 
scenes of the aesthetic regime of art, and where sculpture, or more exactly a 
mutilated sculpture, assumes the position of a precondition of modernity. He 
clearly thinks that other mediums are better. In his approach to collage or film185 
for example (and to film as collage), he is often found praising the capacity of the 
medium to break the distance between heterogeneous realities and re-distribute 
visibility, not only in terms of what is produced at the 'event of art ', in the 
presence of a live audience, but as he points out in The Emancipated Spectator 
in relation to the films of Pedro Costa186 or Martha Rosler's photomontages from 
the 1970s187, in terms of what is done, indeed composed, internally in the unity of 																																																								
185 Cinema, unlike sculpture, provides the perfect metaphor for modernity – with its relation to light and its 
privileged capacity to show real people and capture reality in movement. And it is perhaps because of its 
indexical relation to reality, which many argue is also a relation with truth, that despite the tainted history of 
both sculpture and cinema when it comes to their role in the propaganda apparatus of totalitarian political 
regimes in the past, cinema can easily be associated with the idea of an emancipatory, even militant, idea of 
art. Sculpture, however struggles to depart from its association with ideological constructions, resistance to 
change and autocratic power. As I suggest in the main text, Rancière (who dedicates great part of his writings 
on art to cinema) reinforces, if only indirectly, this view with his reading of the Belvedere Torso by playing the 
idea of a sculptural body against that of a living community. But he is not alone on this. Interestingly, Krauss 
starts Passages in Modern Sculpture with a reference to cinema, more precisely to the very first scene in 
Eisenstein’s film October: Ten Days That Shook the World from 1928: “In that first scene Eisenstein set up the 
two poles of his film: the two opposing metaphors that establish both his analysis of history and the space in 
which it occurs. The crowd and the real space through which it moves are asked to represent the hero of the 
revolution; while the enemy of that revolution is cast as a series of ideologies and formal spaces, each on 
symbolized by means of statuary. In the film’s re-creation of the struggle to retain imperial power in Russia, 
sculptures are made into surrogate actors; and there is consistent identification of particular icons with 
particular political views. “ It is significant that both authors have chosen to start a survey of modern art with a 
scene of a defaced sculpture. Figurative sculpture appears as the enemy of informal space and truth, which 
are both conceived of as a condition of modernity, and importantly as an obstacle of emancipation. Part of my 
work here is precisely to change the perception of sculpture as the bastion of power and to reclaim for it the 
same sort of expectations presently placed upon contemporary cinema. The quote is found in Rosalind E. 
Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture, 7-8.  
186 Writing about Pedro Costa’s so-called Fontainhas trilogy (Ossos from 1997; In Vanda’s Room from 2000; 
Colossal Youth from 2006) Rancière remarks that: “It affirms an art in which the form is not split off from the 
construction of a social relation or from the realization of a capacity that belongs to everyone.” In Jacques 
Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, London: Verso, 2009, 81.  
187 Rancière makes a reference to Martha Roshler’s work in “The misadventures of critical thought”, the 
second section from the The Emancipated Spectator where he brings to question the path taken up by critical 
thought, precisely through a comparison between “ the artistic and political success of collage and 
photomontage: the clash on the same surface of heterogeneous, if not conflicting elements,” that we can 
recognize in the way Martha Rosler addressed the Vietnam war in her collage series from the 1970s Bringing 
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film and paper. These questions are similar to those that need to be asked in 
relation to contemporary figurative sculpture. Considering that working with a 
contemporary language means to include heterogeneous parts and the 
fragment, and in order to avoid total fragmentation, we cannot completely ignore 
the question of the whole either; which in turn means, that we need to ask how to 
rehearse problems of distribution in and through objects.   
 
 
A new task for sculpture 
 
 
Returning for a moment to an earlier source will help me to formulate the next 
step. In The Sculptural Imagination: Figurative, Modernist, Minimalist Alex Potts 
reasons that some of the major developments introduced in sculpture from early 
nineteenth century to late 1990s have resulted from attempts made by artists to 
broaden the way viewers engage with work and stop the promotion of ideological 
integration of individuals. In fact, similarly to Rancière, Potts also tells us that on 
a formal level, this was accompanied by a progressive break with the unity 
between the parts and the whole, and with the unity of expression defined in 
terms of an accord between artistic intention and reception. Potts’s argument, in 
short, is that the history of sculpture for the past two centuries is defined by 
moments that renegotiated the viewing conditions of sculpture and that such 
history culminates in the minimalist mode, which is about the viewing itself. 
 
He concludes his “story of sculpture”, as he describes it, by arguing that a lot of 
the questions raised by minimal art, and indeed by the general developments in 
sculpture, continue to be explored but become manifest in different ways: in a 
sculpture of spaces, of objects, and even of the figure. Three approaches that he 
sees represented in the work of Bruce Nauman, Louise Bourgeois and Georg 
Baselitz. Very quickly, Potts explains that Bruce Nauman is able to produce a 
sculptural mode for viewing video art that disturbs the relation between a private 																																																								
the War Home . As the title suggests, Rosler coalesces the reality of domestic life in America during that 
period and the reality of a scenario of war created by America in Vietnam. In a similar vain,Josephine 
Meckseper uses collage-like techniques, photomontages and assemblages of objects from opposing 
universes often shown inside vitrines, to comment on the American machine of war and consumerism society 
in more recent years, here the process that exposes seemingly opposing universes as belonging to the same 
reality  “proves to be identical to the structure of a reality where everything is exhibited in the manner of a 
commodity display (…) it is always a question of showing to the spectator what she does not know how to see, 
and making her feel ashamed of what she does not want to see, even if it means that the critical system 
presents itself as a luxury commodity pertaining to the very logic it denounces.” Jacques Rancière, The 
Emancipated Spectator, 26-31	
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mode of viewing and the public exposition of such viewing188; and that in the 
series known as Cells, Bourgeois presents artworks that simultaneously appear 
as wholes in the space of exhibition and put to play the idea of fragmentation 
through different elements placed inside the cell and through multiple views 
produced by mirrors and frames in the partitions that defined the area of the 
Cell189. Finally, referring to the kind of figures Georg Baselitz has been producing 
since the early 1980s, e.g. over-life size and roughly carved in limewood, Potts 
points out that expression, gesture, painted marks, and more importantly, marks 
made by the saw used to carve the figures out, appear dissociated from one 
another - that despite the figurative nature of such works, these don’t follow any 
internal logic and don’t represent anything – elements that for that reason are 
“specific”, as Potts puts it, with a clear reference to Judd. 
 
Picking up from this last example, one of the implications of Potts’ analysis of 
sculpture is that Minimalism and figuration are not completely incompatible. And 
it is not only artists such as Baselitz that show this. Examples can also be found 
in the historical roots of Minimalism. Namely in the work of Auguste Rodin, who 
with the object-quality of his figures anticipated the transition from the figurative 
mode to Modernism’s preoccupation with the specific conditions of each medium 
and furthermore prefigured the active viewing of Minimalism by giving visibility to 
process, including fragments and repetition, and finally, with his modeling 
technique based on variations of light effects on the surface of sculpture – a 
technique that ask the viewer to change positions in order to visually understand 
its forms. Brancusi also comes to mind here, with his treatment of the plinth, 
simplification of volumes, use of modules and repetition, and the notable 
influence these had on artists such as Richard Serra and Carl Andre. Rodin and 
Brancusi are in fact two of the most obvious names when it comes to give 
witness to the influence of the transformation of sculptural figurative language at 																																																								
188 In my opinion, Potts’ claim about Bruce Nauman’s work is most explicit in Live Taped Corridor, from 1970, 
where Nauman is able to address the social phenomena of participation and surveillance. For reference: the 
work invites the viewer/participant to walk along a narrow corridor towards two stacked television monitors. As 
he or she approaches the monitors, the viewer sees one monitor showing an image of the corridor being 
empty and his or her own image in the monitor on top, which gets smaller and smaller as approached. This 
results from the fact that the image is transmitted from a surveillance camera mounted at the entrance of the 
corridor. The relation established with the image is thus contra-intuitive, further so because the viewer can only 
see his own back. Adding to the environment of surveillance created by the angle of the camera, positioned 
higher than eye-level, this gives the viewer the felling of being watched. In other words, the work coerces the 
viewer to see himself being watched, which is also felt as he walks out of the corridor, this time because of the 
presence of other viewers, eventually standing outside the corridor, looking in. 
189 The works from Louise Bourgeois commonly known as Cells, are in most cases, room-sized autonomous 
areas, but visually open to the outside, where the artist creates spaces of memory with the use of different 
objects – often including furniture pieces, mirrors and figurative objects, notably strained hand gestures carved 
in stone. In his final discussion on the work of Bourgeois, Potts includes Cell (You better grow up), from 1993, 
and Cell (Glass Spheres and Hands) from 1990-1993, both of which can be described as above. See: Alex 
Potts, The Sculptural Imagination. Figurative, Modernist, Minimalist, 361-370 
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the turn of 20th century on Minimalism. We could also mention Picasso and later 
David Smith and, as noted below, at least one example from an earlier period.  
 
Potts makes a convincing case for the influence of the work of Antonio Canova 
(1757-1822) on future sculptural practice, more exactly for the idea that he 
anticipated a lot of what is at play in Minimalism with figures that appear to 
acknowledge the presence of the viewers, and significantly that invite attention to 
specific, somehow independent, details.  He believes, for example, that we can 
compare Robert Morris’s large and heavy strips of felt pieces that hang freely 
from the wall from the late 1960s with the sense of self-sufficiency and the affect 
of gravity conveyed by the drapery carved in marble in Canova’s The Three 
Graces from 1815-17.  As Potts remark: “The elusive and provisional sense of 
wholeness one has in the presence of the Canova can never be pinned down – it 
too hovers forever on the margins of one’s immediate awareness”.190   
 
So here we have an interesting suggestion in Potts’s argument. The western 
tradition of sculpture has moved towards an increased preoccupation with how to 
engage viewers and along the way relegated formal problems, specially those to 
do with representation, to a secondary plane of importance doing so despite the 
fact that plastic form, or more exactly, structures internal to artworks and 
elements of figuration, don’t necessarily compromise the engagement of viewers.  




the post-war projects of artists like David Smith and 
Alberto Giacometti mark a kind of turning point when 
serious sculpture began to be severed from any 
connection with visions of a reconfigured world. 
Sculpture then became increasingly caught up in a 
bleaker, more insistently critical process of self-
reflection, both at the level of questioning what a 
sculpture is or is not as a kind of object, and at the 
more rhetorical level of how the viewer is being 
interpolated by it.191  																																																								
190 Ibid., 13 
191 Ibid., 378  
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I would perhaps add a couple of names including Marino Marini and Magdalena 
Abakanowicz on that same post-war context, but regardless I agree with Potts’ 
position on this. For the past half century, the field of sculpture has been 
instrumental in redefining the way artworks engage viewers and in developing 
strategies to resist the commodification of objects of art, but has indeed stepped 
back from the task of reconfiguring reality. On the whole, the field of sculpture 
seems more preoccupied with staging objects, and with establishing analogies 
with reality and pre-worked conceptualizations, than with inventing “visions of a 
reconfigured word”.   
 
It is in this gap, already announced in the previous section with Rancière, that it 
is important to explore the theme of composition. Focusing on the figure, below I 
try to establish a conceptual framework for composition via Bruno Latour, only to 
argue later that the hero can operate as a methodology for composition.  
 
 
Bruno Latour, Rachel Harrison and the indifference of objects  
 
 
In the first instance, including Latour might come across as a jump in the text. 
However, Latour shares with Rancière not only an interest for contemporary art, 
but also the idea that democracy demands for a certain disorder, to which art 
associates itself with the capacity to “redistribute the sensible” in the case of 
Rancière, and to “reassemble the social”192 in the case of Latour. Having said 
that, the demos of democracy is differently conceived of by each of the two. 
Rancière sees it as an embodied subject, i.e. as a living community, whereas 
Latour conceives the democratic as a series of changing negotiations, 
translations and mediations between different 'actors', both human and non-
human. In fact, throughout the latter’s work in sociology, he convincingly 
questions the division between the human and the non-human and has managed 
to bring attention to the interactions between the two. What is more, he has a 
transversal approach to composition with some important, albeit indirect, 
implications for what I hazard to say, can be a renewed understanding of 
figurative sculpture.  																																																								
192 The expression is taken from the title of one of Latour’s books, Reassembling the Social. An Introduction 
to Actor-Network-Theory, from 2005, where Summarily put he argues for the importance of sociology to 
reformulate its principles in order to extend the notion of the social to non-human entities and precisely 
“reassemble the social”.  
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For what matters here, Latour views composition as a post-human assemblage 
of negotiations and heterogeneity which is also an adaptive system (or systems) 
without a fixed hierarchy; one that chances according to a network of influences - 
simultaneously local and global - and that can be composed or taken apart, 
added to or subtracted from. Crucially, he argues that composition, not 
cosmologies or critique, is the key to handling the ‘social’ because the search for 
a contemporary assembly cannot be sustained by any systems of thought that 
sift reality through something exterior to reality. As it appears in “An attempt at a 
compositionist Manifesto”, an essay where Latour condenses his ideas and 
expectations about composition:   
 
 
with critique you may debunk, reveal but only as long 
as you establish, through this process of creative 
destruction, a privileged access to the world of reality 
behind the veil of appearances. Critique, in other 
words, has all the limits of utopia: it relies on the 
certainty of the world beyond this world (…) it can 
break down walls, destroy idols, ridicule prejudice, but 
you cannot repair, take care, assemble, reassemble.193 
 
By contrast to critique194, Latour’s conceptualization of composition presupposes 
the possibility of intervention (significantly, it puts the reader in the position of the 
subject of composition) and underlines the connection between the logic of 
composition and the search for the common. This in turn posits composition both 
as a mode of knowing reality and of re-organizing reality - to arrange, re-
distribute, constitute, care for, or in short, to reassemble a common world instead 
of simply mapping a sociology of the social. On a first basis, composition is about 
establishing relations towards the idea of the common with a form of 
commitment. Again in Latour’s own words:  
																																																								
193 Bruno Latour,  “An attempt at a Compositionist Manifesto”, New Literary History, 2010, Vol. 41, 475. 
194 “An attempt at Compositionist Manifesto” is, as Latour mentions therein, a kind of follow up to another 
essay, more influential perhaps, where in brief he argues that the priority of explanation and the stubborn 
object/subject division, and therefore a deficient acknowledgment of non-human agency, has brought critique 
to its exhaustion. For more on this see: Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of 
Fact to Matters of Concern”, Critical Inquiry, Winter 2004, 225-248  
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Composition takes up the task of searching for 
universality but without believing that this universality 
is already there, waiting to be unveiled and 
discovered. It is thus far from relativism (in the papal 
sense of the word) as it is from universalism (in the 
modernist meaning of the world (…). From 
universalism it takes the task of building a common 
world; from relativism, the certainty that this common 
world has to be built from utterly heterogeneous parts 
that will never make a whole, but at best a fragile, 
revisable material and diverse composite material.195 
 
So in this scheme of things, composition applies to distribution, to establish both 
connections and positions in a network of influences as well as having the weight 
of a commitment, as opposed to a gathering that can at any point by dissolved. It 
appears as a mode for reorganizing affects that furthermore correlates with an 
idea of heterogeneous parts working between themselves to form a whole that 
constitutes the reason of this ‘working’ together; therefore meaning it is not about 
what things are but about what things do and the way in which different elements 
interact in the absence of fixed rules. It describes a whole, but not a totality.  
Three points can be made here. By focusing on the interactions between things, 
Latour’s take on composition avoids giving essentialist explanations about the 
nature of those things and logically refuses an appeareance/reality distinction. 
More important still, he offers us a theoretical framework for composition that 
refuses fixed rules of composition but predicts the position of the subject of 
composition, the inclusion of heterogeneous elements and the fragment. Based 
on all these, I would like to call this composition-without-essences.   
Now, the influence of Latour on art theory is nothing new and can perhaps be 
explained in just a few words with a note on how he has managed to construct a 
body of theory that blurs the distinction between objects and subjects, and in so 
doing, has made it possible, or at least suggests that it is possible, to 																																																								
195 Bruno Latour,  “An attempt at a Compositionist Manifesto”,474 
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conceptualize the agency of art works in a broad political sense. Thus his 
theories have become both attractive and useful to renew our ideas about art 
objects. However, it also reveals some limitations. Let us consider the work of 
Rachel Harrison and later of Isa Genzken: two artists that use figuration in line 
with a post-minimal legacy and that paraphrase Latour’s ideas rather well.  
 
Consistently acquiring the form of object-gatherings, Rachel Harrison’s 
exhibitions give witness to a sculptural version of a Latourian assemblage. These 
are normally constituted as a field of interactions between objects conjured with 
various procedures of making and finding that assume different strategies of 
power. In fact, while some objects are presented as if just to be seen, most are 
actually doing something or with a potential to do something. Harrison’s work 
confront us with assemblages, that as described by Ina Blom are “not taken as a 
formal principle but as a form of activity or as a confrontation of forces, wills or 
perspectives, the assemblages of art is the scene of sociality itself”196.  
 
In that sense, Harrison’s practice makes sense primarily in the context of the 
exhibition as a whole, which for the larger part appear without a clear figure-
ground relation, meaning, as exhibitions where it is difficult to visually isolate this 
or that element from other elements. That being said, most individual artworks 
maintain their independent integrity but with the condition, once again in most 
cases, that they are impossible to be perceived instantly. Important features 
become visible only as the viewer walks around them. Harrison’s work, in short, 
is an example of a body of work that successfully establishes part-whole 
relations but where the parts are not totalized by the whole. This is not strange to 
the space of the exhibition either, which is frequently fragmented by dividing 
boards, physical lines or artworks that seem deliberately positioned to interrupt 
the visual field of other artworks (for example in the installation Snake in the 
Grass 1997/2000 – fig. 10)  
 
 
The result, is that the space of Harrison’s exhibitions produce multiple and 
fragmented perspectives that make it difficult to essentialise things and that ask 
the viewer to negotiate with the exhibition by traversing it. Plus, often as a result 																																																								




of acquiring the atmosphere of a site in construction, Harrison’s exhibitions seem 
to set out the idea of process against any attempt to stabilize objects and 
meaning.  
 
                     
               
10. Rachel Harrison, Snake in the Grass (1997-2009)           11. Rachel Harrison, Untitled (2001)  
 Multiple materials                                                                    Wood, Polystyrene, Cement, Acrylic, Formica, 
138x288x498 inches                                                                Protective film and Ceramic figurine              
                                                                                                57x 241/5 x 241/5 inches 
 
 
Another important aspect is the frequent inclusion of individual objects that acquire 
the aspect of viewing subjects - such as small figurines displayed as if someone is 
observing the objects in a gallery (see fig. 11). This aspect contributes to a form of 
display capable of attributing inanimate objects with a sense of subjecthood197 by 
confusing the place of objects and the place of the viewer.  
 
Hence we can establish a connection between Harrison’s work and Latour’s idea of 
assemblage on the basis of the first constituting a series of visible interactions 
between heterogeneous elements (including technological objects such as screens 
and media players) whose content is defined, but not totalized by the whole 
exhibition, and between those elements and the viewer, which translated into the 
context of an exhibition can be described as the scene of several assemblages. This 																																																								
197 I am here using the term ‘subjecthood’ in obvious reference to Fried’s concept of ‘objecthood’, after it was 
first used in a seminar at the Institute Für Kunstkritik Frankfurt am Main and in the subsequent publication: 
Isabelle Graw, Daniel Birnbaum and Nikolaus Hirsch, eds., Art and Subjecthood: The Return of the Human 
Figure in Semiocapitalism, Berlin, Sternberg Press, 2011 
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in turn, makes it possible to establish a connection between Harrison’s work and the 
broader new ‘sociology of the social’ that Latour calls a “sociology of 
associations”198. That being, a sociology as indicated by the name, that does not 
focuses on objects but on the association between objects.   
 
There is a second concept in Latour that Harrison’s work translates equally well, and 
that as discussed below, reveals some of the limitations of both Harrison’s 
exhibitions and ANT, i.e. the concept of assembly. Closely associated with the 
notion of assemblage but not the same, assembly pertains to the problem of 
representation and cohabitation. In the introduction to Making Things Public: 
Atmosphere of Democracy, Latour develops the idea that it is possible to conceive 
of an art exhibition as an assembly and that as such an exhibition is a place where 
we can rethink ‘who is to be concerned’ and ‘what is to be considered’, and it is in 
this sense that I think it is possible to describe Harrison’s exhibitions as 
heterogeneous complex human/non-human assemblies, with a wide range of 
perspectives and with different ‘actors’, procedures and references, distinct 
temporalities and localities, all juxtaposed, considered and co-exiting without being 
summed up.  
 
In fact, entering one of Harrison’s exhibitions is not completely unlike entering some 
sort of natural habitat, where objects have their own social life, their own assemblies 
and their own power relations; a place, simply put, where objects seem to exist 
indifferently to the viewer. An indifference of objects that on a larger scale has been 
gradually acquiring the form of an ‘object-turn’. A new realism, as it’s often termed, 
that in a way backed up by Latour and others, has had a clear impact on exhibition 
making practices in recent years and that one can perhaps connect with the way in 
which the ‘group-show’ has become the exhibition format of choice for many artists 
working today, especially in alternative art spaces. We can also connect this with 
the fact that individual practices often try to mimic the atmosphere of an exhibition 
and explore the interaction and ‘agency’ of objects, as well as is the case of artists 
that curate shows with their own work included – where the meaning and 
significance of artworks can be established in relation to a network of influences 
produced by the ‘cohabitation’ with the work of other artists.  
																																																								
198 See for example Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2007, 248 
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But this ‘object-turn’ has also been pivotal on the level of theory, especially for those 
who, in being interested in rethinking what it means to speak about a collective, also 
find it politically promising to include objects. In other words, the recent wave of 
object-orientated thinking has been feeding the idea of an expanded collective and 
setting the tone for new philosophical movements - like Speculative Realism – that 
gives support to the project of rethinking the left and of getting back to politics 
through claims to universality structured around the idea of agency and knowledge 
beyond the human aspect. This too, can be read in Harrison’s work as it de-centres 
the viewer by staging what can be called an object-orientated scene where objects 
seem to have a life of their own. But there is a problem here. If the stakes of 
Harrison’s work can be read as an articulation between art and politics, one that 
considers positive an understanding of a collective where human beings are no 
more necessary than objects – where both are ‘represented’ and cohabit in equal 
terms -, whose necessity and opinion is being voiced after all?  
 
Indeed, Harrison’s multi-layered practice references different localities and 
temporalities, uses a wide vocabulary of procedures and covers quite a lot of 
today’s vast landscape of materials and objects. What is more, it produces a 
complex field of interactions where it is possible to recognize Latour’s definition of 
composition and, within the framework of ANT, what we are able to call the politics 
of objects. However, it is also organized around exhibition settings where it is 
difficult to know who, as opposed to what, is being considered. Put another way, 
Harrison’s practice carries the mark of a potential political abstraction, a problem, 
which in my view, is equally at play in ANT itself.  
 
The political project of ANT consists in preparing the necessary conditions to 
represent and welcome new and changing actors and open the possibility to 
‘reassemble the social’ with the method that it produces, viz., with improved 
instruments of analysis and strategies of synthesis in a process leading to the 
conceptualization of new assemblies. In the words of Latour: “What ANT has tried to 
do is make itself sensitive again to the sheer difficulty of assembling collectives 
made of so many new members once nature and society have been simultaneously 
put aside” 199. 
 
																																																								
199 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social. An introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, 259 
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This is not the place nor is it my intention to bring the political value of ANT to 
inspection (the above seems relevant enough) but it is important to note that using 
the theoretical space of ANT has some limitations. ANT is a theory of the social with 
a focus on connections and that has in the format of an exhibition its logical practical 
counterpart. The theory frames the setting of an exhibition, which it translates as an 
assembly, as a context where it’s possible to ask who is being considered and what 
is a concern. However these questions are asked as if they were already answered 
- as if it would be enough to simply stage them. In sum, it maps the possibility to 
recompose the social and include new actors, but leaves unclear what the politics of 
objects actually is, and leaves unexplored the possibilities at play on the level of a 
singular actor. These cannot be ignored.    
 
Latour in particular asks us to recognize non-human agencies and the existence of 
systems where those agencies come together in a constant fight for influence and 
adaption. The recognition of these fights, as it were for power and survival, 
substantiates the possibility to speak about politics in connection with the non-
human and specifically in connection with objects. Furthermore, he has successfully 
demonstrated that the politics of objects are influenced by, and indeed influence, 
politics on the level of living people. He has told us that the social needs to be 
understood in such a way that includes both human and non-human agencies.  
 
Thus, Latour has offered us the theoretical tools for identifying the role of objects, 
and more importantly of art works, in the transformation of the social world at large. 
These tools have gained a significant currency within the vocabulary of art theory. 
And yet the way in which Latour identifies the political dimension of objects is not 
completely satisfactory for what I am trying to set out here because his theory does 
not grant us the means for a reflection on how to direct the politics of objects 
towards the benefit of human agencies and necessities.  
 
Aramis, or the Love of Technology, a book published in English in 1996, illustrates 
this rather well and it is worth giving it a moment of attention. Surely one of Latour’s 
strangest publications, it tells the story of a failed technological project of a hybrid 
public/personal system of transport – Aramis - developed for the city of Paris during 
the 1970s and 1980s from the perspective of several actors, including non-human 
actors. With one foot rooted in academic tradition and the other in literature, it 
attempts to understand the cause of the failure using a combination of documents 
and a fictional approach to the problem. Somehow registering as a traditional 
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research question, is starts out by asking: “Who killed Aramis?”200.  
 
This question unfolds into a demonstration, one could say, of the thesis that 
technological systems thrive or disappear according to their capacity to adapt to the 
circumstances that surround them. And Aramis, the book tells us, died precisely 
because it failed to adapt to the changing social and political paradigms of its time. 
Further supporting the idea that technology is not an isolated sphere but a central 
realm of culture, the book traces those changes and in a way functions as portrait of 
French society during the abovementioned period.  
 
But Latour also seems to be suggesting something different, something that 
manifests itself in the way the argument unfolds from the perspective of Aramis and 
the different elements that compose it. Using an impressive array of rhetoric tropes 
to convince the reader of the importance of technological beings, he presents us 
with fictions of what Aramis and the automated-cars would say or think. Yet, in 
humanizing the world of non-human agencies, by giving them a voice, thoughts and 
autonomy, Latour declassifies human matters and necessities – suggesting, in a 
way, that the lives of technological beings are as important as human beings.  
 
So the book is quite convincing in the way it establishes a relationship between the 
outset, the outcome of Aramis and the social situation in which these took place, but 
it does not offer a reflection on the implications and changes the project could have 
brought to that specific situation and to its respective social (human) contingencies. 
The difference between the two observations is perhaps subtle, but it nonetheless 
carries an essential detail. For instance, whilst the book suggests that the resistance 
to the idea of abandoning privately own vehicles was one of the causes behind the 
project’s failure, it does not discuss ways Aramis could have changed the social 
paradigms that support the division between the private and public sphere nor the 
political implications these changes could have had.   
 
Aramis, or the Love of Technology gives witness to Latour’s general argument that 
we need to reformulate the methods of sociology as a discipline of thought. But it 
also suggests that we should learn to love technological beings as independent, 
autonomous subjects, a need that comes to the fore as being crucial to 
understanding technology in its own right and not through the lenses of a tradition 																																																								
200 Bruno Latour, Aramis or the love of technology, London: Harvard University, Press, 2002, 1-11   	
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that interprets the social as being composed exclusively of human subjects.   
 
But then again, whilst underscoring the importance of widening our perception of 
technology and the world of objects as actors in a network of social influences, the 
book leaves us with the problem of knowing how to employ this world in human 
causes and preoccupations. This book in particular, condenses Latour’s general 
arguments and furthermore demonstrates those arguments in writing, recognizes 
and humanizes the politics of objects but at the same time devalorizes human 
agencies, which risks justifying a vision of the world where politics are an abstract 
field of thought. Although it is useful to use Latour’s writing as a framework, this 
framework also falls short of the kinds of commitments I seek to explore and that 
involve the way in which the world of objects, specifically sculptural composition, can 
operate as a vehicle for the reconfigured (human) subject.  
 
A second reference to this book will by in made in a moment. First, let us discuss 
the question of composition not in relation to networks but at the point of things; 
which in an overtly Heideggerian way, Latour frequently reminds us is already a 
gathering of causes. In fact, Latour uses the term things after Heidegger, as entities 
associated with matters of concern (that reveal being), but in a sense that also 
includes what Heidegger refers to as objects: that is, entities associated with matters 
of fact (that the latter thinks has no connection to being). Heidegger’s distinction is 
partially based on the differences between manual and industrial objects, which 
Latour tries to equalize by showing that industrial, manual and in effect, all kinds of 
entities, interact and therefore determined each other. This of course has to do with 
the fact that Latour refuses the idea that “man was shepherd of being”201 and 
considers instead that all things matter. But I need to take a step back here. I will, as 
mentioned, approach the question of composition at the point of ‘singular gatherings’ 
but will call these objects. A minor detail perhaps, but one that helps me to 
deliberately set a distinction, if only subtle, from Heidegger’s condemnation of 
industrial objects and from Latour’s all encompassing notion of matters of concern, a 
notion which raises a lot of questions, but does not really orientate decisions 
inherent to the process of composition. Building a common world requires an open 
understanding of composition but also a careful consideration on the differences 
between matters of concern and matters of non-concern.  																																																								
201 “Who told you that man was the shepherd of being? Many forces would like to be sheperd and guide the 
others as they flock to their folds to be sheared and clipped. In any case there is no sheperd” Bruno Latour, 
referring to Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, as cited in Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour 
and Metaphysics, Melbourne: re.press, 2009, 24 
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The proposal then, is to address the problem of composition under the principle that 
it remains necessary to rethink, indeed to recompose, the human subject and, 
based on the idea that being and objects are mutually determining, that it is possible 
to do so using the vocabulary of objects. In other words, the proposal is to see how 
composition works in relation to the figure.  
 
 
Isa Genzken and the condition of figurative sculpture after the mannequin 
 
 
The use of the human figure - be it the whole figure, small or large, fragments or 
sometimes just simple suggestions of anthropomorphic forms - always seem to give 
a sense of orientation to what we have come to call an ‘assemblage’. The human 
form, in effect, functions as an anchor of meaning. When part of an assemblage, it 
quickly becomes the element with the strongest conceptual gravity, around which 
the meaning of other elements is determined. But the chain of signification created 
by references to the human form does not necessarily lead to the rearticulated 
figure and subject. This is what we first need to address in order to identify some 
important aspects of contemporary figuration.  
 
I will start with the work of Isa Genzken, another artist whose practice is exemplary 
of assemblage procedures. Her work provides an example of how the human figure 
has been referenced in recent sculptural practices, and specifically in terms of a 
dialogue between sculpture, operating as an investigation into the condition of 
objects, and aspects of consumerism culture. Consider for example, Untitled from 
2012 (Fig. 12): a work over average in height, that given its proportional relations to 
the average viewer and the presence of a mask, registers as a figure in the 
convention of a bust on a plinth, or more precisely, as a portrait. Mounted on 
casters, the part that reads as a plinth is visibly constructed with MDF with orange 
plexiglass side panels, with a mirrored interior. On top of it a transparent kitchen 
chair is balanced on a lounge chair, also transparent but with a greenish tone where 
one also finds an almost invisible, easy to miss, toy-sized figurine of an aristocratic 
looking soldier and two crystal swan figurines. Overall, Untitled has a very appealing 
material, formal and chromatic scheme, which is dominated by the presence of the 
chairs and by the grotesque mask fixed to one of the legs of the upper chair. 
Because the sculpture has an entrance but no real back, because it produces the 
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possibility to have one’s own reflected image in its interior, together with the fact that 
the different elements have their focal points distributed along the four sides of what 
I call a plinth (but could also be called a private cabinet) it provokes in the viewer a 
will to move towards, as well as around it. It clearly wants to seduce. However, 
some of its elements also yield a capacity to repel and keep the viewer at a 
distance, as is perhaps more successfully expressed in the image of aggression 
produced by the inverted legs of the first chair and by the grotesque mask facing the 
opposite side of the mirror (not clearly visible from the image), as if a no trespassing 
warning has been attached.  
 
 
           
   12. Isa Genzken Untitled (2012)                                               13. Isa Genzken, Untitled (2012) 
 MDF, Plastic, glass, mirror, foil, Perspex,                                Mannequin and mixed media.  
 glass, mask, tape, artificial hair, casters                                  577/8 x 325/8 x 39 inches  
 94 x 372/5 x 441/2 inches 
 
 
The point of the matter here is that by forming a rather unstable figure, achieved 
much like a collage of high-end retail items, that is, without material intersections, 
the composition attributes meaning to objects through an allusion to the human 
form, whilst at the same time revealing and increasing their commodity status. We 
still see them as sleek objects. In fact, the work seems to play with the attraction of 
fashionable home furniture whilst giving a version of what a portrait of someone 
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living in privileged circumstances under advanced capitalism might look like - a 
portrait, without the human in it, of a psychologically unstable and absent 
consumerism-based self.  
Writing on the occasion of Genzken’s retrospective at MOMA during 2014, Hal 
Foster has suggested that Genzken’s work produces a form of dialectics that 
reveals “not only merely the failures of utopia (of which is easy enough to do today) 
but also the energy in disaster”202; dialectics that, as he continues, functions as a 
diagnosis of a consumerist society at the point of rupture. But the diagnosis Foster 
is speaking of is also concerned with a subject hostage “to its perverse onside of 
getting to pleasure according to a perpetual movement between trash and 
consumerism”203, that reveals a state of material uncertainty with being about to 
collapse whilst suggesting that material (and ideological) precariousness can only 
be slightly disguised and compensated for with excess, dark humour and parody, or, 
the feeling that nothing could go wrong as long as the party continues.  
Some commentators have even suggested that this form of alienation is in fact what 
constitutes the critical dimension of Genzken’s work, for example, with reference to 
a work from 2006, comparable to the one above, Caroline Busta writes:  
 
Returning to Genzken’s Untitled, the form is abstract but 
the form clearly registers as some kind of person – at first 
glance, a pathetic one, one that’s barely keeping it 
together, overloaded and seemingly unable to 
communicate anything really, except the inability to clearly 
communicate. However, seen another way, we might 
instead take this figure as refusing to communicate (…) 
Considering information is a currency and that post-
Fordist capitalism demands that everyone communicate 
as fluidly as possible, maybe this is what a radical body is 
supposed to look like. Everything flows through it –air, 
desire, and power yet whilst functioning as this conduit, 
Genzken’s Untitled refuses to contribute to new 
																																																								





Doesn’t the suggestion that such a treatment of the human figure can respond 
critically to a challenging consumerism culture, fall into the trap, and the 
contradiction, of endorsing a notion of resistance that is too consumerism friendly? 
In plain formal terms: there is appropriation and eventually critique, but no refusal, 
subversion or transformation of the elements that formed the work, which 
furthermore, and because of that reason, is subsumed to a closed universe of forms 
and limited to a set of operations that do not break with a pre-determined material 
order. Works such as Untitled (fig.12) seem unable to depart from the logic of 
advanced capitalism. Genzken’s incredible talent to improvise and rearrange objects 
with a trashy sense of glamour reveals the contradiction of contemporary life. It is 
critical of consumerism but relies too much on its logic to be able to break with it. It 
is as if “everything flows through it”205, which is problematic because what is limiting 
about a life orientated around acts of consumption - the constitution of being through 
a process of obtaining goods that inhibits an active construction of meaning and that 
therefore reduces the potential of life - is not being altered or recomposed but rather 
upheld.   
This double game of critique and reinforcement of consumerism culture is in fact 
a problematic that we can associate with a more general but vast use of the 
mannequin in contemporary sculpture - the main source for ready-made 
figurative work of which Genzken’s practice is one of its most visible faces with 
artworks similar to Untitled, from 2012 (fig. 13). We need to elaborate on this. In 
some ways, the use of the mannequin constitutes a strategy aligned with a 
modernist legacy that tries to include elements of reality in a direct way and be 
critical of that reality at the same time from a position of neutrality mapped out by 
excluding any symbolic order other than that which can be overtly shared and 
verified.  
I’m here thinking, for example, of the work of Charles Ray who moved from 
sculptural explorations within the lexicon of minimal art at the beginning of his 
career, into an address of the mannequin during the 1990s, thus commenting on 
high modernism by disturbing the logic of identification associated with the 																																																								
204 Caroline Busta, “Body Doubles”, Isabelle Graw, Daniel Birnbaum and Nikolaus Hirsch, eds., Art and 
Subjecthood. The Return of the Human Figure in Semiocapitalism, Berlin, Sternberg Press, 2011, 41-42 
205 Ibid.	
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mannequin with variations of scale, the use of his own image and by making 
explicit the sexual identity of the figures. One can also think about John Miller 
who often uses the mannequin to critically confront the viewer with his own 
identity as a consumer whilst sabotaging identification by dressing mannequins 
with unglamourizing clothing. In this sense, the use of the mannequin is more 
about exploring the possibilities for the figure in post-minimalist sculpture than 
properly being a work of figuration. By which I mean, that it appears more as a 
form of sculptural commentary on the mannequin as sign of consumerism 
culture and on the contingency of the figure within such a culture, than an 
attempt to rearticulate the vocabulary of figuration. If only by stretching the 
argument here, we can locate the use of the mannequin within the legacy of 
minimal art because it undermines the very idea of figuration by using figures, 
which are significantly abstract, objective, and empty of expression and artistic 
intention. It could be said that this is an anti-figurative use of the figure.  
 
The way Thomas Hirschorn uses the mannequin as a strategy to stage what we 
can describe as a scene, or the way Cathy Wilkes employs the mannequin in 
installation and affirms the human figure in relation to everyday objects and to a 
non-verbal system of signification, are just two more examples of artists in an 
extensive list, working with mannequins today. In fact it’s hard to deny the 
centrality of the mannequin within the landscape of contemporary figuration.  
 
There are obvious advantages of using the mannequin as sculptural source 
material. One is able to work with the human figure in an immediate, fast way, 
and what is more, to work with the human figure with it a direct reference to a 
typify western mode of living. But this carries a similar problem to that identified 
above with consideration of Genzken’s practice. By displacing the mannequin 
from commercial spaces into spaces of art where it never quite looses the 
commercial connotation creates, almost automatically, a critical tone that does 
not avoid positing the contemporary subject as a consumer.  It’s a form of 
critique, if only subliminal, that in speaking the language of power without saying 
anything different, can and indeed is, easily absorbed by its own logic.  
Furthermore it affirms the domestic condition of contemporary subjectivities 
through the system of art. More problematic still, the use of the mannequin - a 
general, typically industrial and undifferentiated figuration - puts to work the idea 
of the consumer as a politically compromising abstraction of the democratic 
subject.  
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And the impact of the mannequin does not stop in its direct use. At first, one 
might be tempted to compare the condition of sculpture after the mannequin to 
the problem of painting the figure after photo-realism. But the comparison does 
not really hold since the mannequin is not an index of a real person, like in a 
photograph (see what was said about the relation between objects as index 
before), and therefore, even if that is what is at stake, it cannot be used as a 
measure for figurative efficiency. The problem of figurative sculpture after the 
mannequin has instead to do with its massive presence in our lives – by far the 
most familiar reference for the tridimensional human figure - to which figurative 
sculpture needs to respond directly or indirectly.  
 
In addition to artists who use the mannequin, there are others who repeat its 
logic. Antony Gormley, for example, with his ‘figures-as-place’ that deal with 
repetition, indifference and standardization. Other artists produce works that are 
easy to associate with the mannequin because of formal aspects inherent in the 
materials used, such as the use of polyester resin or polychromatic surfaces. In 
addition and importantly, there are also artists whose work operates through a 
different logic to that found with reference to a use of the mannequin, or that 
even try to oppose it, but who are yet to offer a clear alternative to the passivity 
posited by the mannequin. Artists like Stephen Balkenhol with his figures of 
everyman and everywoman, and Ugo Rondione’s figurative work, notably 
Clowns (2001) and Nude (2010), two series of works constituted by figures that 
seem to refuse to do anything at all. I would also cite the work of Mark Manders, 
who I will discuss in a moment.  All things considered, two things can be said. 
The first is that the condition of figurative sculpture is a post-mannequin 
condition, and the second, that the task of sculpture passes through finding an 
alternative space to that of the mannequin.  
 
So let us make a point of situation. Within the framework of Latour’s notion of 
composition, it is possible to depart from the logic of deconstruction and critique, 
and replace, as it were, the logic of the eye that looks at the world, for the logic 
of the hand that is in the world. Put in a different way, Latour predicts the 
position of the subject of composition, who in the context of his proposal is 
neither the subject of critical contemplation nor of power, but rather someone, 
singular or collective, facing the need to reconfigure the world. This introduces 
an important theoretical precedent for contemporary art as it allows attention to 
be given to moments other than the moment of reception. But Latour’s definition 
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of composition is also useful in the sense that it focuses on the interactions 
between different elements, rather than isolating them, and because it 
introduces plasticity to part-whole relations and accepts heterogeneity. It is a 
take on composition, which in my view has the merit of combining the priority to 
reconfigure reality with the complexities of today’s material and technical 
landscape. I called this composition-without-essences. And yet, as seen in 
relation to Rachel Harrison’s work (that can be identified both as an assemblage 
and as an assembly - two central ideas in Latour’s book) one can extend the 
condition of subject to everything that exists, as implied in such account of 
composition, which leaves too much space open for situations where human 
affairs can easily be forgotten or side-lined. Looking at a work by Isa Genzken, 
sculpture-wise this problem is partially undone when objects are put together 
with a reference to the human form, operating as a signification coordinate, but 
with the proviso that the possibility to rearticulate the subject of contemporary 
life does not quite follow from the use of ready-made elements, and more 
notably, from a direct use of the commercial mannequin, which reaffirms the 
problematic logic of an (material) order already in place.  
 
 
From form to function:  the figure as a tool  
 
 
I need to open a parenthesis here. With his defence of the Belvedere Torso 
based on the notion of the potential, multiple compositions, and on how these 
allow for an audience to be involved in the construction of meaning, Rancière is 
adding his voice to the association often made between the fragment and 
modernity206 and indirectly, to the idea that the development of modern life has 
brought down the possibility to conceive not only of the body, but of the subject 
as a whole. This is a commonly accepted argument, that says that the very 
circumstance of modern life (industrialization, acceleration, the infinite 
fragmentation of space and time, and life and so forth) have undermined the 
concept of an authentic subject and the possibility to shape life in a coherent 																																																								
206 Linda Nochlin, for example, argues that the iconography of the fragment appears as a sign of modernity 
after the attacks and subsequent destruction of monuments during the French revolution. It also gain a 
connotation with revolution via the influence that the live image of mutilated bodies, and in particular of 
decapitated heads, had for artists during that period – and only then, because of fragmentation produced by 
the photographic frame. In Linda Nochlin, The Body in Pieces. The Fragment as a Metaphor of Modernity, 
London, Thames & Hudson, 2001 	
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whole. For quite a while now, according to this argument, one is not one, but 
many. 
 
Minimal art comes to mind here again – more exactly, its attempt to break with a 
subject conceived in terms of coherence, intentionality, and the notion of 
meaning as something stable and immanent to objects of art. In this sense, 
Minimalism ties in with Postmodernism and the tradition of deconstruction. In 
fact, it underscores Jean-François Lyotard’s idea of Postmodernism as the end 
of grand narratives by relying on a non-historical subject and on the evacuation 
of narrative structures from objects. On the other hand, however, following on 
from the end of Chapter One, it also comes close to Frederic Jameson’s idea of 
Postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism, in that it produces a 
subject – unstable, neutral, fragmented and serial - that gives way to the 
instrumentalization of being and the commodification of culture and life.  
Minimalism, put another way, echoes if only indirectly, the association between 
fragmentation and modernity as well as the impossibility of constructing a 
meaningful life under the conditions of late capitalism with its elusive, free from 
historical determination and a condition of meaning constantly on the verge of 
disintegration. The body, of course, enters the space of Minimalism with the 
living body of viewers. Which brings us to another question.  
 
Some fields of knowledge, notably found in feminist theory, have explored the 
importance of the performative, and therefore of the body, for processes of 
subject formation.  However, the sexualized and cultural body of 
Postmodernism, which is still the body of today, is a body of sociological 
analysis, critique and deconstruction. More performative than active, it is a body 
of theory that appears dissociated from consequences and the threat of death. A 
post-tragic body of the multiple lives of video games, Facebook and of the 
disembodied experience of the screen, where in short, it is no longer possible to 
recognize a connection with the notion of place. Postmodernism, in other words, 
seems to have diluted the importance of the body as the locus of self and action. 
And if the culture of healthy living and physical exercise have brought a new 
attention to the body, this attention appears hand-in-hand with an obsession 
with monitoring the body and the possibility to instrumentalize the corresponding 
data. This is a body of physical activity, but not of true action or the construction 
of self.  
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Summarily put then, the very same conditions that have created the modern 
world have made it difficult to shape life as a coherent whole; and if, at best, the 
dissolution of a stable notion of subject continues to inform critical thought, at 
worst, it feeds back into late capitalism and its demand for adaptability and 
performativity under the guise of ‘whatever subjectivities’. This is where Latour’s 
proposal to exchange critique for composition becomes a tour de force in the 
sense that, as he points out, whilst critique deconstructs power and is able to 
produce knowledge, it is composition that lends itself to the construction of 
alternatives to the fragmented and confusing reality of living conditions today. 
The task of the previous is to react against a pre-set reality, that of the latter, to 
reconfigure reality.  
 
It is in this scenario that the sculptural figure presents itself as a tool for 
reimagining subjectivities - using the vocabulary of objects, different materials 
and techniques, and through the staging, assemblage, and most importantly the 
origination of new objects. Let me underline the word  ‘tool’ here. Never quite 
about truth but about invention, what a sculptural figure does best is not to 
deceive us into believing that this or that is real, but more exactly the other way 
around: it asks us to think about the human being as an object and in so doing, 
introduces traction and the quality of gravity into the modes upon which we 
might understand the construction of subjectivity. This, if you will, is the utility of 
composing the figure in sculpture, which in these terms carries a connection 
with pragmatism as it gets to be expressed in the original Greek meaning of the 
prefix pragma (πρᾶγµα) registering ‘matter’, a ‘thing’, or an ‘object’.  
 
Along these lines, whilst the definition composition-without-essence, invites us 
to consider (a) composition and its different elements not in terms of what things 
are, certainly not in terms of what things look like, but in terms of a network of 
interactions between heterogeneous elements, its translation into the human 
form anticipates the displacement of the anatomic body and consequently the 
positing of a coherence which is not of a formal, but instead, of a functional kind.  
 
Let me illustrate this quickly using an example other than that of sculpture; that 
of the book. One could argue that part of the influence Latour has acquired 
derives from his style of writing, a style that combines academic erudition with 
an entertaining flow of ideas and everyday examples. However Latour’s style of 
writing is not exactly a stylization of language, but rather a form of writing that 
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meets ANT’s account of a multi-layered reality. One book in particular stands 
out in this regard, that is the already mentioned Aramis, or the Love of 
Technology, a book where one finds different registers of writing including 
official reports, interviews, press reports, the diary of a research student and 
notes from his fictional supervisor, each printed with a different typographical 
layout. The writing method, therefore, accepts and underlines the interruptions, 
pauses and contradictions that compose the book.   
 
If we were to focus on the formal writing aspects in this book it would be hard to 
call Aramis, or the Love of Technology a coherent whole and yet, the parts 
strangely work well together. They are coherent between themselves and 
function well in terms of covering different angles of the story of Aramis. And in 
fact, this is not something exclusive to this book alone. One can say any book of 
fragments is already a whole, be it for the influence each element has over the 
rest or for the physical unit provided by the book. Indeed, what I’ve called 
composition-without-essence has a lot of expression in the world of printed 
material where hybrid forms of writing – and of publishing formats – are largely 
being explored.   
 
In terms of objects, and if only by pushing the comparison between the 
physicality of the book and that of sculpture, sculptural figuration can likewise 
group and make coherent sculptural elements of a different kind, through its 
materiality and through a chain of signification that is formed between different 
elements and between the human form. Like the book, the sculptural body can 
also speak with different languages, and in that way provide us the opportunity 
to combine the human form with the concrete reality of different materials and 
objects.   
 
Let us then establish that after Latour we can think about a figure as a 
conceptually determinable whole, rather an anatomically complete whole, where 
meaning is achieved through a chain of signification defined between potentially 
heterogeneous parts. Significantly, the very idea that things can be composed 
demonstrates how, on the level of ‘meaning’, associative operations displace the 
notion of ‘things in themselves’ by creating something other than what elements 
are in isolation and by changing, by force of influence, the very meaning of each 
element. The process of composition is, in this sense, a practical demonstration 
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that intrinsic meaning is a fragile concept as well as a process opening the 
possibility of producing meaning.  
 
Building on this, it is also possible to say that the precondition of meaning in 
figurative sculpture is formed after an initial association between figure and 
materiality. In bringing to mind the idea of an inanimate body, this ties in 
symbolically with the idea of death, whilst at the same time opposing a 
fascination with death by being formed as a body that cannot die - or more 
exactly, as a body that disappears in a much slower pace than the biological 
body. Figurative sculpture, finally, is capable of inventing and inscribing the body 
in technicity, whilst operating as a reminder of mortality. In other words, it is a 
form of dialectical becoming-object that represents a return to the body as a 
concrete thing (which is of course distinct from the body in the cyberspace) and 
from there, the possibility to reimagine and compose subjectivities with a sense 
of consequence over time.  
 
So to close the parenthesis opened above, if on the one hand the intent of 
figurative sculpture can never be to unveil reality like, for instance, cinema does 
(since on a basic level it refuses an indexical relation with what it represents), on 
the other hand, the opportunity is there to use the figure as a tool to construct 
meaning without a claim to truth. That is, to give some sort of coherence to a 
fragmented and confused reality through operations of composition, where 
versions of the rearticulated figure and subject can be explored and - 
considering the materiality of sculpture - brought into the physical world.  
 
 
The hero as methodology of composition  
 
 
It is here that the hero re-enters the argument, this time as a methodology of 
composition. However, I need to explain this in detail since, with reference to an 
earlier passage, the words ‘hero’ and ‘figure’ are both empty concepts that need 
to be constructed, around their own conceptual void, in order to take shape. We 
need to know what the ‘hero’, as oppose to the ‘figure’ brings to composition. 
What, after all, does such an abstract notion like an idealism-of-necessity brings 
to another, also very abstract proposition, such as composition-without-
essences?  
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These questions point directly to problems of composition and become more 
pertinent once approached from the perspective of practice. Thus from that 
angle, I will now outline a few ideas about the hero as a conceit for reimagining 
the possibilities of figurative sculpture for the post-mannequin and post-
commercial era using the principles established in the previous chapter. I will do 
this without, for reasons that become clear below, describing how such 
principles translate into specific operations.  
 
It was determined the hero has to be nominated. However, nomination does not 
have a direct equivalent in plastic form. Even if some sculptural figures appear 
heroic simply because they are sculptural, the connection between sculpture 
and the ‘hero’ is not an autonomous one. It remains dependent on the use of the 
word, be it written or in the form of a verbal declaration, simply being about 
naming, or associated with a narrative. Hence we can conclude, using the hero 
as theme of representation undermines sculptural autonomy because it relates 
to something other than to the specificity of the medium of sculpture. Of course, 
sculpture can include the use of written language and indeed has done so for 
many centuries in the form of legends - epigraphs or otherwise - or commonly in 
contemporary art through incorporated pre-existing written material. There are, 
of course, different ways to make names and narratives become part of objects.  
 
In reality the ‘naming’ of the hero is perhaps the most problematic and 
provocative gesture within the association that I am trying to set out here 
between objects and questions of heroism. But to stop here would be to avoid 
the problem of sculpture, which lacks both an equivalent to nomination and the 
quality of being fully based in narrative. Sculpture can suggest a gesture and tell 
a story for sure, but not in the same way literature, cinema or television can; not 
through the unfolding of events and the transformation these cause through a 
series of one directional transitions, from one moment to another. So the way 
the hero is translated in sculpture through composition must be through 
processes of signification within the sculptural body, that is, in the way the body 
is put to speak through attitude, gesture, materials, techniques and so on.  
 
Apart from nomination, introducing the hero to the process of composition gives 
way to a mode of figuration, neither personal nor abstract, which is conceivable 
along a dialogue with reality. What is more, this dialogue is based on the idea 
that it is possible to answer to such reality with a positive affirmation. In other 
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words, thinking through the hero introduces the principle of answerability and 
asks for decisions at the heart of composition to be taken in connection with 
what is exterior to composition itself. It makes the ‘whys’ of composition, the 
knowledge of what (a) composition means in relation to a wider context (a 
question that can never be exhausted internally) ever more so urgent. Hence, as 
methodology of composition, we can also conclude that the hero institutes a 
mode of self-reflexivity that asks its subject about the ‘whys’ of the procedures of 
composition, and in contrast to the negativity of deconstruction and critique, that 
it presupposes the aspiration of a rearticulated figure and subject.  
 
In addition to the idea of a non-personal mode of figuration, as discussed 
previously in Chapter Two, the hero appears associated with difference. 
However difference or rather the new, is as some would rightly argue, always 
somehow a pressing condition in art and therefore not specific to the hero, and it 
is hard to disagree with this. And yet within the scenario of the hero, the new 
cannot be understood as a simple novelty. It is something that appears 
associated with a set of collectively shared concerns, or more precisely, as 
something that negotiates and brings what constitutes a concern to question. 
Put another way, the attempt to represent a figure of heroism needs to negotiate 
the universe of human concerns. And despite my use of the word ‘human’ here, 
we need to remember that speaking about heroism is not something generic, 
but rather contextualized. Therefore, it is conducive of a figuration that we can 
describe as being situated, and by implication, one that has a connection with 
the history. 
 
But we need to be careful here. Thomas Houseago, for instance, produces 
rough, often ‘in-process’ looking figures that play with the history of sculpture, 
notably with the vocabulary of Cubism and Futurism. Using traditional sculptural 
materials – plaster, bronze, wood – Houseago develops a postmodern take on 
plastic forms and stylistic conventions borrowed from a pantheon of sculptors to 
produce figures, often imposing in scale, that confront us with overstated feats 
of masculinity and an invocation of a world of kings and warriors; rather evident 
in the frequency with which Houseago treats the head in the style of an ancient 
war mask. Which is to say, that even without repeating heroic gestures from the 
past, Houseago’s work plays with the idea of heroic sculptures. Yet, in the terms 
being explored, Houseago’s figuration cannot be called heroic because it 
reclaims relevancy through the history of art and not through a dialogue with the 
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present moment; it thus starts and finishes in formal questions. Instead, along 
the lines established before, and in following the path of the hero, the principles 
of answerability, negotiation and difference asks the subject of composition to 
avoid ‘formalisms’ and engage with the historic beyond the artistic. 
 
This brings us to another aspect, which is to explore the body in sculpture 
requires a formal likeness with the human form but not a naturalistic 
resemblance. As mentioned above, the framework of Latour admits this by 
allowing different formal registers. However, Latour also leaves us with a grey 
area. The passage from matters-of-fact to matters-of-concern, with which he 
constructs a central part of his argument, describes the necessity to recognize 
the interchangeability between what one considers a fact and what one might 
think of as a concern (coming from the idea that a fact is necessarily a social 
construction that results from a series of social concerns, for instance concerns 
with science, with medical improvements and etc). But his use of the word 
‘concern’ is misleading, for it is used in a generic sense as opposed to implying 
that something is a cause of preoccupation. Everything can be a concern in 
Latour’s terms, which translated into artistic composition does not allow for a 
compositional reasoning.  
 
Thinking through the hero, by contrast, represents a move from matters-of-fact 
to matters-of-concerns, but where what a ‘concern’ is must be associated with 
some sort of common necessity or preoccupation. A distinction that is relevant 
for both the human form and for the use of different materials, objects and even 
techniques. So whilst the model I’m trying to set out here is largely based on 
Latour’s understating of composition, I depart from Latour when it comes to the 
outcome of composition. The non-hierarchical idea of composition, and what this 
opens in terms of probing new possibilities  - specifically for inventing the body 
in sculpture - is considered as a starting point, but not as point of arrival.  
 
In fact, there is no reason why we shouldn’t replace the association between 
hierarchy and power for one that combines hierarchy and distribution once this 
is understood in terms of organizing associations according to what is more 
useful and less useful. This can be done in order to allow the most important 
ideas to be heard, the right tone to this or that, or to give that small detail its own 
voice. Not so distant, in fact, from what happens when organizing meaning 
through writing and its many forms, which are sometimes highly experimental, of 
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composition. Likewise, part/whole relations must be organized in sculpture to 
make the body speak. And this is to say, that instead of distrusting part/whole 
relations and identifying composition with a set of restrictions and rules, it seems 
possible to conceive of composition as that which opens a field of possibilities 
and allows us to organize and reorganize part/whole relations207. From this 
perspective it is equally possible to imagine the heroic operating as a way to 
adjudicate procedures of composition and intensify the work of figuration. This is 
a key idea but one that also needs to be thoroughly explained.  
 
Firstly, it does not necessarily translate as imposing sculptures, visual overload 
or figures in grand poses, but quite the contrary. Intensification in this context 
means a form of concentration and selection, if you will, that seeks to distinguish 
between matters-of-concern and matters-of-no-concern rather than a simple 
intensification of the elements of composition. So in order to speak about the 
hero as a methodology for composition, intensification needs to be thought of 
again in terms of a situated necessity and how different elements of composition 
can potentially be more or less useful in this or that situation. In other words, 
using the hero as a mode of orientating composition implies an intensification of 
the internal structures and relations of a composition. On the other side, it also 
demands for a permanent reflexivity regarding the way in which a given 
composition is able to establish a dialogue and potentially introduce difference in 
its external reality.  This also means that using the trope of the hero to work out 
problems of composition refuses a fixed rule of composition. It is more a mode 
of approaching the unspecificity of problems; a strategy for decisions at the 
heart of composition without a scheme for decisions or a fixed syntax.  
 
For example, the heroic is often equated with scale. Scale is quite important 
because it provides a means to determine the relationship between the work 
and the body of the viewer, and by implication, the number of people that can 
share in the viewing of a work. The bigger the work, the more people will be able 
to see it at once. However, as important as scale may be, scale alone does not 
determine the meaning of a work, nor its heroic quality. When it comes to 																																																								
207 The material substance of clay, which I frequently use in my practice and have done so in the developing 
of the present research project, provides something of a perfect metaphor for this plastic understanding of 
sculpture. A material with no predefined hierarchy or structure that can assume any form, whilst keeping the 
potential for new forms (for if unfired, clay can always be brought to a working stage with water). In other 
words, it is a good metaphor for my claim because it allows unequivocally, for the re-actualization of potential 
forms.  	
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relations of size, it is proportion rather than scale that determines how the figure 
is read. For instance, in scaling up his small figures from the early 1990s, titled 
United Enemies, which are made with modelling material, fabric and other 
cheap materials, to massive bronze versions in 2011, some of them with almost 
4 meters, Thomas Schütte gave a public dimension to the latter that the 
originals clearly lacked. However, these later works are certainly not more 
‘heroic’. In fact, we can even reason that despite their dimension, the smaller 
figures are not only more innovative, but indeed more heroic given the relation 
of visual proportions inherent208 and how the different materials ‘situate’ the 
small figurines. Actually, something similar can be said about the bronze pieces, 
or more precisely about bronze itself: although we tend to associate it to 
sculptural representations of heroic or presumed heroic figures, bronze alone 
cannot signify ideas of heroism.  
 
What I believe establishes a relationship between different process and 
materials with notions of heroism is more to do with how these are able to 
respond to specific demands.  Thus, once again, more a questions of what 
materials do rather than what materials are. The same goes for pose, surface 
values, and other factors introduced by a combination between the human form 
and other assembled objects. To return to Latour, the strength of each element 
is not in the element itself, but in the relations it establishes within a system of 
inter-relations. Not in scale, or this or that material, this or that configuration, but 
in the inter-relation between all the different elements. What can perhaps be 
tentatively established is a general connection between the positivity of the hero 
and operations of addition as opposed to subtraction, and with plastic form 
defined in terms of volume, rather than by reduction or geometric synthesis, 
which has further implications for the way sculpture is viewed; the more a 
sculpture works through volumes, i.e. the less flat it is, the more the viewer is 
asked to move through the space around it as opposed to stand in front of it.  
 
Now, the fact that aligning the hero with composition stops me from being more 
specific about forms, techniques or materials, suggests that these are important 
but not the main point in this context. Let us then recapitulate a few ideas in 
order to try to single out the central implications of using the ‘hero’ as 																																																								
208 The influence of proportion on the way a work is read, is particularly explicit in the photographs Schütte 
has made of United Enemies, where by changing the relations of scale with the use of the photographic frame 
he reveals the figures are actually more imposing than what they actually appear to be. 
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methodology. As suggested earlier on, figurative sculpture is in a sort of 
impasse.  For it is often regarded as an outmoded project and therefore 
rejected, or read in terms of irony or even categorized as a subdivision of 
installation art. The field of sculpture itself is found in a phase as Potts has told 
us, that seems to be less about creating visions of a reconfigured world and 
more about reflecting on what sort of object a sculpture is and how viewers 
engage with it. A logic, that as demonstrated in Chapter One in connection to 
Minimalism, intertwines with the question of truth as well as with an association 
between the viewer’s experience and the democratic subject: an idea that 
reemerged with Rancière’s position and his defense of art as a way to create 
new modes for sense perception.   
 
Yet truth, as I’ve also tried to show, is never at play in figurative sculpture, not in 
terms of something that is ‘out there’. Instead, figurative sculpture affirms the 
connection that exists, as Rorty argues, between truth and construction209.  And 
Latour, whose views are not far from a constructivist theory of truth, or in fact 
from a pragmatist attitude, who considers it to be necessary to break with an 
object/subject divide and root philosophy, social theory and critique in a practical 
approach to social problems, has asked us to think about composition within the 
logic of assemblage and as a system of multiple, and multidirectional, 
negotiations between heterogenous elements. This produces a theoretical 
framework that supports the exchange between composition seen in terms of a 
fixed system of hierarchy, for composition seen as a system of relations where 
affects can be reorganized. An exchange that furthermore makes it possible to 
extend the idea of a social actor to the world of objects and therefore to extent 
the demos of democracy to the non-human. This touches upon an important 
area in the art field for whilst the idea of composition has fallen into disuse, 
largely due to the influence of views that connect hierarchy in art to a structural 
refusal of the idea of democracy, Latour’s ideas brings the focus back to objects 
and shortens the distance between the subject of composition and the 
democratic subject.  																																																								
209 On this matter, it is worth to include a short citation with reference to Rorty’s take on the difference 
between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out there: ”To say that the world is out 
there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with a common sense, that most things in space and in time are the 
effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say 
that where there are no sentences there is no truth. That sentences are elements of human languages, and 
that human languages are human creations.  
Truth cannot be out there – cannot exist independently of the human mind, because descriptions of the world 
are not. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. Only description of the world can be true 
of false. The world on its own – unaided by the describing activities of human beings – cannot. “.  Richard 
Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity, 5.	 	
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Before this and still in connection to the question of truth, I suggested that what 
figurative sculpture does best is to permit us to think about the human as an 
object, and that in so doing produces something I’ve called the becoming-object 
dimension of sculpture. This is the premise that has lead me to propose that by 
using a Latourian notion of composition it is possible to produce thoughts on 
subject formation around the invention of the sculptural body where different 
types of objects and materials can be included. As pointed out in the Greek 
case, in conclusion figurative sculpture opens into the invention and the 
inscription of the body in the concrete order of things, but instead of forms and 
rhythms of nature, we have now a diverse material landscape and temporalities 
to consider and work with. And while this is already at play when considering the 
‘figure’, the ‘hero’ as Lacan teaches us, connects with the tragic dimension of 
life. In this sense the latter asks for composition and what, as a result, gets to be 
rehearsed therein to be channeled towards creating versions of the rearticulated 
subject around interrogations concerning what constitutes a meaningful gesture 
and crucially what can exceed the possibilities of the everyday.  
 
So to summarize, Latour’s objected-orientated thought and specifically his 
notion of composition offers theoretical support to a heterogenous materiality in 
sculpture. More importantly, it allows for this materiality to be aligned not with a 
will to dissect what sort of object a sculptural work is or can be, but rather with a 
preoccupation with the interactions between the different elements of (a) 
sculptural composition and how to render them effective, as a whole, within the 
context they are found in.  Latour, in brief, allows us to replace a pattern of 
thought based on the idea of formal coherence, for another that searches for a 
functional coherence.  
 
In this scheme of things it is possible to conceive of the body in sculpture in 
terms that combine the human form with different types of objects and 
procedures. Now, although being able to work with a broad material landscape 
represents an advantage for any sculptor, I’ve suggested that the use of the 
figure, obviously central to any project of figuration, guarantees that within an 
assemblage of different elements the articulation of meaning is done around the 
‘idea’ of the human. It is also my opinion, that the origination of objects is more 
significant than working with found sources because it allows for deeper levels 
of artistic intervention and reduces predetermination; in short, because the new 
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appears more easily through making than it does through finding – or more 
exactly, through making as a form of thinking as oppose to simple execution.    
 
Additionally, Latour associates the theme of composition with the necessity of 
building a common world, thereby opening a theoretical precedent that enables 
us to assume the position of the subject of composition, without undermining the 
democratic nature of the task. And, as mentioned, what thinking through the 
hero asks this subject to do, is to put what is internally rehearsed in sculpture in 
a dialogue with problems exterior to sculpture. Furthermore considering that 
figurative sculpture operates as a mode of thinking about the human being as an 
object, this also implies an attempt to articulate the ethical-political subject, 
which is a condition proper to the hero but not to the ‘figure’, through the 
exploration of different materials, procedures and significantly sculptural 
gestures. These being what, in a given situation, may voice common concerns 
and potentially register as forms of collective meaning. This is the central 
implication of using the hero as way to work out problems and decisions at the 
heart of composition.  
 
Two more inferences can be made here; the first, that composition demands for 
an on-going revision of its conditions - which for that reason cannot support a 
practice based on the signature of conventions or style. This brings back the 
idea of relating dialectics of the figure as one that correlates with affirmation but 
also with substitution, that is with a positive redescription in a series of 
substitutions. The second inference is that within the framework of Latour’s idea 
of composition and my own theory of the hero operating as an artistic conceit, 
the subject of composition at play is not the personal, biographical artist, but 
instead a subject formed around necessity and the principle of answerability.  
 
It is also important to note that Latour changes the shape of the problem in 
regards to part/whole relations. Once we consider that what matters is the 
interaction between different elements and what objects do, not what objects 
are, it no longer makes sense to work around a preoccupation with the truth of 
self-identical objects and the specificity of different elements of composition. 
Similarly, a critique of figuration based on a reality/appearance distinction no 
longer holds after Latour’s notion of composition; a notion concerned not with 
debunking and exposing a reality behind the veil of appearances, but with 
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constructing, bringing together, assembling, reassembling, and more 
importantly, with bringing immanence and truth together210.   
 
Thus building on Latour’s understanding of composition and on the idea that the 
hero ties in with invention and questions of meaning, what I have tried to show is 
that as a subject of representation the latter can orientate problems of 
composition and in particular the work of figuration in a different direction from 
that of individual representation and into forms of rehearsing and figuring 
collective meaning. In general terms, this replaces the idea of art as a machine 
of sense experience for that one that focuses on composition as a mode of 
reconfiguring the sensible material upon which ideas about the subject can be 
rehearsed and the meaning of different objects brought to question and be 
changed in its function.  
 
As a final point, it is relevant to say that the coherence of (a) composition, as 
defined in terms of function rather than in terms of form, depends on whether or 
not a whole can be produced without becoming a totalizing whole. In turn 
suggesting that the success of a given composition depends on process and 
associations being intelligible to those who encounter it, viz., it relies on the 
possibility of composition to be understood according to the logic of its 
construction. Finally, we can outline how the hero helps to reimagine the 
possibilities for the post-mannequin condition of figurative sculpture as thus. It 
introduces intensity and the principle of answerability to composition and gives 
priority to the new, to difference and non-neutrality. Therefore it refuses a 
figuration which is mass-produced and neutral, in favour of the probing of new 
gestures of meaning and new associations of materials, techniques or objects, 
outside the (domestic) sphere of consumerism and the logic of capital. It 
designates an approach to figuration, that by definition, refuses positing a 




210 The theme of immanence appears throughout the essay “An attempt at a Compositionist Manifesto”. 
Here’s an example that I think clarifies Latour’s idea about the relationship between composition and 
immanence:  “We compositionists want immanence and truth together. Or, to use my language: we want 
matters of concern, not only matters of fact” in Bruno Latour, “An attempt at a Compositionist Manifesto”, New 
Literary History, 478 
211 Whilst a connection can be established between the fixed nature of objective representation and 
capitalism, between correspondence and repetition and hierarchized modes of production, the idea of 
construction and difference open alternative spaces of thought, that explicitly in the case of difference, resist 
many of enticements of contemporary forms of capitalism, notably, the logic of branding 
	 168	
Final notes: on the figures of Mark Manders 
 
 
I would now like to conclude this chapter with a discussion of the work of Mark 
Manders, which contains aspects that illustrate some of the ideas discussed 
above. His multilayered compositions provide a glimpse into how post-
mannequin alternatives might look and can be seen as forerunners to a kind of 
heroism in contemporary figurative sculpture.  
 
To begin with, and after what was said, reflecting on composition as a way to 
reorganize affects within a material landscape cannot be clear-cut and 
distinquished from existing objects. In fact, in the context of contemporary art it 
does not seem possible, or desirable to ignore the logic of the ready-made, but 
there is also no reason why existing sources should be limiting in terms of what 
is available to work with. So the task of composition today seems to pass 
through combining what already exists with the creation of something new. 
Furthermore, whilst the notion of fragment is part of contemporary vocabulary 
and has strong potential for composition, it seems equally important to address 
the question of the whole and object continuity. That is to say, not only to re-
compose, re-combine, re-distribute or re-assemble, but also to work directly with 
the material causes of objects, or in sum,   to originate objects.   
 
Hence, we can say the problem of composition is one of combining a mode of 
finding and a mode of making. And in the sense that making allows for a higher 
level of invention and commitment, as I have suggested before, we can also 
affirm that making ought to take precedent over finding. This is, of course, not to 
be taken as rule but instead as a useful general principle.  
 
Mark Manders intertwines these two modes of composition with the logic of what 
we’ve come to call composition-without-essence. A connection that one might 
gather by looking at how he establishes associations that change the original 
function, and we can add the original meaning of objects. He changed, for 
example, the meaning of pens, glue tubes, rulers, erasers, and so on, when he 
first used these items to define a floorplan in Inhabited for a Survey (First Floor 
Plan from Self-Portrait as a Building) from 1986, as well in later works such as 
Unfired Clay Figure, from 2005-2006 (fig. 14). Artworks, put another way, where 
it’s not what objects are but what objects do in association to other objects that 
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establishes value and that seems to count the most. In fact his is a practice that 
continuously experiments with how meaning is produced by juxtaposing objects.  
 
Mark Manders’s figures, more specifically, rely more on modes of making than 
on modes of finding. There are also a few sculptures of animals but let us focus 
on the human figure, which I think is the central element to his work. Apart from 
the aspects of his figures, one of the most visible elements in Manders’s 
figuration is process. Normally modelled in Clay, then cast in bronze, aluminium 
or resin and painted to look like clay again, Manders’ figures often appear 
unfinished or in the process of coming-into-existence or out-of-existence. This 
idea is even more emphasized when he shows figures together with thin plastic 
sheets, which are similar to those used to prevent clay from drying during the 
process of modelling. But what is most relevant here is how Manders 
incorporates different materials and in fact, different objects into those figures: 
these being mostly pieces of wood, or parts of furniture that are used, not so 
much for what they are but for what they do, which in most cases is to offer 
some sort of physical support to the figurative element.  
 
Additionally, by exposing the way that different elements can support the figure - 
whether or not this would actually be necessary, since the final material looks 
like clay, but is not clay, which means it can support itself - Manders is able to 
balance the importance of structure and of the figurative element by making the 
first part of the latter, for he recurrently opens the inside of figures to externalize 
and make visible the structural elements. This can be seen in works such as 
Unfired Clay Figure (Fig.13), where the figure is literarily divided by its structure. 
In fact, like most of Manders’ figurative work, Unfired Clay Figure presents the 
human form around a core but refuses the idea of essence, which is 
undermined by the affirmation of the process of construction. Significantly, the 
core, or more exactly the ‘structure’ of the figure, does not register 
predetermination, but rather another modified and modifiable element of 
composition. These ideas are also visible in works such as Composition with 
Blue from 2013 (fig. 15) where the artist presents a game of interchange 
between interior and exterior, and where the figurative element is dissected by, 
and rests in-between its own support. In sum, Manders’ figuration appears 





                  
                        14. Mark Manders, Unfired Clay Figure (2005-2006)  
                        Iron chairs, painted epoxy, wood, and various materials   




In addition, Manders denies us the familiarity of a known tradition of figuration. 
His figures could either be male or female and as Penelope Curtis has 
described them, at once Greek, African, or Etruscan212. Manders literally re-
invents the human body, appearing as a hybrid, impossible body, that is just 
enough ‘like us’ to allow viewers to think about themselves, but crucially, where 
there is no direct relation to anatomy. Mimesis is clearly absent from Manders’ 
project in terms of resemblance but also in the sense that the body is composed 
with different, heterogenous elements that form the body as a conceptual body. 
As Manders himself has suggested in speaking about his own work: “After all, 																																																								
212 Penelope Curtis, “Mark Manders and the (after) life of sculpture” in Mark Manders, Short Sad Thoughts, 
exh. cat. Gateshead: Baltic Centre for Contemporary Art, 2006,10  
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what am I? A human being who unfolds into a horrifying amount of language 
and material by means of a very precise conceptual constructions”213.  
 
Another interesting aspect in Manders’ work is the way it achieves what we 
could describe as an ‘almost-complete-figure’, or alternatively, quasi-
autonomous figures. Figures that have a ‘completeness’ that can only be 
achieved with the presence of different elements – that become part of the 
figure - and where the human form remains recognizable as such. Put another 
way, it is a form of figuration defined in terms of the association, or assemblage, 
between different procedures and elements, where any initial function and 
meaning that these may have had is transformed in function of their physical 
use for composing the figure. It is also a figuration where it exists invention and 
commitment to the human form as it is materialized internally in artworks, as 
oppose to being simply suggested by the use of objects with anthropomorphic 
qualities. Furthermore, although Manders plays with the idea of the figure 
coming in and out-of-existence, one can sense that this is not the sort of 
figuration that can be decomposed at any time.  
 
In comparison to Rachel Harrison’s work, that present objects as if with a social 
life of their own, or Isa Genken, who sharply exposes the contradictions of a 
world where material abundance coexist with the threat of collapse without 
defining an alternative to it, Manders invents the body and recruits materials and 
objects for composing the figure; elements that are physically and conceptually 






213 Mark Manders, [artist’s webpage], < http://markmanders.org/works-b/drawing-with-shoe-movement-two-
consecutive-floor-plans-from-self-portrait-as-a-building-may-21-2002/?wire=f091f1811048fb60b45daea>          
[Accessed September 26th 2015]	
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                            15. Mark Manders, Composition with Blue (2013) 
                                       Wood, painted wood, painted epoxy   




So how, in the end, does the work of Mark Manders show us an alternative to 
the logic of the mannequin? The first distinction is that he upholds the work of 
figuration in terms of construction. He affirms it as process. Furthermore, he 
conciliates the origination of new forms with the language of the ready-made, 
which is equivalent to the distinction I made earlier between the mode of making 
and the mode of finding, but with the proviso that making and the human figure 
take precedent over the second. Indeed it does not seem possible to conceive 
an alternative to the logic of consumerism without an address of making. 
Manders’ current practice offers us a new, or at least a distinct, vocabulary for 
the relation between the human and the non-human – an artistic project that 
demonstrates how once seen in terms of composition-without-essence, 
figuration might work as a medium of negotiation for what constitutes matters-of-
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concern and matters-of-non-concern. This, by depicting the human figure and 
revealing the process of its construction while involving a range of different 
procedures and objects; that hence show it is possible to attribute meaning to 
different elements according to their function within the composed figure, or in 
other words, that is possible to change and subordinate the meaning of objects 
to the human figure.  
 
In addition to this, we are never very far from the idea of death with Mark 
Manders’ work, be it because his figures that as mentioned, are often presented 
as if in the process of coming-into-existence or out-of-existence, thus perhaps 
reminiscent of mutilated bodies, or because he joins objects, the human and 
animal form, in something of a fictional archaeology, where again, the idea of 
death can easily be recognized.  
 
That being said, concerning the notions of heroism I outlined earlier, gesture is 
absent from his figures who seem incapable of doing anything. It is therefore 
complicated to associate Mander’s practice with the idea of heroism in a direct 
way. And yet, the association is not completely out of sense. One could say his 
project sketches a different type of heroism in sculpture as one that is not 
concerned with describing what heroism is, but with positing the human figure 
around the very idea of its construction.  A proposal that invents the body and 
locates in the figure the main source of meaning of different elements. 
Meanwhile refusing, exactly because of process and construction, a direct 
identification with the mannequin and crucially, out-of-the-shelf subjectivities. 
With this in mind, in the next chapter I return to the question of politics and ask 
how the hero and sculpture may challenge the way we understand the formation 



















I will now return to Simon Critchley and more specifically to his take on 
contemporary forms of political resistance and ethical subjectivity. In fact this 
last chapter relies heavily on Critchley, following on from the fact that with his 
theories on, he allows me to summarize what was previously discussed in 
connection to a present day scenario. While at the same time, he opens the 
discussion in a different direction - that being, the connection between the 
concept of hero and figurative sculpture in relation to the way Jacques Derrida 
has asked us to think about democracy, as it appears in The Politics of 
Friendship. Here Derrida considers democracy as something that always 
remains to come and that belongs to the space and time of a promise. Too 
general to be discussed at once, this will be unfolded firstly through Critchley’s 
answer to Derrida’s last chapter titled “For the First Time in the History of 
Humanity”, where the author simultaneously concludes and reopens the theme 
of friendships and politics, and secondly, through Critchley’s updates on 
Derrida’s ideas in terms of anti-heroism and humour in the book Infinitely 
Demanding. Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance. In contrast to the 
position of the latter, I will reason that the subject of the hero opens into an 
experience of decidability and presentability and that these allow us to connect 
figurative sculpture to an idea of ethical commitment.  
 
 
The space of the promise and the public utility of Deconstruction 
 
 
True democracy, Derrida suggest, would have to include the search for the 
common together with a demand of the fellow citizen, that he calls (a) friend, 
beyond affiliation or reciprocity. It would require this friend not to be reduced to 
one’s own idea of the friend, and furthermore, that friendship itself would be 
open to the point of accepting the friend as the enemy he might become214 - an 																																																								
214 Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship. London, Verso, 2005, 81-82 
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asymmetric and unconditional friendship orientated to the demand of ‘the other’ 
qua other, that refuses normativity and to frame ‘who’ the friend is.  
 
This is underlined in a literary dialogue Derrida offered first with Maurice 
Blanchot, suggesting that pure friendship refuses the knowledge of ‘who’ the 
friend is and allows one to speak to the friend but not about a friend; and with 
Friedrich Nietzsche, offering the theory that such friendship would have to be 
forgotten215. Derrida, in short, wants to deconstruct the association between 
friendship and affiliation at the heart of an understanding of politics based on the 
formation of circles of allies that he thinks betrays the principles of democracy. 
In other words, Derrida asks us to think about friendship without ties. A form of 
equality without fraternity based not on similarity or on what the friendship 
means to the individual, but on the singularity of the other - on what the other is 
that will always remain unknown to me - in a way that refuses to bring down the 
friend to a usable, instrumentalizable idea. A friend who again, is someone “ to 
whom one speaks (if only to tell him or her that there is no friends), but of whom 
one does not speak about”216.  
 
And yet, by asking us to consider friendship on the lines of a boundless bond, 
Derrida also proposes that we part with the dogma of belonging in order to bring 
friendship closer to a claim to universality that he identifies with democracy as a 
political system that is supposedly for all. A proposal, that in involving the 
complexities of a mutual demand for singularity and universality, or a break with 
the singularity/universality divide, implies that both democracy and its subject 
remain as pure, unresting thought, for they are coherent only insofar as they 
stay un-presentable. In Derrida’s own words:  
 
 
For democracy remains to come; in its essence in so 
far as it remains: not only will it remain indefinitely 
perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but, 
belonging to the time of the promise, it will always 
remain in each of its future times, to come: even when 
																																																								
215 The exchange between Blanchot and Nietzsche is long but Derrida articulates this in a few pages. See: 
Ibid., 294-295   
216 Ibid., 294 
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there is democracy, it never exists, it is never present, 
it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept217  
  
So what I propose to do is follow Derrida but attempt to go beyond the idea that 
it is possible to consider a democracy of the promise, and particularly the notion 
of a subject-to-come, only insofar as they remain unthinkable and un-
presentable. In other words if, as Derrida thinks, the promise of democracy 
requires us to include the demand of a subject-to-come, how can we actually 
think and include those we might one day call friends beyond the limitations of 
what Derrida only sees in a space of indeterminacy? What if, instead of the 
thinking in terms of the friend, we consider the hero? And what are the 
implications of figurative sculpture for this scenario?  
 
Let us start by considering at length Simon Critchley’s reading of Derrida 
together with his attempt to displace a heroic paradigm. This will allow us to 
return to some of the claims made earlier on in regards to using the figure of the 
hero as a conceit of figuration and to question the possibilities of determining the 
(sculptural) hero for a non-foundational relation between, what in a free use of 
the terms, we might call the aesthetical and the political.  
 
In the chapter titled “Deconstruction and Pragmatism: Is Derrida a Private Ironist 
or a Public Liberal?”218 Critchley takes an indirect route to the problem of the un-
presentable political subject found in Derrida’s theory via Rorty. He reminds us 
that Deconstruction and Pragmatism overlap insofar as the latter attempts to 
deconstruct any form of intellectual and political foundation, displace the belief in 
truth as a form of correspondence between mental representation and external 
reality and furthermore posit a conception of meaning as a function of context. 
But he also argues that Deconstruction is not pragmatist all the way through and 
that the difference between the two theories carries ethical and political 
implications; that the first retains something that cannot be deconstructed or 
pragmatized, and contrary to Rorty’s claim, that Derrida’s work, in particular, has 
a direct public utility219.  																																																								
217 Ibid., 306	 	 	
218 “Deconstruction and Pragmatism: Is Derrida a Private Ironist or a Public Liberal?” is an essay published in 
both Simon Critchley, Ethics. Politics-Subjectivity. Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French 
Thought, London, Verso, 2009, 83-105; and Chantal Mouffe, eds., Deconstruction and Pragmatism, London, 
Routledge, 2009, 19-40 
219 At the same time that Rorty expresses his admiration for the work of Derrida on several occasion, he 
says: “Ironist theorists like Hegel, Nietzsche, Derrida and Foucault seem to me invaluable in our attempt to 
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He starts by noting how Rorty divides Derrida’s work in terms of two distinct 
phases. An earlier phase is defined by works such as Of Grammatology and 
Writing and Difference, where, in the opinion of the latter, Derrida focus on trying 
to overturn metaphysics. The later phase is exemplified by works such as The 
Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, and Glas, that Rorty considers 
more relevant, being as he sees it, involved in a dialogue with preceeding 
philosophers. With the latter, the task of thinking about dialogue itself, which 
assumes a form of world disclosure that blurs philosophy and literature and is 
able to challenge, re-describe and replace conventional philosophical 
vocabularies. This is what Rorty sees as ironic theorizing, that is, the building of 
non-argumentative and disposable philosophical language that returns 
philosophy to the status of writing220. Critchley notes on the matter: 
 
For Rorty, Derrida, ‘has done for the history of 
philosophy what Proust did for his life story’: he has 
achieved autonomy though art. The consequence of 
this development thesis [i.e. the description of 
Derrida’s work in two phases] is that Derrida’s work 
has no ethical, political or public significance insofar as 
it has given up on the attempt to reconcile theoretically 
the public and the private. It is this claim, that I 
[Critchley] want to challenge. 221  
 
 
Which he does by arguing that Derrida’s work has a public utility constituted 
around a profound preoccupation with justice for the Other, that being, the 
unknowable other who for that reason posits a demand for justice that can never 
be completely met. In fact, Critchley identifies justice as the condition of 
Deconstructivism that can never be pragmatized. This in turn means that, if we 
accept that justice must be done, then justice must allow an experience of 
undecidibility and stay on the level of infinity for it is only then that the demand of 
the other, which remains infinite, can be answered to. Put another way, it is 
through the experience of this infinite ethical demand that we can say that 																																																								
form a private self-image, but pretty much useless when it comes to politics” in Richard Rorty, Contingency, 
irony and solidarity, 83	
220 Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity, 122-137.  
221 In Simon Critchley, Ethics-Politics –Subjectivity. Essays on Derrida, Levinas & contemporary French 
thought, 95 
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justice is being done towards the other, qua other and not towards the other as 
an object of cognition. In this scenario, true justice can never become a 
regulated decision-making practice, institutionalized or be bound to affiliation or 
territory. As Critchley puts it:  
 
 
The undeconstructible condition of possibility for 
deconstruction is a commitment to justice, defined 
in terms of an ethical relation to the other, a 
response to suffering that provokes an infinite 
responsibility and the attempt to minimize cruelty. 
Such an ethical conception of justice can never be 
fully instantiated in the public realm, nor can it be 
divorced from the latter; rather, justice regulates 
public space, making politics critical Utopian and 
radically democratic222.  
 
 
The idea that justice is an imperative that cannot be deconstructed or 
pragmatized, that it ought to regulate public space but never be regulated by it, 
suggests a necessary disembodiment and deterritorialization of justice itself: “A 
deconstructive approach to politics (…) leads to what one might call the dis-
embodiment of justice”223. Hence, it is the performance of a disembodied sense 
of justice, that Critchley recognizes in the work of Deconstruction that proves the 
public utility of the latter and more exactly of Derrida’s work. Which he finally 
asserts in connection to Rorty’s criteria of what is the public obligation when 
acting within liberal democracies, i.e. to reduce suffering224. So to summarize, 
Critchley proposes that deconstruction theory has a public utility that 
corresponds to a disembodied and continuous performance of justice, realized 
beyond the normalized space of the law and in a form that allows for an address 
of the singularity of the other to be formed, precisely, after ironic theorizing. Of 
course we could say that this is not so far from Rorty’s claim that the priority of 
																																																								
222 In Simon Critchley, Ethics-Politics–Subjectivity. Essays on Derrida, Levinas & contemporary French 
thought, 102 
223 Ibid., 101  
224 The claim that the task of liberal democracies is to reduce suffering comes in line with Rorty’s definition of 
the liberal ironist: “someone for whom cruelty is the worst we do”. Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony and 
solidarity, 85  
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philosophy ought to be re-description rather than inference, and what is more 
that democracies need literature more so than philosophy225 .  
 
But there is indeed an important difference. Rorty reasons that a direct 
conciliation between the private and public spheres is unproductive. In his view 
the wellbeing of a given democracy is related to the possibility of a separation 
between these two spheres, or more precisely, on the attempt to conciliate the 
two without cancelling out one or the other. Put another way, Rorty argues that it 
is politically necessary to develop a socio-cultural context that creates the 
conditions for irony, that is, the conditions for self-improvement and for a 
continuous process of doubting and rewriting one’s own vocabulary; and 
furthermore, that it is pivotal for the structures that support these conditions to 
accept being changed by ironic procedures, but crucially, without becoming 
ironic themselves. As he suggests along the following lines, the perspective of 
extending irony to the public sphere would seem to open into a pernicious 
scenario where one could no longer expect to trust the very idea of democracy: 
“I [Rorty] cannot imagine a culture which socialized its youth in such a way as to 
make them continually dubious about their own process of socialization. Irony 
seems inherently a private matter”226. It is perhaps worth remembering that 
Rorty is better defined not as an ironist but as a pragmatist who is interested in 
the use-value of irony, as described above, and in the work of thinkers such as 
Hegel, Nietzsche, Foucault, and Derrida, who in his opinion have used irony as 
a process of circumventing and redefining the philosophical vocabulary.  
 
This is where Critchley has a point that I wish to relate to. In the framework of 
Rorty, practices of self-improvement and the development of empathy may or 
may not lead to a form of justice. He hopes it can, he hopes someone who is 
aware of his or her own contingency will be a more just individual, but then 
again fails to predict a way to move from a community of readers who improve 																																																								
225 Rorty argues about the importance of literature over philosophy throughout his work. However, the 
argument is perhaps more explicit in Contingency, irony, and solidarity, where he directly aligns literature and 
the development of new vocabularies, with the emergency of social hope and solidarity. Here’s an example: 
The idea that liberal societies are bound together by philosophical beliefs seems to me ludicrous. What binds 
societies together are common vocabularies and common hopes. The vocabularies are, typically, parasitic on 
the hopes - in the sense that the principal function of the vocabularies is to tell stories about future outcomes 
with compensate for present sacrifices.  
Modern, literate, secular societies depend on the existence of reasonable concrete, optimistic, and plausible 
political scenarios as oppose to scenarios about redemption beyond the grave. To retain social hope, 
members of such a society need to be able to see no insuperable obstacles to this story’s coming true. Is 
social hope has become harder lately, this is not because the clerks have been committing treason but 
because, since the end of World War II, the course of events has made it harder to tell a conniving story of this 
sort.” in ibid., 86 
226 Ibid., 87 
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their vocabulary by playing figures against figure, or more exactly through the 
work of literary criticism, towards something we might call a politically organized 
community. Adding to that, there is the question of territory that repeatedly, and 
problematically, comes to the fore in Rorty’s often too optimistic and uncritical 
views on western, predominantly American, liberal democracies. Views too often 
sound condescending towards the political structures that don’t exactly comply 
with what he considers to be the liberal obligation to attempt reducing suffering; 
this being a crevice that makes clear the need to bring to question, if not to 
ridicule, the legitimacy of the political institutions that supposedly represent 
everybody. Hence a necessity that moves into the sort of potentially positive 
internalization of political irony that Critchley argues can be found in the work of 
Derrida. In contrast to Rorty, Critchley believes that Derrida is “still seeking to 
fulfil the classical philosophical project of reconciling the public and the 
private”227. 
 
To summarize, Critchley shows that Deconstruction has a public utility, which he 
describes in terms of a performance of a disembodied and deterritorialized 
justice. This follows from a demand of the other, at once singular and universal, 
that can never be exhausted and for that reason must accept an experience of 
undecidability. A possibility that Derrida anticipates by rethinking the relationship 
between politics and friendship in terms of a radically opened, hence at heart a 
public space found in constant renovation. The space of a contingent, 
transitional and forever improvable condition where, as Derrida reasons, what is 
relevant is “no longer a matter of founding, but to open out to the future, or 
rather, to the ‘come’, of a certain democracy”228.  It can be concluded that the 
importance of an experience of undecidability for the question of justice, its 
disembodiment and deterritorialization, is related to the ideas behind the claim 
that democracy and the democratic subject is unpresentable concepts, that they 






227 In Simon Critchley, Ethics-Politics–Subjectivity. Essays on Derrida, Levinas & contemporary French 
thought, 102	
228 Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 306   
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The problem of decision in Derrida’s idea of promise 
 
 
In “The Other’s Demand in Me: What Are the Politics of Friendship?”229 Critchley 
addresses the political abstraction left by Derrida’s proposal (that of a promise 
that stays unthinkable and un-presentable) and asks if it is possible to retrieve 
from the politics of friendship an understanding of political decision, that is, if it is 
possible to deduce politics from the ethics of friendship. 
 
Critchley starts with a familiar question that Derrida makes to Blanchot: “What is 
to be done?”230. A question that is political in content and form and the utterance 
of which seems to refuse an idea of political foundations - for as long as the 
question is asked, one assumes there is no normative answer and that we are 
not yet sure what is best or the more important way to progress but that, 
however, there is a will to do, or at least the awareness that something has to be 
done. The question seems to posit the openness of democracy as I have 
outlined and at the same time the necessity to move from the undecidability 
found therein towards “a responsible decision [that] must be taken – here and 
now, again and again – without any transcendental guarantees, without any 
ontological foundations (…)”231. 
 
Critchley returns the problem back to Derrida and asks if there is a non-
normative passage between the space of friendship and political decision: 
“Might there not be a hiatus between friendship and politics, that far from 
inducing paralysis or resignation, perhaps opens onto an experience of political 
decision?”232 The following two slightly longer quotations show how he prepares 
																																																								
229 Simon Critchley, “The Other’s Demand in Me: What Are the Politics of Friendship?” in Simon Critchley, 
Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity. Essays on Derrida, Levinas & Contemporary French thought, 254-286  
230  Famously attributed to Lenin after his political pamphlet, “What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our 
Time”, published in 1901. The question, which became something of a recognizable sign of left-wing thinking 
and art, belongs in fact, in terms of its printed original, to Nikolay Chernyshevsky and his novel with the same 
name. A novel published in 1863, where the author promotes ideals of socialism through a plot, which is 
typical of Russian narrative literare, involving complicated family relations and in this case, the theme of 
emancipation from family ties combined with a praise of a cooperative-based forms of subsistence. It is 
relevant to note that Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, referenced in chapter two, is well known for 
mocking the utilitarianism found in Chernyshevsky’s novel. In Derrida’s The Politics of Friendship,  it appears 
in the following context: “The question is not only the one which brings on semantic vertigo, but the one which 
asks: ‘what is to be done?’: what is the be done today, politically, with which and its necessity? What is to be 
done with the ‘what is to be done?’? And what other politics –which would nevertheless still be a politics, 
supposing the world could still resist this very vertigo –can this other communality of the ‘common’ dictate to 
us?” In Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 297	 	
231 In Simon Critchley, Ethics-Politics –Subjectivity. Essays on Derrida, Levinas & contemporary French 
thought, 275 
232 Ibid., 272   
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and answers the question - that he suggests is already answered in Derrida’s 
Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas:  
 
(…) ethics is left defined as the infinite responsibility 
of unconditional hospitality. Whilst on the other hand, 
the political can be defined as the taking of a 
decision without any determinate transcendental 
guarantees. Thus, the hiatus in Levinas [the gap 
between the understanding of ethics as hospitality 
and the politics of hospitality in Levinas’ work] allows 
Derrida both to affirm the primacy of an ethics of 
hospitality, whilst leaving open the sphere of the 
political as a realm of risk and danger. Such danger 
calls for decisions or what Derrida, citing Levinas, 
calls ‘political invention’, an invention taken in the 
name of the other without this being reducible to 
some sort of moral calculus233  
 
And then:   
 
Derrida emphasizes how the very indeterminacy of 
the passage from ethics to politics entails that the 
taking of a political decision must be a response to 
the utter singularity of a particular and inexhaustible 
context. The infinite ethical demand of 
deconstruction arises as a response to a singular 
context and calls forth the invention of a political 
decision. Politics itself can here be thought of as 
the art of response to the singular demand of the 
other, a demand that arises in a particular context –
although the infinite demand cannot simply be 
reduced to its context –and calls for political 




234 Ibid., 276   
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Whilst the two commentaries establish how the possibility of deducing politics 
from ethics lies within the singularity of a decision, they do not move in the 
direction of rendering the political subject thinkable, which is necessary in order 
to understand the relationship between the democratic process as a 
philosophical theme, the criticism and presentability of it. In connection to this 
Critchley agrees with Derrida and considers that the ‘who’ of democracy must 
remain undefined, while also proposing a slightly different theory through a 
model of subject formation - a model that as it will soon become clear, focuses 
on the question of decision, on the reason why a subject is affected by the 
demand of the other, or what he calls, the approval of the demand235 - more 
importantly, on knowing whether or not political invention can be extended to 
the question of the subject him or herself. Below I will discuss the way in which 
Critchley attempts to extend and translate Derrida’s thought into the reality of 
the political process, through the articulation of an ethico-political subject. This 
will allow me to introduce a few ideas that will later be used as reference points, 
or more exactly as points of contrast, for a speculation on the wider implications 
of figurative sculpture.   
 
In Infinitely demanding; Ethics of commitment, Politics of Resistance, Critchley 
argues that a contemporary ethical subject must be constituted against a tragic 
heroic paradigm and against the orthodoxy of autonomy in western thought. A 
problem that he connects to contemporary tactics of resistance and in particular, 
with a form of neo-anarchism “concerned with the mobilization of politics”236, that 
he regards in terms of a common front united under a shared feeling of 
wrongdoing that subjugates freedom and self-autarchy (his words) to 
responsibility; a form of anarchism that furthermore refuses violence while 
maintaining humour rather than tragedy, as the associated work of sublimation. 
Put another way, he asks how an ethical subject can be formed, “the way in 
which a self binds itself to some conception of the good and shapes its 
subjectivity to that good,”237 in a time of deep political disappointment. A 
disappointment caused, as he diagnoses rightly in my opinion, by contemporary 
liberal democracies being incapable of sufficiently motivating their citizens.  
 
																																																								





So he proposes a model, chiefly constructed around Badiou’s logic of the event, 
or more precisely around the idea of a fidelity to an event238, where he 
establishes the centrality of a commitment to the singularity of a situation and 
the premise that an ethical demand, i.e. the demand of the other, is internal to 
subjectivity but can not be completely fulfilled. Additionally, that the ethical 
subject is divided between an infinite ethical demand and the impossibility to 
meet that demand –corresponding to something we might call a dividual239.  
 
We are also told that the load brought upon consciousness by an infinite 
demand asks for the work of sublimation, which, against the tragic-heroic-
autonomy paradigm (that he recognizes for instance in the work of Heidegger 
and Lacan), Critchley proposes should be considered in terms of humour and 
comedy - “the practice of a minimal sublimation that both maintains and 
alleviates the division of the ethical subject”240, which is not structured around 
practices of self-mastery, but rather constituted around an experience of 
conscience responsibility: “ an inauthentic humours self that can never attain the 
autarchy of self-mastery”241.  
 
Arguing that the development of capitalism has not lead to the simplification of 
class structures into the antagonistic poles of bourgeoisie and proletarian, as 
Marx thought it would242, but rather to its complexification, Critchley furthermore 
maintains that we can no longer conceive of emancipatory politics and the 
condition for “a new militancy and a new optimism”243 using simplified ideas 
such as that of the Proletarian; that instead, we need to consider the sense of 
dislocation introduced by global capitalism, and drawing from Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri, the multitude as the contemporary form of radical political 
subjectivity244. Critchley also suggests that radical politics asks for a “meta-
political ethical moment that provides the motivation force of propulsion into 
political action”245 and that includes a situated, yet non-territorial claim to 																																																								
238 “The idea of the subject committing itself in fidelity to the universality of a demand that opens in a singular 
situation but which exceeds that situation.” In ibid, 40 
239 Critchley takes as principle that the subject “ shapes itself in relation to a demand that it can never meet, 
which divides and sunders the subject.” Ibid.   
240 Ibid.,11 
241 Ibid. 
242 See, for instance ibid., 103-105 
243 Ibid.,102	
244 Writing on the influence of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Critchley says: “ [the] multitude in the sense 
of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri is a new political name. This is clearly the implicit ambition of the powerful 
analysis of the emergent form of the network sovereignty given in the hugely influential Empire from 200, an 
ambition made explicit in the 2004 sequel, Multitude, which argues that the multitude is the new political 
subject and political alternative that grows within empire”. In ibid.,104 
245 Ibid., 13 
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universality. A claim that he associates with the idea of neo-anarchism and that 
he ties in with a disturbance of the political status quo: that being, a form of 
anarchism predicated not on individual freedom or an heroic self, but on 
responsibility, anonymity and non-violence, and that appears associated with 
spaces that create interstitial distance from the state246. These being, semi-
autonomous spaces of resistance “within and against the state” where 
democracy and a demand for each other can be re-enacted and people can 
care for each other, and where there might be the possibility to connect to an 
idea of good. These are spaces that Critchley associates with everyday ‘meta-
political’ settings, where alternative forms of communal life can be rehearsed 
and forms of political opposition organized around non-violent warfare tactics of 
resistance, typical joyful, humorous and even carnivalesque behaviour, as 
epitomised by some NGOs and by activism groups such as Clownarmy. Spaces 
and groups that, in Critchley’s view, provide a glimpse into new forms of political 
subjectivity; a glimpse into what can be done, when nothing seems possible to 
be done and into forms to maintain and alleviate, but significantly not to 
formalize ways to answers to a demand for justice.  
 
Summarily then, starting with the idea that we live in a time of deep political 
disappointment caused by contemporary western democracies being unable to 
sufficiently motivate their citizens because, devoid of a strong concept of good, 
Critchley argues that the main question for philosophy today is the question of 
ethics and politics, or precisely: how to connect to a concept of good and the 
discovery of what to do. Returning to Derrida’s non-foundational politics for a 
moment and to the way in which he suggests that one thinks of democracy as 
an informal space of friendship and infinite critique, in effect contemporary forms 
of protest can be seen as the radicalization of critique with the stakes of an 
anonymous and humorous ethical subjectivity. A particular understanding of 
ethical-political subjectivity that completes Derrida’s un-presentable democratic 
subject and the idea that a demand for justice can only be approached through 
the deconstruction of structures of power. 
 
Now, the decision to run the text through this unusually long passage on 
Critchley was made on the basis of his reading of Derrida and Rorty, on his 																																																								
246 By using the term ‘interstitial’, Critchley means to describe a space that is both within, and distanced from, 
the state. Writing on the matter: “Politics, then, is praxis in a situation that articulates an interstitial distance 
from the state and allows for the emergency of new political subjects who exert a universal claim.” Ibid., 92	
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negative take on the heroic paradigm and crucially because his writings are in 
the spirit of recent events and express a positive, and somehow dominant, view 
on contemporary tactics of resistance. In fact, written in 2007, before the 
Occupy movement, Infinitely Demanding. Ethics of Commitment, Politics of 
Resistance anticipated much of the practices put in place, for instance during 
Occupy Wall Street which, again, was characterized by non-violent and often 




With, through and contra Simon Critchley  
 
 
Critchley’s philosophical architecture is successful in terms of describing an 
ethical experience and the possibility to connect to a concept of good in the 
current politically challenging climate. However, the argument outlined above 
also risks providing a form of comfort ethics in that it focus more on the 
possibility of having an ethical experience and connecting with a concept of 
good than on finding ways to undo the wrong that causes disaffection. It is an 
argument that as mentioned, updates Derrida’s association between justice and 
the impossibility to ‘institutionalize’ justice by formulating the question of 
decision in terms of a situated and singularly conceived decision, which is 
aligned with a chance of maintaining an ethical demand, that being one that 
does not try to map the possibility to introduce difference and somehow meet 
such demand.  
  
In my opinion this is a problem that has to do with how notions of resistance, 
emancipation and the ethical subject are being thought of in terms of a position 
taken against an enemy - alternatively defined in relation to the state and the 
financial corporative world – and that while determining the ethical experience 
itself, seems to undermine the very possibility of a self-determined, self-
empowered ethical subjectivity.  
 
Put another way, Critchley proposes us to think about ethics along the necessity 
to debunk and react against, the oppressive forces of the state, multinational 
corporations and political misrepresentation. Yet this also means the ethical 
subject as such is presented in negative terms, in the sense that it remains 
	 187	
dependent on an opposing ‘evil’ force against which it can be defined as being 
ethical. This negativity can also be found at the heart of the logic of critique - a 
process of thought that deconstructs a given issue in order to reveal its flaws or 
understand its implications, but without ever arriving at the positivity of a process 
of construction, and what is more, that never fully departs from what it wishes to 
disturb or examine. The sense given by the expression “within and against the 
state”247, that Critchley uses to described the ‘interstitial’ spaces where a 
moment of political disturbance is possible, conveys in fact the idea of 
dependence and opposition rather well. It also brings to mind, that in the 
framework we’ve been discussing, ethics has to do with problems of justice and 
appears associated with the logic of critique.  
 
And as shown, humour is never too far removed from critique. Humour can 
battle almost anything and as a form of sublimation that maintains and alleviates 
the weight of an infinite demand, it could hardly be more important - it is as 
important as happiness is. But humour and laughter appear as a release of 
energy that is not easy to reconcile with the possibility to introduce difference. If 
only to use a caricature, one cannot laugh and speak clearly at the same time. 
But the problems with the marriage between ethics and humour, and we can 
add political irony, don’t stop in formal difficulties, so to say. It is in fact, 
problematic to project an ethical subject as a comic self, for it risks undermining 
the very possibility of finding an ethical subjectivity.  
 
Returning to Rorty’s point concerning the danger of political irony, while it is 
easy to laugh at political decisions, it seems to me, that to conceive politics in 
terms of humour is to accept that politics can become trivial; that a scenario 
where we would welcome the idea of taking political decisions conceived as 
being laughable from the outset is not only an evasive scenario but one that 
carries an invitation to political subterfuge and lack of responsibility. In other 
words, it seems precarious to discuss serious issues through humour unless the 
aim is to make a joke or to use laughter as a political tool for criticism, which in 
turn means you actually want to be taken seriously. Humour, in short, is a 
promising proposition in terms of maintaining and alleviating an ethical demand 
as Critchley has shown us, but seems limited in terms of allowing for an ethical 
decision beyond the immediate moment of that decision.   																																																								
247 Ibid., 148 
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A similar problem appears with the anti-heroic. On the one hand, the anti-heroic 
is a paradigm capable of dissolving and ridiculing authoritative norms. A mode 
of thought, let us say, that introduces a conscience of the insufficiency of what is 
either imposed or achieved, and that in being associated with modesty, feeds 
the continuation of a given task. Yet on the other, it is difficult to conceive of the 
anti-heroic as an ethical model outside a retrospective direction of thought. One 
cannot claim that an action or invention is anti-heroic and ethical at the same 
time without undermining one of the two terms  - for if an action is said to be 
ethical, than surely it will be closer to heroism than to anti-heroism, whereas by 
contrast, if an action is said to be anti-heroic it can only be ethical insofar as we 
accept that the anti-heroic and the heroic are interchangeable. That is, that the 
anti-heroic has something belonging to the heroic. 
 
However, once again the anti-heroic as with the concept of humour, seem to 
pertain to ethics, firstly in terms of criticizing models that do not include the 
demand of the other, like an aristocratic model of heroism in its most 
individualistic version; and secondly, as an attitude of modesty that finds it 
insufficient, indeed laughable, to think that such demand can ever be met. But 
then there is a contradiction in saying that we can, or ought to, articulate an 
ethical subject in terms of a future anti-heroic subject, for it is in the attempt to 
be the best one can be, rather than the negative of this, that will allow for the 
subject to work upon the self ethically and thus potentially respond to the other’s 
demand.  
 
Let us move into a different direction. Protest, and in particular the Occupy 
movement, have marked an important and most of all, a positive moment of 
resistance against the influence of corporations on politics. Here is an example 
when a collective voice of discontent has been heard and the hope that 
something can perhaps be done, has sufficiently been expressed. Protest has, 
and one could say will, always allow for the promise of democracy to manifest 
itself. To a large extent, Cricthley’s model has anticipated and does reflect the 
reality of contemporary tactics of resistance, staying true to a school of thought 
that says true democracy is that of a lively informal condition and infinite critique 
- never to be framed or fixed in some inert form. A school of thought that 
logically privileges the living fabric of a community as a changing, non-
hierarchical and anonymous form, and that considers the space of democracy 
as one and the same as that of the promise, or as Judith Butler has put it in her 
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now famous speech delivered during Occupy Wall Street, as a space of 
“impossible demands”248.  
 
But the point where the problems with humour and the anti-heroic almost seem 
to disappear is the point at which other problems revealed themselves. A 
promise without a promise, “impossible demands”, or in fact anonymity, 
produces an unrealized energy that lacks a capacity to, or more exactly that 
refuses to organize forms to overcome what stands in the way of emancipatory 
possibilities. And it does not seem possible to reconfigure the very mode of 
living that has brought us to a point of rupture using humour, anonymity and the 
everyday – modes that resist but do not revoke – because these are unable to 
guarantee, to put it in Lacanian terms, that a gesture made against the ‘service 
of goods’ will not pull us back to a life determined by, and reduced to, economic 
interests.  
 
In fact there is a perverse side to the way protest itself ends up speaking the 
same language and identifying with what it wishes to attack. Consider the 99% 
percent slogan for the Occupy Movement, or the ‘branding effect’ of the Tunisian 
revolution modelled after Gene Sharp’s highly influential book From Dictatorship 
to Democracy, or even, if we push this a bit further, how anonymity, non-
hierarchic, de-centred forms of organization, and an absence of clear demands, 
end up repeating the abstraction and fluidity of globalized financial markets. Is it 
not possible to say that singularly conceived decisions and the idea of infinite 
unclear demands, disorientate rather than orientate? And isn’t the incapacity to 
make decisions with a sense of traction and the difficulty in constructing an idea 
of the future exactly one of the problems today? A kind of neo-liberal zombism 
that refuses to die but lingers on with no sense of direction or alternative. Is it 
not true that the new spirit of capitalism and the corporative world are feeding 
precisely on creativity and adaptation? On everyone being always under the 
pressure to adapt to the demands of the market and its variations, to constantly 
change - change jobs, change cities, change partners – and at the same to live 
in a constant limbo; on unexamined adaptability and the impossibility to 
commitment beyond the instant of a provisional moment?  
 																																																								
248 A transcription of Judith Butler’s speech at OWS, and a video, can be found at Verso Books web page. 
Judith Butler, “Speech at Occupy Wall Street”, Verso Books [publisher webpage], < 
http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/765-if-hope-is-an-impossible-demand-then-we-demand-the-impossible-
judith-butler-at-occupy-wall-street-video> [Accessed September 26th 2015] 
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Surely the reawakening of protest has oxygenated western democracies, but it 
has also shown how corrupt they have come to be. There is of course, a direct 
economic cause for the state of precariousness and disaffection, and in more 
recent years, to a politics of austerity. This is fed by the paradox of a belief 
system structured around acts of consumerism whose logic asks for an 
increasing economic growth that in turn, leads to the erosion of the conditions 
and value of labour. But what also seems to exist is a symbolic cause created 
by an absent ideological plane where a concept of good can be located beyond 
consumerism itself, and that despite allowing for everyone to connect to an idea 
of good, contemporary tactics of resistance are yet to offer a real alternative and 
unblock the invention of emancipatory political subjectivities beyond the subject 
of protest itself - a subject that is at once produced and weakened by 
consumerism249. 
 
Counting as one of the many thinkers who joined the protest in New York in 
2011, Slavoj Žižek voiced an alternative opinion to Critchley’s concerning the 
Occupy movement. Writing for the Guardian later in early 2012, he argues that 
what the protest movement has revealed is a necessity to consider a 
replacement for what is causing the problem and that:  
 
 
The emergence of an international protest 
movement without a coherent program is therefore 
not an accident: it reflects a deeper crisis, one 
without an obvious solution. The situation is like that 
of psychoanalysis, where the patient knows the 
answer (his symptoms are such answers) but 
																																																								
249 In connection to this, the art world has largely joined the voices of protest, but it has also appropriated its 
forms and preoccupations. From Mark Wallinger’s State Britain, from 2007; passing through Peter Weibel 
2011/1012 curatorial project that investigates ‘the global contemporary’ and the idea of “global activism as the 
first new art form of the 21st century”; and projects such as The Bernadette Corporation that not only 
glamourize protest and political activism but also play a double game of critique and promotion of 
consumerism in works such as the video piece Get Rid of Yourself, from 2003. Whilst this is not so much at 
play in the first two examples, the last one gives witness to how the romance between protest and art, as well 
as other endevours found in the so-called ‘creative industries’, can take a route run dangerously close to the 
commodification of both critique and protest itself, by bringing together advertising, politics, fashion, art 
exhibitions, publications and so on, all gathered under the allure of the ‘young’ and ‘cool’ spirit of protest.   For 
Weibel’s citation, see: Peter Weibel, global aCTIVISm: global citizen”, [ZKM Blog], 
<http://blog.zkm.de/en/editorial/global-activism-global-citizen/> [Accessed September 26th 2015] 
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doesn’t know to what they are answer, and the 
analyst has to formulate a question. 250  
 
 
Žižek detects the absence of a “coherent program” as a symptom that 
simultaneously offers a possible answer to its cause, that is, the idea that we 
need to formulate a question, and it could be added, to articulate a new subject. 
So my claim here is that, in the face of the crisis, it is important to ask not only 
what can be done, but also what kind of subjects we can all become, individually 
and collectively. For what the ‘unrealized’ subject of protest reflects, the subject 
of anonymity and “impossible demands”, is a necessity to rethink the way we 
live today and, following Žižek’s notably Lacanian intimation, a necessity to 
return to the question of desire, meaning, a necessity to examine, and find 
alternatives to the neoliberal lifestyle that feeds the paradoxical nature of the 
crisis and is also used as justification of several of the political decisions that 
have brought us all here251. This includes the importance of thinking about the 
day of tomorrow, about what stays along with what is to come, which in short 
translates as the importance of placing contemporary reality in relation to a time 
that is not its own, as a way of orientation for the task of re-imagining the subject 
beyond the now proven false promises of an economy-driven life. 
 
However, before moving on I believe it necessary to provide a brief summary of 
what has been presented up until this point. Derrida explains that democracy 
requires a radical openness and never-ending critique, that it remains an 
unpresentable concept and that it cannot be defined without undermining the 
very openness that constitutes it. The same goes for the subject. Critchley in 
turn has reminded us that the question of justice is at the heart of Derrida’s 
theory, and that because justice for the other can never be truly met, the theory 																																																								
250 Slavoj Žižek, “Occupy Wall Street: what is to be done next?”, The Guardian, 2012, [newspaper], 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/apr/24/occupy-wall-street-what-is-to-be-done-
next>[Accessed September 26th 2015] 
251 In the wave of publications dedicated to the Occupy movement, the fall 2012 edition of October was 
dedicated to OWS. Here  Mignon Nixon establishes a parallel between the events of 2011 and Yayoi 
Kusama’s performance Anatomic Explosion staged on the sidewalk outside Wall Street during the year of 
1968 in protest to the Vietnam war. In this performance the artist “directed four professional dancers, two 
women and two men, accompanied by a conga drummer, to strip and frolic with Rite of Spring-Like abandon in 
front of the Stock Exchange”. Nixon concludes: “that the artist proposed a more speculative mode of political 
resistance to war, one that asked, in effect: what makes us make the state make us make war?” On a 
superficial level, what Nixon establishes here is a parallel with today’s controversy surrounding the US use of 
drones, viz. the inhumanity of drones versus arguing for their utility on the war or terror and security and, 
therefore the effect on the economic. The point she finally makes is, to my mind, very similar to Zizêk’s point: 
that there is a need to rethink desire, which in its relationship to consumerism is what endorses (or at least 
helps to justify) states around the world allowing for economic and social injustice notably associated with 
precarious working conditions. In Mignon Nixon, “Anatomic Explosion on Wall Street” in October, 142, Fall 
2012, 3-25 
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asks for an experience of un-decidability. In this framework, irony appears as an 
important instrument of political critique and the problem of decision is thought in 
terms of provisional and situated decisions.   
 
As I hope to have shown, these ideas present the dynamics at play in recent 
forms of protest, namely in the Occupy movement. But the origin of protest also 
reveals that there exists a necessity for reconfiguring the social/political reality 
beyond the promise of protest itself and that the moment of its occasion - a 
necessity to imagine what is to come, or, what action to take and what kind of 
subject to be beyond what is right here and right now. Openness and critique, 
the performance of justice and in the end the possibility of an ethical experience 
appear as necessary and yet insufficient conditions for figuring alternatives 
forms of living because schematically, their logic is that of deconstruction and 
critique. Thus, in the end, it is also a question of structures of thinking.  
 
My contention is that asking ‘what is a hero?’ offers an equivalent to the problem 
that Žižek suggests we need to formulate. A proposal made under the principle 
that to gather under a shared feeling of wrongness is less motivating than, 
borrowing from Rorty once again, working towards “one’s hopes for one’s 
grandchildren“252, for which it seems necessary to create versions of a 
reconfigured world and of what a meaningful life could be in individual as well as 
collective terms.  On that note, and just before moving on, it is relevant to 
remember that even if the ‘subject’ presents him or herself as being one with the 
collective, ethical subjectivity connects to the experience of something that 
happens to the individual, i.e., something that ‘I’ and ‘I’ alone, can choose to 
commit to, and for which in the end, I have to allow to put ‘my’ body, ‘my’ life, at 
risk for. Concluding that it is difficult to separate the ethical subject from an 







252 As Rorty explains, he uses the expression from Hans Blumberg to describe the central development of 
modern thought: “willingness to endure suffering for the sake of future reward was transferable from individual 
rewards to social one’s, from one’s hopes for paradise to one’s hopes for one’s grandchildren.” In Richard 
Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, 85 
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From the mode of the ‘perhaps’ and ‘maybe’ towards that of the ‘as if’  
 
 
For the purpose of discussing the mode of hero as way to re-imagine the 
subject, let us move away from the preoccupation with the experiential side of 
an ethical experience and the question of justice, and focus instead on trying to 
locate the notion of a subject-to-come beyond the space of indeterminacy 
introduced by what Derrida and many Derrideans after him, have seen, in my 
opinion, only in the mode of maybe and of the perhaps. The key to this is to 
show how the figure of the hero opens into an experience of decidability that 
involves invention and that introduces singularity, but where the problem of 
‘decision’ holds a dimension of time that extends further beyond the moment 
when the decision is made, and crucially, one that engages with the question: 
what kind of person one wants to be.  
 
Briefly returning to the second chapter for a moment, as I outlined Lacan 
explains that to think through the concept of the hero is the equivalent of asking 
ourselves whether we have acted according to our desires, by which he means, 
in the direction of true desire, the desire for the other, the desire of being. A form 
of desire that in being opposed to by the real asks for a commitment that can 
only be met when separated from the living body. We’ve also considered Plato’s 
theory of the hero and how this theory is structured around ideas of virtue and 
courage, defined by him as the “knowledge of what is and is not to be fear”253 
which in the framework of his proposal also means the knowledge of what is 
morally more important. In combining this idea with Lacan’s approach, it 
becomes possible to think about the hero as a figure of someone who is capable 
of a meaningful gesture - made along the lines of what is morally, or better said 
ethically, more important - knowingly of the consequences. That is, in 
conscience that a commitment always comes with a price: a price that the latter 
describes as a second death, or symbolic death. So if Plato establishes a 
connection between heroism and the metaphysical world (even if as it was 
suggested, we can read Plato in a non-Platonic way) for Lacan, heroism is 
always inter-subjective while not quite belonging to life as we might know it 
either. Both positions are relevant to my argument, but it is the second that I am 
																																																								
253 Plato in Protagoras, as cited in Angela Hobbs, Plato and the Hero. Courage, Manliness and the 
Impersonal Good, 9 
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most interested in because of this inter-subjective aspect and the possibility to 
associate the notion of symbolic death to that of a symbolic body. 
 
In this scenario, to think through the notion of the hero requires questions to be 
asked concerning what is most important and what counts as courage, that 
being the willingness, which is also a commitment, to pay the necessary price in 
order to access what one might consider the most important aspects of life. 
Thus we can say that thinking through the hero, i.e. what counts as heroism, 
provides a moment for an experience of decidability based on courage as the 
knowledge of the consequences of a commitment; which in turn suggests that 
the question of the hero works as way to channel, and therefore reconfigure, 
‘what is more important’. This implies that the hero, unlike the anti-hero, lends 
him or herself to a redefined sense of worth through courage, which in the 
present context also means a willingness to break unequivocally with the 
comforts and wonders of a consumer-orientated lifestyle and pay the price 
associated with such a decision. The very notion of the hero, in short, is 
associated with the sort of commitment that clarifies and sublimates ‘what is 
more important’.  
 
Furthermore as seen earlier, to think through the hero, means to use an 
intensified idiom of thought, and in that sense, to be able to invent, construct, or 
indeed compose a subject capable of introducing difference beyond the 
condition of the individual. Found between the individual and the collective, the 
hero appears as a conceit of figuration connected to the knowledge of new 
possibilities and hence as an opportunity to probe new forms of describing 
individuals and to organize collective meaning.  
 
But the hero does more than prepare ground for the new. The hero’s positivity is 
that of an inscription that seeks to locate the human in relation to what is 
meaningful beyond the community formed by those living in the present space-
time continuum. It is a concept articulated with the contingency of a specific 
situation whilst connecting at the same time with what is past such contingency. 
We also need to remember that it appears associated with the construction of a 
narrative involving a speculation about a subject capable of changing the 
conditions of what is possible to everyone beyond the condition of the individual. 
The hero is therefore a figure, or a conceit of figuration, through which ideas 
about what constitutes a meaningful act can be rehearsed and renewed. This is 
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what I refer to with the ‘as-if’ in the title of this section: a mode that, unlike that of 
the ‘perhaps’ and the ‘maybe’, and unlike the anti-heroic, allows for a positive 
affirmation and opens into problems of decibility based on the interrelation 
between ‘what to do’ and ‘who to be’, where the first can still be conceived in 
terms of contingency and as ever-revisable decision, but not without changing 
the second; not without implications for being.  
 
So it is a controversial and potentially dangerous concept that needs to be 
understood alongside a constant dialogue with reality, along negotiations, non-
metaphysical negotiations, concerning what counts as heroism, and that yet 
represents a positive affirmation and the possibility to imagine a subject capable 
of answering to an ethical demand. This, with the proviso as Lacan has told us, 
that it exists separately from the living body and therefore beyond the time of an 
experience. It is on this basis that the hero comes into being as a symbolically 
realized concept that makes it possible to speak of presentability.   
 
Before ending this point and moving on to sculpture, it is necessary to make two 
more observations. The first, that even if contemporary tactics of resistance are 
viewed as anti-heroic, this does not mean that these do not bring forth acts of 
great courage. In fact, one could say that the difference in choosing to describe 
such acts as anti-heroic results largely from the specificities of a moment in time 
when we have come to have reasons for questioning the heroic figures. And yet, 
as soon as one starts to build a narrative around the importance of a particular 
movement or event, one is already attempting to make sense of such 
occurances, wanting more than the experience itself, and which, to my mind 
means reflecting on what counts as heroism.  The anonymous protester is a 
figure one might associate quite easily with that of a hero and in fact this has 
already taken place. Time Magazine for example, elected the ‘Protester’ as 
person of the year in 2012. Even Critchley’s passionate, indeed romanticized 
position on movements of political resistance - starting from his early interested 
in the Punk movement to this recent interest in the Occupy movement - denotes 
a desire to heroicize the figure of the political dissident. Along what was drawn 
above, however, it is difficult to describe the figure of the protester as a hero 
because he or she is opposed to power and moves with the space of what is yet 
to come but leaves this space unarticulated. 
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Which brings me to the second observation. It is safe to align protest with the 
general disaffection experienced today in western democracies. But disaffection 
can also give rise to forms of extremism in face of which the anti-heroic model 
can expect to find tough competition coming from calls for more active, and 
sometimes violent, forms of participation in processes of political rupture. A 
problem that connects to the question of motivation but also the question of 
meaning, or rather with what is more meaningful, which the anti-heroic model of 
ethical subjectivity along the lines outlined above, does not engage. The anti-
heroic is concerned with justice, not with the question of meaning. On this 
matter, Critchley makes an important distinction. He tells us the crisis in justice 
has a political root, whereas the question of meaning has a religious root 254. 
And yet, it is difficult to completely separate justice from meaning. We can say, 
for instance, that questions of meaning are directly related to the political 
process, both on a level of the ideological wars that have become a reality 
again, and in the way feelings of self worth and therefore self-meaning, are 
culturally constructed around acts of consumerism that in turn endorse 
inequality particularly in working conditions and access to wealth. A simple 
association of ideas that goes to show that meaning carries a connection not 
only to politics but also to justice. There is, one might add, also a crisis of 
meaning in western democracies.   
 
And it is in this scenario that in saying we need practices of redescription and 
self-improvement seems particularly relevant. For even if these do not 
guarantee a direct engagement with problems of justice, they present the means 
to rethink matters of meaning, and with reference to Rorty, bring to question the 
mutual impact between private obsessions and social hopes. Along these lines, 
it seems possible to say that the concept of the hero can be used as a way to 
rethink the political imaginary and how this imaginary appears under the 
principle that democracy is not only a space for justice, but also a space of 
meaning. On that note, and just before returning to sculpture and bring this 
thesis to an end, I want to anticipate a short conclusion in the form of a 
summary.  
 
For the most part of this chapter, we have moved around a negative 
understanding of ethics. Negative because in the terms discussed along with 																																																								
254 See Simon Critchley, Infinite Demanding; Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance, 1-13 
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Critchley, ethics stands for an attempt to reduce forms of evil and correct 
problems of political misrepresentation.  In those terms, ethics fundamentally 
corresponds to an ethical experience defined in terms of the possibility for the 
self to connect to an idea of good. Earlier on, however, Badiou allowed me to 
introduce the positivity of ethics, which in turn corresponds to a state of 
nonconformity to the world as it is, and more importantly, to a capacity for 
developing emancipatory practices that may lead on to something new. Badiou, 
in short, tell us that the moment when a subject is formed is always a positive 
moment, not a negative one.  
 
I’ve also talked about Lacan, who similarly to Badiou, reasons that the ethical-
subject cannot be conceived of by using everyday discourses because ethics 
asks from the subject a capacity to describe himself or herself without the 
principles at work in everyday life, those being: work, success, the accumulation 
of wealth and so forth. In other words, Lacan argues that ethics demands us to 
find something within ourselves around which an idea of authentic life can be 
constructed. The word ‘something’ here registers as desire, which Lacan asks 
us to consider in terms of a pure desire, this being, a desire realized through its 
own impossibility and for that reason, one that needs to be sublimated. He also 
tells us that ethics and the construction of an authentic self comes at a price, 
and that the willingness to pay this price, which in an extreme situation 
correlates with a capacity to put one’s own body at risk, represents the conduct 
of an ethical being and its construction.  
 
During the present chapter I focused more on the negative approach to ethics, 
for reasons that as I’ve explained before have to do with an attempt to establish 
a dialogue between my argument and recent events, However, what I have tried 
to do throughout this thesis was, on the whole, to show that the positivity 
inherent to the concept of hero, makes it particularly adequate for the task of 
reimagining the ethical and the political subject.  
 
Along the way, it was demonstrated that the very notion of hero ties in with 
invention and the construction of narratives and that it presents itself as an 
articulation of the ethical-political subject based on questions of meaning, or 
rather, on the question of what is meaningful. My central claim was that it is 
useful to couple this articulation with sculptural figuration, which constitutes as it 
as were a technical support for an invented, impossible body, where ideas about 
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heroism can be rehearsed. A body whose relevancy can be expressed beyond 
the limits of the biological body, and crucially, beyond the dimension of the 
individual; an ‘incarnation of the impossible’ that can, if only tentatively, be seen 
as a physical counter part to the Lacanian ‘petite object a’ - the withdrawing, 
fleeting, unreachable object of ‘desire’, that sculpture, as a kind of transitional 
object, is capable of doubling and make attainable by means of externalization. 
 
Indeed, if we consider Lacan’s argument saying that an infinite ethical demand 
requires a commitment that cannot be completely realized through a living body, 
it is perhaps not completely out of sense, one might claim, to consider figurative 
sculpture as a medium through which an articulation of ethics and politics can 
be carried out. With a nod to Antigone and how death is the vehicle of 
Antigone’s ethical being, it is important to bring to mind that the body in 
sculpture, a body without life, carries a relationship with the idea of death, or 
more exactly with the anticipation of death. This because it enables us to think 
of human beings as objects and therefore operates as a reminder of the 
condition of the body as being that of a future object.  
 
And yet, the theme of death does not exhaust the body in sculpture. This body 
can work as a reminder of mortality for sure, but it also represents the possibility 
for composing and inscribing ideas in a material support and in that sense the 
opportunity to engender a body that represents life by means other than life.  
 
This is related to composition, which for the most part I have discussed in 
Chapter Three. I used the neologism composition-without-essences to describe 
the principles of composition in terms of functional coherence, as opposed to 
formal coherence, and also to describe how this allows for a consideration of the 
body as being composed of heterogenous parts. What amounts to the claim that 
figurative sculpture lets us build a dialectical becoming-object precisely through 
its capacity for making us think about the human being as an object and the 
possibilities opened by composition; these being those associated with the 
opportunity to reinvent the body and change the meaning of different objects 
through a series of interactions established with the human form. Meanwhile, 
using the figure of the hero as a conceptual framework for composition means 
that attempts are being made to articulate the ethical and political subject and 
rethink the value of objects outside the logic of consumerism. Thus, what 
figurative sculpture is capable of doing is, in conclusion, to present the subject 
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not to himself but to rearticulated versions of himself through its materiality. This 
brings us to the question of presence and hence to space, which is the theme of 
the next and last section of the chapter and thesis. 
 
 
The space of figurative sculpture 
 
 
In order to speak about the space of figurative sculpture, I need to keep the 
connection with Derrida’s notion of democracy as a space of promise going on, 
so let us first consider this: in The Spectres of Marx Derrida associates this 
notion with the theme of hospitality, notably illustrated with a parable of 
democracy as a house with a room always ready to receive the absent friend, 
that being, the friend-to-come. As the title of the book indicates, the question is 
related to the condition of the spectral and to the necessity to invoke and 
conjure, indeed to house, the many spectres of Marx. Significantly, Derrida 
seems to suggest that there is a necessity for some sort of language of spirits at 
the heart of a democracy; a language to speak with, and give voice to those who 
are no longer here and those that are not yet here, thus somewhere between 
being and non-being. Furthermore, the centrality of Hamlet in The Spectres of 
Marx, which is a play concerned predominantly with the themes of revenge and 
injustice, leaves no doubt of the continuing importance that justice plays for the 
author. However, the book is also about apparitions and its spaces, and 
therefore, about representation and representability – or more exactly, about the 
right of what only exists in the form of spectre to have some form of political 
representation. Taking this as a cue, I will now talk about figurative sculpture, 
which in a way is also a form of apparition caught between being and non-
being255. I will consider this with reference to the question of space, referring 
mostly to urban, exterior spaces that have public access.  
 
A discussion about public space is perhaps not the most obvious way in which 
to engage and support the ideas of sculpture as presented thus far. This 																																																								
255 It is in The Specters of Marx that Derrida coins the now over-used term ‘hauntology’ - which he uses to 
describe the paradoxical condition of ‘the spectre’ existing between being and non-being, as well as the idea of 
‘present’ as existing in relation to a time that is not only that of the ‘present’. Writing on the matter, Rorty has 
observed that the term suggests an attempt to trace the authority of what is ‘hunting’ and in that sense betrays 
Derrida’s own project by not evacuating “all theology, all ontology” (for citation source see below).  Despite the 
currency of the term and its potential use to describe figurative sculpture’s ‘hunting’ affect, in agreeing with 
Rorty’s point I have made the decision not to use the term. For more on this see: Richard Rorty, 
“Deconstruction and circumvention” in Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and others. Philosophical papers. 
Vol. 2., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 91-99 
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connection risks sounding outmoded and does, indeed, carry several problems 
regarding production and rights to engage with public space - problems that 
appear under the guise of legal questions of use, funding and therefore relations 
of power. These problems are outside the scope of the discussion here but the 
question of space itself cannot be completely ignored. In fact, we know the 
weakening of the material and historical legitimacy of figurative sculpture 
coincides with the decline of the monument at the beginning of the 20th century, 
and crucially, with a progressive disinvestment in legitimate public spaces after 
that.  
 
Significantly, one of the things the Occupy movement was able to show was that 
physical space still matters. That despite all the new platforms of public-ness 
that exist today, notably those being Internet-based, and despite the bankruptcy 
of a notion of public space as a place for free speech and unconditional access - 
as demonstrated by the often violent, and yet legal actions taken against non-
violent protesters during the Occupy Movement - urban spaces still play an 
important role as a stage for gatherings and civic representations. Working 
along the recognition that public space still matters but also that it is now a half 
artificial concept, what I propose next is something of a thought experiment, or 
more precisely a speculation, on the implications of figurative sculpture using 
the paradigm of space.  
 
So let me first formulate a question. Writing on the aftermath of Occupy Wall 
Street and the events that occurred at Tahrir square, W.J.T. Mitchell has 
suggested that the image that best captured the iconography of non-sovereignty 
and the refusal of an individual face in favour of the multitude, is the image of 
the empty square256. An image that furthermore fixes the refusal to describe in 
detail what was attempted there, and that hence remains appropriately, like the 
events, in a state of potential: that being, in a continuous and inexhaustible 
preparation for a democracy to come. At first, one might assume this image of 
an empty square to have little, if anything to do with sculpture. However, when 
considering the history of modern sculpture describing the passage from an idea 
of the sculptural without plinth to that with a space without sculpture, that being 
a space that involves the viewer in a direct and immediate way, then it is 
																																																								
256 See William J.T. Mitchell, “Image, Space, Revolution: The Arts of Occupation” in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 39. 
Nº , Autumn 2012, 8-32 
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perhaps possible to establish a parallel between an empty square and the 
historical dematerialization of sculpture.  
 
Now, thinking of a comparison between this image and Derrida’s parable of 
democracy as a house that needs a guestroom, what would happen if we 
challenge this dematerialization and add the perspective of sculptural figures to 
the claim that spaces of democracy are informal and open spaces of potential 
occupancy? What might this alternative approach mean in terms of how we 
consider those spaces? 
 
Two authors will help me to establish a quick transition here and to prepare for a 
discussion on what sort of work sculptural figures do in space. The first is the 
American poet Wallace Stevens, who can be frequently found in the writings of 
Alain Badiou and Simon Critchley, and more importantly, who writes beautifully 
about the concrete world of things. He is both a poet and a phenomenologist 
often writing about and through metaphors of statues and the condition of public 
space257. For instance in The American Sublime, a short poem from 1936, he 
begins by asking his reader to consider how one might pose a statue aiming to 
convey an idea of the sublime, when knowing of the vulnerability to “the 
mockers, The mickey mockers”258. At first he appears to dismiss the idea, telling 
us that all the sublime requires is the “landscape and that (…) The spirit and 
space, The empty spirit In vacant space”259. Yet, and right at the end of his 
poem, Stevens suggests we need some form of symbolization posing questions 
such as, “what wine does one drink? What bread does one eat?”260. In a later 
publication titled The necessary angel. Essays on Reality and the Imagination 
from 1951, he picks up the question of public sculpture once more, of the 
equestrian statue to be more precise. Here he starts again by recognizing the 
danger of anachronism when referring to the connotation with the idea of nobility 
found in sculpture, but then moves on to argue about the importance of “an 
interdependence of imagination and reality as equal”261 for the necessity to think 
about what poetry can be in a given time: in this case, in a country like America 
dealing with the Great Depression and scars remaining from the First World 																																																								
257 For more on sculpture in the poetry of Wallace Stevens, see: Michael North, “The American Monument: 
Stevens, Berryman, and Lowell” in Michael North, The Final Sculpture. Public Monuments and Modern Poets, 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985, 185-228 
258 Wallace Stevens, Collected Poems, London, Faber and Faber, 2006, 112 
259 Ibid. 
260 Ibid.	
261 Wallace Stevens, “The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words” in, Wallace Stevens The necessary angel. 
Essays on Reality and the Imagination, New York, Alfred A Knopf, 1951, 27 
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War. In other words, despite recognizing that sculpture infringes the attention for 
the ordinary that substantiates a great part of his own work, he argues that 
statues represent important vehicles in order to construct and edify collective 
meaning, by bringing together the poetic and the material.  
 
The second author I wish to reference is Henri Lefebvre, who in The Urban 
Revolution from 1970, which is recognised as a precedent to his better-known 
The Production of Space, speaks of the value and challenges brought forth by 
the problematic condition of the monument in the post-industrial environment of 
the 1960s and 1970s262. He writes for and against the monument, against the 
repressive nature of the monument that creates a space essentially “colonized 
and oppressed”263, that presents symbols to “social awareness and 
contemplation (passive) just when those symbols, already out-dated, are 
starting to lose their meaning”264. Speaking for the monument, he recognises it 
as being antithetical to the fluidity of modern life, but also as an object that 
provides the opportunity for figuring collective hopes that have not succumb to 
the logic of capitalism and that go beyond the desire to reinstall elements of a 
traditional urban environment, calling it “the only conceivable or imaginable site 
of collective (social) life in the modern world”265.  
 
Neither Stevens’s nor Lefebvre’s position rely on an appearance/reality 
distinction but instead focus on the fact that sculpture is capable of making 
appearances part of the unity of reality. In other words, they do not present the 
sort of preoccupation with truth, about what sort of object a sculpture is as may 
be found in other writings on sculpture, but instead are concerned with what 
these sculptural figures are capable of doing for a given society.  As both 
authors point out, this involves a potential to symbolize and politicize space.  
 
However, both do speak of the dangers associated with figurative sculpture, and 
in so doing, suggest that the presence of sculpture in public space demands for 
attention to be given not only to the construction of sculptural figures but also to 
the possibility of their destruction. Writing on this matter, Howard Caygill has 
argued that, despite the dominant aesthetic tradition being one that considers 																																																								
262 Here I am relying on an introduction to Lefebvre’s text published in Jon Wood, David Hulks, Alex Potts, 
eds., Modern Sculpture Reader, 297 
263 Lefebvre, quoted from an exceprt published in the volumed citated above. Ibid.   
264 Ibid., 298 
265 Ibid.	
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the artwork primarily in terms of its coming-into-existence, we cannot ignore the 
fact that artworks, from the outset, exchange energy with the surroundings and 
therefore are in a permanent state of going-out-of-existence: a process that on 
the one hand can be controlled and decelerated through the work of 
preservation, and on the other, radically accelerated in moments of 
destruction266.  
 
Thus, alongside the priority of truth and the evacuation of illusion, the absence 
of narratives on the perspective of destruction has left the importance of 
sculpture in key moments of political emancipation and change largely unwritten 
in the history of art. One can conclude that this is another factor that contributes 
to a negative assessment of sculptural figuration. The long history of attacks on 
sculptures and the polemics that almost always takes place when it comes to 
installing sculptural figures in public space, still today after over two centuries of 
modern thought - if we are to consider the French Revolution as the inaugural 
event of Modernity –shows that the presence of sculptural figures in a space 
shared by people is not taken lightly. Of course one can also be unconcerned 
about preservation or the destruction of these artworks, but sculpture continues 
to show the contrary. At some point it seems that the un-quite stillness of these 
objects cannot be ignored and that, in fact, sculptural figures ask to be noticed 
and at the same time carry an invitation to an attack on their parts.   
 
Centuries of scientific thought and attempts to extinguish magical thinking were 
unable to put an end to the capacity sculptural figures have to disturb people 
who share space with them. This raises a focal question, that question being, if 
sculptural figures are indeed unimportant, dumb objects of illusion, how might 
we understand all the effort that goes into attacking or erecting sculptural figures 
in the first instance? Surely sculptures have no spirit – nobody is there to upset 
us and everyone knows that – so why do we struggle when negotiating the 
presences of these objects? Parallel in a way to what happens with the 
importance of physical space, what we do know is that the materiality of 




266 See Howard Caygill “The Destruction of Art” in, Diarmuid Costello, Dominic Willsdon, eds., The Life and 
Death of Images. Ethics and Aesthetics, London, Tate Publishing, 2008, 163-173    
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Hence why it is necessary to attempt to understand better the implications of the 
spatial relations produced by figurative sculpture. We know that sculptures in 
space produce a figure/ground relation that exists without the logic of a fixed 
frame (and where it is the figure itself what operates as a field to organize formal 
relations and meaning). They can be seen from different distances and offer 
views from varying sides depending on the relative position of the viewer. More 
importantly, this means that although the figure, that being the idea being 
represented, comes into being imaginatively, it also shares with the viewer a 
common space.  
 
To comprehend the specificities of figures in space, I would like to borrow some 
ideas from Heidegger who turned to sculpture in a latter phase of his work in 
order to reflect upon and discuss the relations between bodies and space267. 
Heidegger has taught us that space is a medium of exchange and that we can 
identify three types of space in a situation of cohabitation between humans and 
objects: the first being the space internal to sculpture; the second, the space 
internal to the body; and the third, the most important in my view, being that of 
the surface of the sculpture268. This introduces a notion of limits, not as the place 
where objects end but rather where they begin - that which allows for objects to 
be introduced to the surroundings and participate in the multiple relations found 
therein. It is through this third space that an object appears and radiates 
throughout a multiplicity of relations.  
 
Recognising the limitation of objects - the division between matter and the void 
that defines the shape - in terms of a beginning rather than of a confinement, 
implies that even if bodies and objects have their own internal space, they 
always exist in relation to each other and therefore, that there is always a 
common space between two or more elements, which mutually influence the 
other through a series of interactions. According to this view a work of art, 
indeed the thingness of an object, can never really exists as a thing-in-itself. Its 
condition instead, is that of being in the world as a matter of relations and 
relating to the presence of elements, objects and bodies around it, which is 
consistent with another important idea found in Heidegger’s theory, that the 
origin of the work of art runs from work to origin rather than being the other way 																																																								
267 Andrew J. T. Mitchell gives a concise and valuable account of the relationship between Heidegger’s  
thought   and sculpture in Andrew J.T. Mitchell, Heidegger among the Sculptors. Body, Space, and the Art of 
Dwelling, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010   
268 The relation between object and space in Heidegger is easier to read in texts such Art and Space, The 
Origin of the Work and Art, and even The Question Concerning Technology. 
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around, thus from what it does instead of from what it is269.  
 
In this sense, it is complicated to say that objects that one might think of as 
being self-contained exclude context. Instead we might say that objects are in 
tension with their spatial context and are able to influence the scheme of 
relations existing around them. It is this dynamic, between the body of viewers 
and figures in space, together with the necessity to negotiate the presence with 
the latter, that I think can explain, partially at least, the psychological affect and 
the reactions that figurative sculpture can produce on a community.  
 
This leads us to appreciate the difference between the spatial dynamic 
produced by figurative sculpture and the neutral space of minimal art, where 
different viewers engage with the work in a similar way, that is, purely on a 
physical basis and without predetermining differentiating factors. This is the 
kernel of the claim that minimal art achieves a democratic form of presentation. 
An argument that has found its urban equivalent in the non-historical, normally 
abstract, monuments one is likely to find in plazas next to office buildings in 
westernized metropolis – and that came to proliferate in cities during the 1980s 
when a renewed interest in the condition of the monument took place, and 
significantly, during a so-called time of economic prosperity. Like the gallery 
counterparts, these works also claim a sense of neutrality and a universal 
condition. Indeed, somewhere located between the category of sculpture and 
urban furniture, such works, which to all intent and purposes are sometimes 
purely decorative, could be located anywhere without much difference.  
 
In fact, at this point we might consider how, in her seminal essay titled 
“Sculpture in the Expanded Field“ Krauss locates the historical origin of the 
double-negativity that she believes has come to define the condition of post-
modern sculpture as non-landscape and non-architecture. She reasons that the 
appearance of multiple editions of the same artwork in different places and the 
loss of the plinth during the turn of the 19th century, jettisoned the logic of 
celebration traditionally associated to a specific place and event; paving the way 
for an almost self-referential sculpture which determines its own conditions of 
meaning.  
 																																																								
269 I am of course referring to the general thesis gathered in the abovementioned essay The Origin of The 
Work of Art. 
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One crosses the threshold of the logic of the 
monument, entering the space of what could be 
called its negative condition – a kind of 
sitelessness, or homelessness, an absolute loss 
of place. Which is to say one enters modernism, 
since it is the modernist period of sculptural 
production that operates in relation to this loss of 
site, producing the monument as abstraction, the 
monumental as pure marker or base, functionally 
placeless and largely self-referential270.    
 
 
There is no question that the use of the plinth and the presentation of a unique 
sculpture upon it found in a specific site establishes a strong relation with the 
given space it is situated in271. But even in the absence of these conditions, the 
body in sculpture establishes a relation with space that is very different to that 
produced by a minimal type of artwork. The figure can create a tension with a 
cultural context, because the human form, one might say, is a universal signifier 
and is capable of saying something to everyone, but not in the same way, 
everywhere.  And even in the absence of its historical function to symbolize a 
specific site, figurative sculpture maintains a capacity to politicize space, 
because it produces a scene where the viewer has to negotiate his own 
presence with the subject “embodied” in plastic form and with what it arrives at 
representing (even if unspecific or anonymous) within that given context. In 																																																								
270 Rosalind E.  Krauss, The originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, 280 
271 In connection to this Auguste Rodin’s famous work The Burghers of Calais, 1884-95, is often regarded as 
the marker for the abolition of the plinth and the logic of fixing figures to a specific site. Different editions of the 
work can be found in various places around the world and are normally presented in a similar conditions to 
what documents reveal Rodin intended for the display of the work: that being, at ground level, - rather than the 
conventional height reserved for figurative sculptures representing ideals of religious orders or the authority of 
rulers. However, we also know that the commission set by the city of Calais finally decided to go against 
Rodin’s intention and in 1895 publically display the work for the first time on top of a 5ft base. More 
importantly, several existing photographs show that Rodin himself experimented with different heights for the 
work to be display, all the way from ground level up to the level of a two-story building. In other words, the 
development of the work underwent a series of artistic experiments as well as negotiations with Calais city 
authorities. In a recent publication, theorists Eva Grubinger and Jörg Heiser, have established an interesting 
comparison between the negotiations that took place and the height of this work, establishing what they call 
the negation of negotiation with site and audience in Minimal art, as it manifested in the bureaucratic 
procedures leading up to the installation of Richard Serra’s Tilted Arch and in the process leading to its 
removal (1981-1989). A comparison between a work that marks the transition to a “self-reflexive 
communication –a negotiation- between the artist and the citizens about their respective status” and another 
that “staged the crisis of the symbolic function of the public artwork as a severe traumatic rift.” Eva Grubinger, 
Jörg Heiser, “Introducing Sculpture Unlimited”, in Eva Grubinger, Jörg Heiser, eds., Sculpture Unlimited, 
Berlin, Stenberg Press, 2011, 7-18 	
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essence, it is a question of cohabitation that again is maybe easier to 
understand in its negative sense by bringing to mind the weight of having to 
share space with a figure that has become oppressive.  
 
So maybe figurative sculpture does in fact stand opposed to the fluidity of the 
modern world. But one might also claim that this, in a way, is also its strength. 
As I have already observed, figurative sculpture asks viewers to activate a mode 
of deceleration, to alter their rhythm, as they traverse space, thereby working 
against the acceleration of life as experienced under the conditions of neo-
liberalism, but still there is more. While it is not necessary to discuss these 
questions in detail here, it remains relevant to note that figurative sculpture 
resists the logic of circulation because of difficulties associated with transport, 
and more importantly, because sculptural figures, who don’t accept all meaning, 
challenge the sense of local belonging that a given community might have; 
standing directly opposed to the relatively passive circulation of commodities.  
 
And at the same time that it denies an immediate, instantaneous, perception of 
forms (and not being flat is of a course a determinant factor here), a figure in 
space invites the viewer to move around it, and in so doing begs attention, 
which means it slows down one’s rhythm when crossing this space. Imagining 
this against a contemporary urban scenario and we might conclude that 
figurative sculpture is indeed in conflict with the accelerated rhythms of the 
cityscape. Likewise, we can also say that because it is not frontal, sculpture is 
antagonistic to public advertising billboards and the presence of screens that 
have come to dominate the visual landscape of the city.  
 
With this being said, a short detour is required to make an important connection 
between the question of representation and what I discussed at the beginning of 
the thesis. On the first pages, I made a reference to Corner Relief from 1913 
(fig. 1), and how in this work Vadlimir Tatlin presented a radical gesture, which 
consisted of moving shapes from the pictorial space into the real space, thus 
grounding a refusal of representation that would put sculpture on the path for the 
sort of concrete materiality later explored by Minimalism. In the words of 
Benjamin Buchloh, Corner Relief, which acts as the antecedent project for the 
more well-known Monument to the Third international from 1919-1920, and 
Marcel Duchamp’s Readymades, established two main poles of sculptural 
reflection in Modernism and ultimately defined the conditions leading to the 
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dissolution of the material and historical legitimacy of sculpture as a separated 
discourse. Then further suggesting that post-modern sculpture represents 
nothing more than a regressive analysis of these same conditions, which it is 
unable to overcome. Speaking of these two moments:  
 
They recognize the dialectics of sculpture from 
now to be operative either as a model for the 
artistic production of reality (e.g. sculpture’s 
transition toward architecture and design) or as 
an epistemic model that investigates the status 
and conditions of aesthetic objects production 
(the ready made, the allegory, the fetish).272  
 
 
Minimalism conciliates the two models Buchloh speaks of. It explores the 
material specificity of objects and rethinks the status of the aesthetic object by 
evacuating representation and stripping works from the paradigm of originality. 
Having established how the refusal of representation in art, i.e. illusion, appears 
associated with a preoccupation with truth and an attempt to demystify the 
sculptural object - a reflection that leaves out the question of what sculpture is 
capable of doing, along the lines of what Buchloh tells us it seems logical to 
conclude that the question of truth is at the basis of sculpture’s loss of legitimacy 
as a separated discourse.  
 
A possible inference here is that sculpture, as a specific discourse, depends 
largely upon figuration. For we can recognize in the capacity of sculpture to 
represent something in space a possibility that distinguishes it from other 
material-related disciplines, such as design or architecture. A capacity that 
offers a certain autonomy to objects, an autonomy seen in terms of the 
opportunity to organize meaning through elements of plastic form and 
part/whole relations, and thus to attribute such object, such composition, with an 
intelligence that becomes proper to itself; which inversely is also a capacity that 
takes away such autonomy by allowing for an object to relate to something other 
than itself.  																																																								
272 Benjamin Buchloh, “Michael Asher and the Conclusion of Modern Sculpture” in Jon Wood, David Hulks, 
Alex Potts, eds., Modern Sculpture Reader, 359  	
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Once we depart from the self-reflexivity of sculpture to focuses on the physical 
structures of objects as a mode of analysing the real, then a third dialectical way 
is open for sculpture, which specifically, in terms of the human figure, becomes 
operative as a mode of rearticulating the subject through the materiality of 
sculpture. Furthermore this allows for the juxtaposition of different materialities 
and procedures whilst creating a chain of signification around the human figure; 
a chain where the meaning of the first can be modified, composed, and 
subordinated to the latter, to human concerns.  
 
Additionally, in contrast to the neutral space and the kind of democratic 
presentations proposed by minimal art, or minimal-inspired art, figurative 
sculpture re-enacts the idea of democracy understood as space of constant 
negotiation, allowing for the possibility of disagreement. But perhaps what 
makes figurative sculpture more relevant in terms of its (here speculative) 
relation to urban space is this: it is antithetical to the way spaces with public 
access are increasingly used to organize habits of consumerism, because it 
engenders the possibility of the reimagined subject to be represented in a 
shared space, whilst functioning as a potential site for conflict of opinions 
regarding who, or more exactly what, is being represented. In other words, the 
stubbornness of the sculptural figure introduces, and one might say literary, a 
sense of gravity in a time of urgency.  
 
Having said that, I would like to come back to the question raised initially, that 
being, what figurative sculpture might mean in terms of how we consider what 
constitutes the democratic space. It seems to me that part of the meaning 
sculptural figures acquired once located in a public space results largely from 
the fact that these figures function as a declaration of importance and as a 
metaphor for a public type of being. Having this in mind, what I have attempted 
to show is that we can think about the hero as a concept for figuration – as an 
idealism necessary to re-enchant the world in disappointing times – in the sense 
that it registers a passage from questions of action to question of being, from 
what to do, into who to be for instance, without connecting to a claim to truth. A 
passage that as previously discussed with reference to Critchley, is not about 
understanding how ethical subjectivity can be experienced but rather, how the 
ethical-political subject can be re-described beyond the time of an experience. 
And it is under those terms that the hero, which as established is an impersonal 
but not abstract notion that opens into an experience of decidability, seems to 
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help us to deal with the impossibility to be a subject capable of meeting an 
infinite demand. This being again, as a conceit for the task of producing the 
vocabulary for drawing what a meaningful life might look like in terms of being 
an alternative to the instrumentalizing conditions of neo-liberalism.  
 
Sculpturally, what translates ideas about heroism is the combination of the 
human form with operations of composition, with different materials, procedures, 
plastic form, gesture and so forth. But sculpture of course, has a capacity, to 
make “redescriptions” available through concrete materials, and thus to 
compose a body-without-a-body, a body between being and non-being through 
which versions of a subject capable of introducing difference can be rehearsed, 
a commitment to this subject posited beyond the living body, and more 
importantly, staged in real space. This is what distinguishes sculpture for 
instance from literature: it literalizes what was established before as 
presentability and it is at once capable of inventing and physically externalizing 
ideas about the human subject. 
 
Before ending, I need to pick up a different thread. There is a profound divorce 
between present-day figurative work produced for outdoor, shareable spaces, 
and the debates one recognises to be driving the contemporary art world. It is 
important, therefore, to underline some key differences between what we 
commonly understand by ‘public space’, and the physical and discursive space 
of the gallery.  
 
Let us consider public spaces as areas of free access, with no physical barriers 
to prevent access and with no restriction in terms of the schedule of their 
access. As such, public spaces are fundamentally open spaces, where 
exchanges – symbolic and otherwise – can take place in a general manner. The 
space of the gallery, by contrast, is not always open and is normally connected 
to specific cultural circles and, therefore, to more restricted and more selective 
audiences.  
 
Hence, it is in public spaces that sculpture gains a true political consequence 
regardless of whether it involves some sort of political analogy or reference. It 
has political consequences simply because it occupies a space that is supposed 
to belong to all. Furthermore, in the context of this thesis, the problem of public 
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space becomes pivotal since it is there that the questions debated in relation to 
the hero – posited as a public type of being – gain a more clear expression.  
 
Yet, insofar as the art world constitutes a legitimate platform by which to 
measure the success of sculpture in the public realm, and let us assume it does, 
we can speak about a failure of the latter.  
 
As previously intimated, this failure can be associated with the deterioration of a 
legitimate notion of public space; more than that, it also registers a regression of 
artistic languages. Often limited to local homages, most figurative sculptures 
produced today appear dissociated from debates taking place within the field of 
art (which inversely reduces artistic legitimacy). In addition to this, the human 
form is frequently treated with an outmoded naturalistic approach that is often, if 
not to say most of the time, clearly compromised and impoverished by a lack of 
formal sophistication (not to mention the general absence of elements of 
questioning the very use of that language and not another).   
 
Two aspects stand out in this regard: present-day figurative work shows an 
increasing tendency to reduce the attention to volume, and a general lack of 
movement. Both aspects are emphasised by an exaggerated frontality, which 
furthermore compromises what I described above as sculpture’s resistance to 
the flatness of screens found throughout cities.  
 
The work of Stephan Balkenhol, a prolific artist in both the universe of art 
galleries as well as in that of art for public spaces, is an exception from whom 
we might take a few notes. His figures – most of them directly carved in wood by 
hand – have a great capacity to respond to the limitations and compromises of 
such a context with a surprising treatment of plastic form, inventiveness and 
understanding of the human figure. They clearly depart from the pseudo-
naturalistic languages so often found in outdoor figurative works. It is also 
important to note that Balkenhol develops his artistic investigation for the public 
sphere through the idea of the anonymous common man and common woman; 
this is often pointed out as his work’s most distinct and relevant quality.  
 
More than this, Balkenhol’s figures show a capacity to respond to the specific 
demands of different sites. Indeed, they normally show a great capacity to 
create a sense of site with adaptations of scale and of the viewing conditions, 
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while departing from the logic of celebration associated with important people or 
official events. This is further emphasised by Balkenhol’s recurrent choice of 
unlikely areas to place his figures, as notably exemplified by his 1992 project 
Head of a Man / Figure on a Buoy, shown in London, where Balkenhol made 
use of a bridge over the River Thames, and a buoy in the middle of it, to place 
his work.  
 
Furthermore, Balkenhol’s practice gives witness to the possibility of developing 
an artistic project based on figuration, without losing touch with key artistic 
debates. As Jeff Wall has noted273, Balkenhol’s practice can be aligned with 
major sculptural developments along two main poles over the last half-century: 
that of the sculptural object as a unified structure, epitomised by Minimalism; 
and the regime of the fragment, developed mostly by Art Povera and Art 
Povera-inspired art, with its interest for dismantling historical contexts and art’s 
universalising pretension as crucially expressed in the monument. The latter is a 
problem that Balkenhol precisely addresses with his continuous exploration of 
the human body – a form where the whole and the fragment coexist – and with 
his investigations into the condition of the statue – or more exactly: with his non-
historical, non-universalising and non-individualised figures.  
 
We might also remember again the work of Mark Manders, who, despite having 
no expression in the outdoors, offers us a glimpse into different possibilities for 
the integration of figures in space and the use of sculptural procedures. These 
possibilities have to do with the mechanics of Manders’ figuration; this, as 
suggested in the previous chapter, is distinctively achieved by his use of 
different elements and the overlapping of the conceptual and the physical 
function each element has for the construction of the figure as a whole. In turn, 
this is reinforced by the way Manders often lets the process of construction 
remain visible, and more specifically, the way he plays with the idea of figures in 
the making.  
 
The manner in which Manders combines what I’ve described as ‘a mode of 
making’ and ‘a mode of finding’ seems equally promising. Firstly, because 
similarly to what occurs in Balkenhol’s practice, Manders’ figurative work is 
largely achieved through the expression of manual work, and, inasmuch as 																																																								
273 see Jeff Wall, “An outline of a Context for Stephan Balkenhol’s work 1998” in Jean-François Chevrier, 
Thierry de Duve, Boris Groys, eds., Jeff Wall (Contemporary Artists Series), London: Phaidon, 2002, 94-101 
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manual work can be characterised by an opening to the accident and the 
unplanned, it then opens the way for the occurrence of the new. Secondly, 
because, following the use of different procedures – including assemblage and 
collage – Manders is able to combine made and invented forms with pre-existing 
sources; in that sense, he produces unexpected juxtapositions of different 
material realities.  
 
This seems relevant in terms of rethinking the figure for outdoor scenarios 
precisely because it maps out a strategy for putting the project of figuration in 
dialogue with the historical contingencies of today’s complex material reality. 
Adding to this, or rather arriving from this, the inventiveness with which Manders 
reworks the human form – freeing it from the rigour of anatomy – posits what 
could be well seen as a materialistic approach to representation in the sense 
that it never separates the figure from the (heterogeneous) material reality that 
composes it. In fact, in the context of Manders’ work, representation should be 
called figuration since it involves the construction of figures without attempting to 
correspond to something or someone that exists or existed. In parallel to this, by 
composing figures with the use of non-figurative elements, like furniture items or 
simple pieces of wood, Manders demonstrates how the human form can work to 
influence the meaning of objects and materials and subordinate these to the 
idea of the human.  
 
It is also important to underline that the space of the exhibition in Manders’ work, 
where figures often appear as if in a state of coming-into-being or coming-out-of-
being, operates on a metaphorical level as a space where viewers are invited to 
the place and time of the making of figures. It is a space where figures are still 
the promise of figures but where there is already something being brought forth, 
said and proposed in real space. By simply imagining an outdoor version of 
Manders’ work, this sketches the possibility to overcome the association 
between figurative sculpture and the monument, and to replace it with another 
association between figurative sculpture and the event of art. This is an 
association that posits sculptural figuration as a project that is never quite 
finished or final, and where, in parallel to the affirmation of figures in space, what 
is proposed is the possibility to introduce the new and, therefore, change.  
 
Appreciating the level of formal and conceptual sophistication found in the work 
of Balkenhol and Manders reveals some of the options available for 
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contemporary figurative sculpture thought for public space; these are options 
that come after post-minimal developments in the field of sculpture, as these 
were developed in more experimental spaces for art such as galleries, 
alternative exhibition spaces and sometimes even museums. Specifically, in 
terms of what I have suggested to be the marks of the general failure of public 
figurative sculpture, both show attention to volume and – this is particularly true 
of Balkenhol – attention to surface values; this reduces the frontality of figures 
and invites viewers to move around sculptures. In other words, Balkenhol and 
Manders help us to map out some ideas concerning how to rethink the language 
of figurative sculpture for public spaces and increase its artistic relevancy.  
 
However, in the terms being developed here, this map, as it were, is not 
completely satisfactory; it leaves out the question of local belonging, and a 
sense of gesture is still missing. Balkenhol’s figures, for example, reference a 
Western code of dress but don’t allow associations with specific places. And 
while it requires no effort to link Manders’ figures to ideas about life and death, 
an exploration of gesture – a gesture that would connect with the tragic sense of 
life and create an alternative space to the everyday – is absent.  
 
Before describing how thinking through the hero might change this, let us 
quickly go over some of the general aspects discussed in regards to the work of 
figurative sculpture. To begin with, it was established that the medium carries a 
connection with the tragic, which has to do with the way a figure presents itself 
as a body without life, and therefore announces death. In other words, figurative 
sculpture connects with the finitude of life but also with a form of existing beyond 
life; this expresses what I’ve called the ‘becoming-object’ of sculpture.  
 
It has also become possible to view figurative sculpture as a medium whose 
plasticity renders possible an artistic articulation of the subject through the 
reinvention of the body; this is to say, it makes it possible to imagine the body 
beyond the limits of the living, biological body. This is quite different from 
situations, such as situations of protest, where a subject is formed by the 
interrelation between an event and the living participants of that event. It is a 
process that, in being entirely dependent on the presence of living subjects and 
hostage to the duration of the event itself, hinders the affirmation of ideas being 
rehearsed beyond the time of the rehearsal itself. Sculpture, instead, is capable 
not only of rehearsing and proposing ideas but also of manifesting a subject in 
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its materiality and in that sense of answering to the separation between being 
and non-being, as well as to that between being and being-here. This pertains, 
of course, to the fact that sculpture produces a situation of cohabitation between 
living and non-living beings, where ideas about the subject can be rehearsed 
and become part of the material world and, borrowing from Latour, part of the 
social world as well. Under these terms, it was possible to say figurative 
sculpture combines transcendence and an immanent world. It was also 
reasoned that the figure operates as a vehicle for the transformed meaning of 
the different elements that compose it, while subordinating such meaning to the 
idea of the human.   
 
Along with ideas introduced with Stevens and Lefebvre, it was reasoned that 
sculptural bodies lend themselves to communal meaning by instantiating in real 
space (and therefore in a plane that enables sharing) that which imagination 
alone can produce. Stevens suggests that this holds relevancy because it allows 
for the figuring of collective, symbolic meaning. In turn, Lefebvre intimates that 
sculptural bodies are relevant because they give way to potential conflict and 
because their sculptural condition is antithetical to the acceleration of life and to 
how urban space is increasingly organised to facilitate acts of consumerism.   
 
In this scenario, using the hero as platform to rethink the possibilities of 
figurative sculpture – possibilities that are amplified and crucially brought into 
question in public areas – involves an attempt to give form to a collective 
narrative and, at the same time, to introduce some form of difference; this, in 
turn, means without avoiding potentially controversial ideas. In fact, as 
previously discussed, the very notion of the hero is formed in culture, where it 
registers as a reflection of the instable and non-universal condition of meaning, 
which is to say, on the changing and always contextualised implications of what 
we mean by saying that something is meaningful. This also suggests that using 
the hero as a conceit of figuration involves searching for the significant new, the 
relevant gesture and, crucially, for ways to translate this into plastic form. 
 
It was reasoned that the problems of the hero could be translated into four 
principles of composition. At this point, it is sufficient to say that apart from 
answerability, which has to do with the way the hero works as a situated 
concept, these include the more self-explanatory principles of difference, 
negotiation and intensity. In addition to these principles and how they might 
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influence the practice of sculpture (where one might consider the hero as a 
methodology of work – or more exactly, as a principle of sculptural research), it 
is relevant to underline here again the importance of gesture and, therefore, at 
least in a sense, of movement. This seems vital for a renewed understanding of 
figurative sculpture and specifically for breaking free from the neutral, inactive, 
even pacified attitudes that seem to inform and dominate today’s compositional 
understanding of sculptural bodies (especially those found in public spaces).  
 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that the very notion of the hero, hence 
the present approach to sculpture, depends on a continuous process of 
negotiating what constitutes heroism and because of that, that the hero has to 
be nominated. On the other hand, it also seems right to say that the connection 
between heroism and sculpture is not exhausted with nomination because such 
connection always depends on narrative; rather, it depends on the sort of 
narratives that are constructed, over and over again, around the question of 
what the word hero actually signifies and, therefore, on the stories this or that 
sculpture presents. In a way, figurative sculpture always stays dependent on 
narrative, or to be more precise on language; this is because, although it works 
through the use of referents, plastic form cannot fully determine the meaning of 
a figure.  
 
Surely, something similar could be said about minimal art, which, as observed in 
the first chapter, is supported by a complex work of theory and is thus also 
dependent on the use of language. However, there is an important difference: 
although we may view both minimal art and figurative art as being intertwined 
with the use of language – be it in terms of theoretical thought or narrative – 
unlike the first, the latter lends itself to redescription and therefore to creating 
versions of the rearticulated subject. More than this, figurative sculpture allows 
for such redescription to take place through the physical world of objects. In so 
doing, especially if we consider the case of public space and the encounter that 
can potentially be staged therein between living people and non-living subjects, 
it also allows the inscription of such a subject in a space of symbolic exchanges 
where it can produce either influence or the will to overcome that which is 
instantiated in space.  
 
Using terms closely associated with the writing of Rorty, we can say that the 
utility of using the hero as a conceit of figuration consists of introducing a priority 
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to invent, and make available, a vocabulary for the extraordinary (which, as I 
hope to have demonstrated, constitutes a political necessity) within processes of 
redescription. This utility can also be explained in terms of replacing the logic of 
critique – and its preoccupation with truth and deconstructing the structures of 
the real – with a positive affirmation that simultaneously presents itself as a way 
of investigating and rehearsing alternative forms of what meaningful life might 
involve. As seen more recently, this investigation is produced along the 
experiences of decidability and presentability found at the heart of the concept 
of the hero. So, in short, the latter constitutes a form of idealism that opens into 
the possibility to exchange questions about what reality is, for questions to do 
with what reality, or more exactly what the subject of reality, could be.  
 
Once we consider the context of public space and its political dimension, the 
marriage between the problematics of the hero and figurative sculpture turns 
into an opportunity to give a body to a subject of collective meaning; this 
presents an opportunity to articulate a subject-to-come, to make this subject 
public and to invite it to the scene of politics. This is close to what, earlier on, 
was named sculpture’s third dialectical way. Furthermore, because of the 
concept at play, this articulation asks for the work of figuration to be situated, 
and for the rehearsing of compositional gestures where concerns might be 
brought into question and recomposed through a dialogue between the human 
form and the material world.   
 
So, introducing the hero as a strategy to rethink figurative sculpture adds to how 
artists such as Balkenhol and Manders are helping us to redefine the language 
of contemporary figurative sculpture in the following ways: it implies a non-
personal mode of figuration and, at the same time, departs from the idea of 
anonymity (which, as previously suggested, represents a subject that is not yet 
articulated). Put in different terms, thinking through the hero involves an 
articulation of, or at least an attempt to articulate, a subject and, more 
specifically, a subject capable of introducing difference. This implies not only an 
attempt to situate the work of figuration but an effective search, as I have been 
insisting over the last few paragraphs, for a relevant gesture that, on the level of 
the human form, announces movement. If we think about the figure as a 
heterogeneous structure, then using the hero as strategy for the work of 
figuration presupposes a choice of elements that may somehow relate to 
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important questions and necessities (and that may help to question and redefine 
those necessities).   
 
Now, just before finishing, I need to take a second to try and answer two 
questions that are inevitably raised by what I have proposed. The first question 
has to do with the criteria used to distinguish between good and bad sculpture. 
In the present context, this is equal to the problem of knowing which sort of 
sculptures would correlate to the idea of heroism and how this could be 
successfully achieved.   
 
Defining stable criteria, which could somehow lay the basis for aesthetic 
judgement, was not the aim of this thesis. What has been attempted here 
appears, instead, as a territory for rethinking figuration, through a concept that 
undermines the notion of representation as correspondence and replaces it with 
representation or, more exactly, figuration as construction. This territory, as it 
were, was also considered for reflecting upon the political implications of 
figurative sculpture and, hence, on what sort of work it creates outside the scope 
of art.  
 
That which I have discussed points towards a situated figuration and involves, 
therefore, the collapse of any fixed rules for the definition of good and bad 
sculpture. On the other hand, one could also mention the capacity that a given 
figure has to enter a dialogue with the context in which it is located – a capacity 
to somehow disturb and propose something new as a form of criteria, albeit one 
that is permanently changing.  
 
Thus, what was attempted was a framework that invites the project of figuration 
to be considered and, in a way, evaluated according to its ongoing capacity to 
bring into question problems of meaning and create versions of the 
rearticulated, or recomposed, subject. This, according to its capacity to speak 
the language of its time, to take on board debates central to such a time, and to 
answers, in a no regulated way, to a given context by rehearsing meaningful 
gestures.  
 
Now, in an age of cultural contingency such as our own, where contexts are 
permanently changing, it seems necessary to think about strategies that may be 
used to avoid the threat of a continuous disintegration of artistic discourses. This 
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brings us to the second question, which somehow has a more immediate 
answer and has already been anticipated in what is discussed above. It seems 
impossible to predict a way for artists to avoid such a threat and, following all 
that has been established, this would not necessarily be a good thing either; not 
if one assumes that art ought to be accountable to life and, therefore, ought to 
relate to the changing realities and contingencies of its time. 
 
In fact, once seen as a conceit of figuration, we can actually identify the hero as 
a strategy for (not) avoiding the threat of a discursive collapse. This is because it 
presents itself as a mode of investigating questions of meaning that necessarily 
looks for what introduces difference while involving a form of negotiation 
concerning what constitutes significance within a given historical ‘site’.  
 
So if I’m to generalize hugely, which I believe I can at this concluding stage, 
what I have done here amounts to a move away from the prevailing idea of art 
as life into another mode of thinking about art as capable of providing an answer 
to life: a move built on the notion of representation as construction and process. 
Hence in this context, the word ‘idealism’ signifies something that is immanent – 
a kind of idealism that comes to the fore as a positive affirmation through 
processes of construction and non-metaphysical negotiations about what counts 
as heroism. And sculpture is well capable of underscoring this immanence for its 
materiality affirms its own artifice. In other words, the combination of the hero 
and figurative sculpture constitutes an immanent form of idealism that never 
takes you out of this world – because the materiality of figurative sculpture is 
never fully suspended – and that instead enables the creation of physical 
versions of a reconfigured world.  
 
In conclusion, the potential of figurative sculpture to politicize space is perhaps 
more visible in negative terms, in moments when figures come under attack and 
become a means of overcoming collective trauma. In fact I cannot stop thinking 
that given the shortage of new figurative projects such opportunities will soon be 
exhausted. But whilst attacks on figures might prove the vitality of sculpture as a 
discourse in its own right, my concern here has been with the positivity of the 
hero as a concept of figuration and its possible uses for the construction and 
reconstruction of collective narratives. With the thesis coming full circle with 
Derrida’s ideas presented at beginning of this section, together the hero and 
sculpture constitute a form of rearticulating and give appearance to a subject-to-
	 220	
come, someone who might no longer be here or not yet here, a subject that 
might include the human as well as the non-human and with whom it might be 
important and useful to speak with, to conjure, and most of all, to share space 
with. A means, in other words, of politicizing space and considering who is to be 
considered and what is a concern by staging a physical and dialectical 
encounter between humanity and what symbolically represents that humanity 
beyond itself.  
 
Thus, if only by using a fictional approach to the question, the implications of 
figurative sculpture for an understanding of public space might perhaps be 
described in terms of the possibility presented by sculpture, to stage scenes of 
cohabitation between living beings and artistic articulations, or more exactly 
artistic attempts to articulate ideas, in this case, about the ethical-political 
subject.  
 
Admittedly, this proposal and this thesis in general, have limitations, and more 
importantly, some provisions. The first limitation is this: the hero needs to be 
nominated and this limits what is possible to achieve in sculpture. More than 
that, nomination, and narrative it can be added, cannot refer to the name of 
specific individuals because this will sit within a personal category. Additionally, 
the hero represents a positive affirmation but also something found in a constant 
dialogue with reality, therefore in a constant need of revision; thus being, a 
positive affirmation within a series of substitutions. A similar movement, so to 
speak, is reflected in the history of assaults on sculptural figures, which brings 
me to the provisions. Schematically: if at times figurative sculpture presents 
itself as a privileged means for overcoming and substituting a symbolic order, or 
at least, for expressing a collective will to do so, then destruction cannot be 
ignored as a sculptural procedure. Furthermore, composition and destruction 
need to be seen as two poles of the same logic. Inversely, this implicates the 
challenging scenario where it is possible for those who might encounter figures 
in space to somehow contribute to their composition274, that is, to become 																																																								
274 In the same article where W.J.T. Mitchell speaks about the empty square as the iconic image of protest, 
which is  mentioned earlier in the main text, the author reminds us that the large figure, i.e. Goddess of 
Democracy, made by art students during the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen square. Thus suggesting 
that, in opposition to the image of the empty square this icon of the events worked as a form of refusing the 
government that turned protesters, i.e., the mass of people, into a living sculpture with no alternative but to act 
as one. Regardless of anything else, the example gives witness to a form of figurative sculpture created by 
protesters against the order of power in place, with public visibility.  For more See William J.T. Mitchell, 
“Image, Space, Revolution: The Arts of Occupation” in Critical Inquiry, 8-32 
 
	 221	
subjects of composition.   
 
Furthermore, my proposal is based on an idea of representation seen in terms 
of construction, whereupon the body can be viewed as a heterogeneous 
concept that accepts the juxtaposition of different materials and procedures. 
Lastly, because the legitimacy of figurative sculpture as mode of thinking upon 
which we might rearticulate the political depends on the space where it can be 
realized, it stays hostage to a reconfigured public space. With these provisions, 
one might say that the task of composing a figure for a new type of heroism 
through the medium of sculpture might function as a platform for a nearly 
impossible compromise between imagination and reality, art and politics.  
At this point, I think I am done. I intimated that the reasons behind the 
evacuation of the human figure by minimal art are related to questions of truth. I 
have discussed how the hero departs from questions of truth and can be 
regarded as a conceit of figuration, and considered some of the theoretical and 
practical implications of the latter for composition. I concluded with a reflection 
on the combination of the hero and figurative sculpture, and how this challenges 









































































































18. João Gonçalves, Critical melancholia (2009)  















                          19. João Gonçalves, Where’s the rest of us? (2009) 
                             Plasterboard, wood, flag, steel, polyurethane, straps  
                             27x53x35 inches  












                              
                            20. João Gonçalves, Where’s the rest of us? (2009) 
                            Plasterboard, wood, flag, steel, polyurethane, straps                      
                            27x53x35 inches             






























21. João Gonçalves, Where’s the rest of us? (2009) 
Plasterboard, wood, flag, steel, polyurethane, straps  

















 22. João Gonçalves, Tactics for global variations – the internal horizon (2009)  
  Steel, cement fondue, styrofoam, high-visibility fabric, duck-tape  
  20x53x20 inches  










   
    23. João Gonçalves, Tactics for global variations – the internal horizon (2009)  
     Steel, cement fondue, styrofoam, high-visibility fabric, duck-tape  
     20x53x20 inches  











24. João Gonçalves, Maria Doroshenkova (2009) 
Steel, plaster 












                     25. João Gonçalves, Maria Doroshenkova (2009) 
                     Steel, plaster 
                     24x37x59 inches  














27. João Gonçalves, A material experience on the differences between sculpture and cinema (2011) 
Sports jacket, found mannequin, cardboard, polymer clay, acetate transparent prints, notice board 















                    28. João Gonçalves, A material experience on the differences between  
                    sculpture and cinema (2011) 
                    Sports jacket, found mannequin, cardboard, polymer clay,  
                    acetate transparent prints, notice board 
                    31x55x20 inches / variable 









              
 
                   29. João Gonçalves, A material experience on the the differences between  
                   sculpture and cinema (2011) 
                   Sports jacket, found mannequin, cardboard, polymer clay,  
                   acetate transparent prints, notice board 
                   31x55x20 inches / variable 



















The image on the next page is a visual rendition of a work that asks for a short 
explanation.  
 
The work brings together different materials and juxtaposes found objects with 
objects produced using contrasting procedures.  
 
The scale is close to that of the human body. As a reference, the figurative 
element identifiable in the image, is made of unfired clay and stands at an initial 
height of two metres. The image is proportional to reality.   
 
The work also includes a physical computing and hydraulic system, developed 
during this research project, and that gives the work a capacity to react to the 
presence of viewers according to two factors: the distance to the figurative 
element and the number of people found moving within a spatial perimeter 
defined around that element. The interaction of these two factors is translated 
into levels of water pulverization in the area immediately around and over the 
figure, which varies from an absent to an intense pulverization. The proximity to 
the work and a larger number of people means more intensity and vice-versa.  
 
A prolonged inactivity of the system will lead on to the clay drying out, fracture 
and at its limit, to the destruction of the figure. In turn, any excessive activity will 
lead to the clay dissolving to eventually disappear.  
 
I was interested in exploring the idea of figuration as a process, to consider 
ways of leading the very act of viewing to affect the physical conditions of the 
work, and inversely, in the potential of making viewers affected by what 
determines the possibility of the process of the work, e.g. the pulverization of 
water. In short, I was interested in producing a sculptural situation defined in 
terms of a constant negotiation between a changing audience and the 




30. João Gonçalves, Untitled (2014) 
clay, wood, steel, cement, aluminium, zinc, rubber, plastic boxes, electronic proportional valve, computer, web 
camera  
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